top of page

11. Heroes and Villains of the Modern Era: Political Scandals & Constitutional Conflict — Russian Election Interference, Impeachment, & Accountability

1 hour ago
43 min read

My Name is Walter Mondale:

Most people called me Fritz. I was born on January 5, 1928, in Ceylon, Minnesota, and grew up in small communities where people knew their neighbors and understood hard times. My father was a Methodist minister, and my mother taught music. During the Depression, helping a struggling family was a practical responsibility, not a campaign slogan. Those early years shaped my politics. I came to believe that government could help people get a fair chance—and that anyone entrusted with public power had an obligation to use it honestly.

 

Learning to Do the Work

Hubert Humphrey helped draw me into politics. His energy could fill a room; I generally preferred getting the work organized. I attended Macalester College and the University of Minnesota, served in the Army from 1951 to 1953, and earned my law degree in 1956. Along the way, I married Joan Adams, whose devotion to the arts brought a wonderful dimension to our family life. In 1960, I became Minnesota’s attorney general. We pursued fraud and defended consumers. A respectable name on an organization’s letterhead did not excuse taking advantage of the public.

 

Opening Doors in the Senate

When Humphrey became vice president, I was appointed to his Senate seat in December 1964. Washington offered plenty of opportunities to make speeches. Passing legislation required something more: patience, preparation, and enough colleagues willing to vote yes. I worked with Republican Senator Edward Brooke and others to advance fair housing legislation, enacted in 1968. A family’s race should not determine where it could buy or rent a home. I also worked on education and children’s needs. These were questions about what opportunity actually meant in an American household.

 

Making Power Answer Questions

In 1975, I served on the Church Committee, which investigated abuses by American intelligence agencies. We examined secret activities that had violated the rights of citizens, including the FBI’s campaign against Martin Luther King Jr. National security was a serious responsibility. So was obeying the Constitution. An agency could not be allowed to decide for itself that secrecy placed its conduct beyond examination. We needed effective intelligence services, but we also needed records, oversight, and officials who could be held responsible. That principle mattered regardless of which party occupied the White House.

 

A Vice President with a Job to Do

When Jimmy Carter selected me as his running mate in 1976, we discussed what the vice presidency could become. I wanted access to information and the opportunity to offer candid advice. Carter agreed. After we won, I received an office in the West Wing, participated in major discussions, and met regularly with the president. Our arrangement helped establish the working vice presidency that later administrations adopted. We faced inflation, energy problems, and the Iranian hostage crisis. In 1980, voters chose Ronald Reagan. The responsibility of governing included accepting their verdict.

 

The Campaign That Made History

In 1984, I sought the presidency myself. I chose Congresswoman Geraldine Ferraro as my running mate—the first woman nominated for vice president by a major American political party. I also told voters that reducing federal deficits would require higher taxes. That was hardly the easiest campaign promise to sell. Reagan won forty-nine states; I carried Minnesota and the District of Columbia. There was no difficulty interpreting that result. Still, an election defeat did not erase the importance of opening doors or the obligation to speak plainly about difficult choices.

Service, and One Last Reflection

I later served as ambassador to Japan from 1993 to 1996 and returned for a brief Senate campaign after Paul Wellstone’s death in 2002. Public service remained part of my life into my final years, which ended in April 2021 at ninety-three. Looking back, I owed the country honesty about my own failures as well. My early support for the Vietnam War was a grave mistake, and I deeply regretted it. Experience should teach a public servant some humility. Ask hard questions of your leaders, examine the evidence, and expect them to answer. I was never entitled to an exemption.

 

 

Russian Interference: What Needed Investigation? — Told by Walter Mondale

When Americans heard that Russia had interfered in their presidential election, two questions quickly became tangled together. What had the Russian government tried to do? And had any Americans knowingly helped it? Those questions required separate answers. Having served on the Church Committee, which investigated intelligence abuses, I understood why the government needed to examine foreign threats—and why investigators themselves needed supervision. A foreign government’s preference for a candidate did not prove that candidate had agreed to cooperate. Equally, a candidate’s denial could not settle what foreign intelligence officers had done. The evidence had to lead.

 

The Assessment Arrives

On January 6, 2017, the intelligence community released a declassified assessment prepared by the CIA, FBI, and National Security Agency. It concluded that Vladimir Putin had ordered an influence campaign intended to undermine confidence in American democracy, damage Hillary Clinton. It was nothing new but it was important to know. The agencies examined hacking, the release of stolen material, and propaganda. Their confidence levels differed on some judgments, between many intelligence agencies, meaning there was no consensus to their individual reports. The public version withheld sensitive supporting information. Crucially, the assessment did not determine whether Russian activities changed the election’s outcome. It was not a finding that Trump had conspired with Moscow or that American vote totals had been altered.

 

Comey Confirms the Investigation

Then came a consequential public hearing. On March 20, 2017, FBI Director James Comey confirmed that the bureau was investigating Russian interference, including possible links and coordination involving people associated with Trump’s campaign. The inquiry had begun in July 2016. Suddenly, a counterintelligence investigation—an inquiry into possible foreign threats—was openly part of the new presidency’s daily life. But announcing an investigation was not announcing guilt. Investigators needed to examine communications, interview witnesses, and compare accounts with records. Members of Congress and television commentators had a responsibility, too: they should not present unanswered questions as established crimes, though many on the political left laid judgement where there was none.

 

The Argument Trump’s Defenders Deserved to Make

Trump’s supporters argued that political opponents and parts of the media treated suspicion as a verdict. That objection deserved consideration. Looking ahead to Mueller’s 2019 report, his investigation did not establish that Trump campaign members conspired or coordinated with the Russian government in its election-interference activities. That was an important limit on what prosecutors could substantiate. Was the hundreds of millions of dollars wasted on these two investigations? Saying that nothing was proved about any Russian connections would go further than the evidence allowed. Investigators documented numerous contacts, including the June 2016 Trump Tower meeting after campaign officials were offered purported Russian government information damaging to Clinton. Though the Trump campaign said they were offered to buy sensitive information, they instead declined the offer and later reported the incidence.

 

Clinton’s Campaign Also Required Scrutiny

Fairness required examining politically funded allegations as well. Clinton’s campaign and the Democratic National Committee financed opposition research through their law firm and Fusion GPS. That work included reports compiled by former British intelligence officer Christopher Steele, drawing on a network of sources about Russia. Trump’s defenders reasonably questioned the reliability and political origins of those allegations. Serious claims in the dossier remained unverified or were undermined. Nevertheless, funding research was not itself proof that Clinton coordinated with the Kremlin’s election operation. The Justice Department inspector general later found that Steele’s reporting had not triggered the FBI investigation, while identifying serious errors and omissions in surveillance applications concerning Carter Page.

 

Obama’s Open Microphone—and One Standard for Everyone

Trump’s supporters also recalled March 2012, when an open microphone caught President Barack Obama telling Russian President Dmitry Medvedev that he would have greater flexibility after the election, during a discussion about missile defense. Medvedev said he would relay the message to Vladimir Putin. Critics questioned what concessions Obama might contemplate; the administration described difficult diplomatic negotiations. The exchange deserved scrutiny, but it did not establish an election-interference agreement. The same discipline should apply to Obama, Clinton, and Trump: identify what happened, investigate credible concerns, and distinguish political criticism from proven wrongdoing. A democracy needs both protection from foreign interference and protection against accusations outrunning the facts.

 

 

My Name is Ken Starr: Former Lawyer for Trump’s First Impeachment Fefense

I was born Kenneth Winston Starr on July 21, 1946, in Vernon, Texas, and grew up in San Antonio. My father was a barber and a minister. Faith, work, and responsibility were familiar subjects in our household. My education eventually took me to George Washington University, Brown University, and Duke University School of Law. In 1970, shortly before beginning law school, I married Alice Mendell. The law offered a compelling vocation: carefully examine the facts, understand the governing principles, and explain why a particular conclusion follows. Conviction mattered, but an attorney also needed to make his case.

 

Learning the Responsibilities of the Law

After law school, I clerked for federal appellate judge David Dyer and later for Chief Justice Warren Burger. Those positions brought me close to decisions with consequences far beyond a courtroom. In 1983, President Ronald Reagan appointed me to the federal appeals court in Washington. In 1989, I became solicitor general under President George H. W. Bush, representing the federal government before the Supreme Court. An advocate must anticipate difficult questions. A judge must weigh competing arguments. Serving in both roles gave me different perspectives on the same constitutional system.

 

An Investigation Reaches the White House

In 1994, a panel of federal judges appointed me independent counsel in the Whitewater investigation, which concerned an Arkansas real-estate venture associated with Bill and Hillary Clinton. Our responsibilities expanded through additional authorizations. Eventually, we investigated and found that President Clinton had lied under oath and obstructed justice concerning his relationship with Monica Lewinsky. My position was that a president’s testimony was subject to the law, just as another citizen’s would be. Critics argued that our investigation had become excessively intrusive and politically driven. Those disagreements became part of a national struggle over the proper limits of an independent prosecutor.

 

The Report and the Constitutional Process

In September 1998, we submitted a report to Congress describing evidence that we believed could provide grounds for impeachment. The House impeached President Clinton that December on charges of perjury and obstruction of justice. The Senate acquitted him in February 1999. These distinctions matter. An investigator presents evidence; the House determines whether to impeach; the Senate decides whether the charges warrant conviction and removal. My report did not itself remove a president. The episode also exposed a difficult question: how could the country investigate its chief executive without allowing the investigation to consume its political life?

 

Universities and a Different Kind of Accountability

I later became dean of Pepperdine University’s law school and, in 2010, president of Baylor University. Teaching and university leadership offered opportunities to work with students and discuss law, faith, and public service. But my Baylor presidency ended in controversy. An outside review found serious institutional failures in responding to reports of sexual assault, including cases involving football players. In 2016, Baylor’s regents removed me as president. I subsequently resigned as chancellor and left the faculty. The university’s handling of those reports raised questions about leadership and accountability that could not be answered by pointing to its other accomplishments.

 

Returning to an Impeachment Trial

In 2020, I joined President Donald Trump’s defense team during his first Senate impeachment trial. This time, I argued against removing a president. I warned that impeachment could become too frequent and too partisan, weakening its place as an extraordinary constitutional remedy. Critics saw a contradiction between that argument and my earlier investigation of Clinton. I maintained that the circumstances and constitutional questions required careful distinctions. The Senate acquitted Trump on both charges. My career had placed me on different sides of two presidential impeachment battles, and Americans would judge the consistency of my reasoning.

 

A Final Examination

My life ended on September 13, 2022, at seventy-six. Looking back, my record included judgments I defended and decisions I regretted. In my memoir, I expressed regret about taking on the Lewinsky portion of the investigation, while maintaining that I had faced no practical alternative. At Baylor, I publicly accepted responsibility as its leader, even while disputing what I had known about particular cases. Those qualifications did not erase the suffering involved. A fair examination of my life must include the people harmed, the criticisms raised, and the limits of my own judgment.

 

 

FBI Director Fired—Special Counsel Appointed — Told by Starr and Mondale

Starr: On May 9, 2017, President Donald Trump dismissed FBI Director James Comey. The decision immediately raised a constitutional question, but let us begin with a distinction: the president possessed the authority to remove the director. An FBI director’s ten-year term does not guarantee ten years in office. Trump said the bureau needed new leadership, and his administration pointed to recommendations from Attorney General Jeff Sessions and Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein. Whether the dismissal was wise, justified, or improperly motivated required further examination. The existence of presidential authority was only the starting point.

 

Mondale: And the circumstances made that examination unavoidable. Comey had publicly confirmed on March 20 that the FBI was investigating Russian election interference, including possible coordination involving individuals associated with Trump’s campaign. Now the president had removed the official leading that bureau. That did not prove Trump had committed a crime. It did create an obvious concern: could investigators examine matters involving a president’s associates without fearing consequences for their careers? Americans needed confidence that the investigation would continue wherever the evidence led, including toward findings favorable to the president.

 

The Case for Replacing Comey

Starr: Rosenstein’s memorandum provided substantive criticism of Comey’s handling of the Hillary Clinton email investigation. In July 2016, Comey had publicly announced the FBI’s recommendation against prosecution while criticizing Clinton’s conduct. Rosenstein argued that Comey had assumed a role belonging to prosecutors and improperly publicized damaging information about someone who was not being charged. He also criticized Comey’s October communication to Congress about newly discovered emails. Former Justice Department officials from both parties had objected to Comey’s actions. Trump’s defenders therefore had a serious argument: criticism of this director had existed well before his dismissal.

 

Mondale: Those criticisms were real, but they did not settle why Trump acted when he did. In a May 11 television interview, Trump said he had intended to dismiss Comey regardless of the recommendations. He also discussed the Russia controversy when explaining his thinking. Critics questioned whether the administration’s initial explanation told the whole story. Defenders maintained that Trump regarded the investigation as unfair and Comey as ineffective. A responsible inquiry had to examine the chronology and evidence rather than assume either explanation was complete.

 

Eight Days Later, a Special Counsel

Starr: On May 17, Rosenstein appointed Robert Mueller as special counsel. Sessions had recused himself from campaign-related investigations, leaving Rosenstein responsible for supervising this matter. Mueller, a former FBI director, was authorized to investigate Russian interference, possible links or coordination involving Trump campaign associates, and matters arising directly from that investigation. Rosenstein expressly emphasized that the appointment was not a determination that crimes had occurred. That point deserves attention. Appointing an investigator creates a process for reaching conclusions; it does not announce those conclusions in advance.

 

Mondale: Rosenstein’s stated purpose was to strengthen public confidence by giving the investigation a measure of independence from the ordinary chain of command. Removing Comey had not ended the FBI’s work, and Mueller would now oversee the inquiry. The arrangement addressed a difficult problem: the executive branch was investigating matters connected to the president who headed that branch. Investigators needed room to examine records, question witnesses, and pursue evidence without political interference. At the same time, the people being investigated retained their rights and deserved fair treatment.

 

Independence with Accountability

Starr: Mueller’s position differed from the independent counsel office I had held during the Clinton investigation. His appointment operated under Justice Department regulations, and he remained within that department. Those rules protected him from day-to-day supervision but required compliance with departmental policies. They also permitted removal by the responsible attorney general for specified reasons, including misconduct or other good cause. Independence was therefore substantial but bounded. Prosecutors wield enormous power. Requiring them to follow rules protects the legitimacy of their work as well as the people whose conduct they examine.

 

Mondale: The lesson, then, is that presidential authority and investigative independence both require safeguards. A president must be able to replace officials who perform poorly, but that power must not become a means of shielding wrongdoing. Investigators must pursue credible evidence, but suspicion must not become a substitute for proof. Comey’s dismissal and Mueller’s appointment brought these competing responsibilities into sharp focus. When you judge such a dispute, ask what authority existed, what reasons were offered, and what evidence supports those reasons. Apply those questions consistently, regardless of the president’s party.

 

 

My Name is Rush Limbaugh: Influential Conservative Broadcaster

Ladies and gentlemen, before there were millions of listeners, there was a boy in Cape Girardeau, Missouri, who wanted to be on the radio. I was born on January 12, 1951, into a family where the law was a serious business. My father was an attorney and a World War II veteran. But courtrooms were not calling my name. Microphones were. I would turn down the television during baseball games and supply the play-by-play myself. By high school, I was working at a local radio station. Imagine that: somebody would actually let me talk on the air.

 

Getting Fired Was Not the Final Chapter

I attended Southeast Missouri State University, but left to pursue broadcasting. As a young disc jockey, I used names such as Rusty Sharpe and Jeff Christie, playing records and learning how to keep an audience listening. Success did not arrive on schedule. I lost jobs. Stations changed direction. In 1979, I left radio and went to work in sales and promotions for the Kansas City Royals. Baseball was a wonderful business, but broadcasting still had my attention. Those early disappointments did not tell the whole story. They were simply the part before things started working.

 

Finding My Own Voice

In 1984, I arrived at KFBK in Sacramento, California. This time, I was talking politics under my own name. I mixed commentary with humor, impersonations, music, and an unmistakably conservative point of view. Government spending, taxes, liberal politicians—there was no shortage of material. I believed millions of Americans heard their convictions dismissed by prominent news organizations. I wanted to give those people a program that took their ideas seriously and entertained them along the way. A political argument could be lively. It could even be fun. Sacramento gave me the opportunity to prove it.

 

Taking the Show National

In August 1988, my syndicated program launched on fifty-six stations. Eventually, hundreds carried it. Listeners joined me in cars, offices, workshops, and kitchens. Some called themselves “Dittoheads,” a nickname associated with listeners expressing agreement and appreciation without repeating lengthy introductions. I called my operation the Excellence in Broadcasting Network. Modesty was not exactly the advertising strategy. My books, The Way Things Ought to Be and See, I Told You So, became bestsellers. I argued for limited government, free enterprise, and individual responsibility. Supporters heard someone saying what they believed; critics heard a broadcaster making political hostility worse.

 

When Hearing Became a Battle

In 2001, I suffered severe hearing loss. Consider that predicament: a radio broadcaster who could scarcely hear. A cochlear implant restored some hearing and helped me continue working, although listening was no longer the effortless experience it had been. Then, in 2003, I publicly acknowledged addiction to prescription pain medication and entered treatment. These were difficult personal realities behind the familiar voice. Nevertheless, the program continued. The relationship with my audience had become an enormous part of my life, and I wanted to remain at that microphone.

 

Standing with Donald Trump

Before Donald Trump was elected, it could be said that I was a ideological skeptic of his due to him not being a Conservative like myself, he was a Populist. It wasn’t until he took office and actually kept his promises to the U.S. citizens that I started to become a defender of his policies. I challenged his critics, and argued that established institutions, like the Congress, the media, and all those in power on their opposing side treated him unfairly. My listeners heard those arguments throughout the Russia investigation and his first impeachment. In February 2020, I announced that I had advanced lung cancer. The following evening, President Trump awarded me the Presidential Medal of Freedom during the State of the Union address, and First Lady Melania Trump placed it around my neck. I continued broadcasting during treatment. My life ended on February 17, 2021, at seventy.

 

 

Accountability for Veterans — Reforming the VA (2017) - Told by Rush Limbaugh

Folks, consider what the word “accountability” means to a veteran waiting for help. It means someone answers when a problem is ignored, misconduct goes uncorrected, or an employee fears reporting wrongdoing. On June 23, 2017, President Donald Trump signed the Department of Veterans Affairs Accountability and Whistleblower Protection Act. The legislation addressed a straightforward concern: VA leaders needed effective tools to discipline employees for misconduct or poor performance, while employees who exposed problems needed protection. Signing that reform was a concrete accomplishment for Trump—one that deserves attention alongside the controversies that dominated the headlines.

 

Republicans and Democrats Found Common Ground

This was also an achievement of bipartisan cooperation. Republican senators Johnny Isakson and Marco Rubio worked with Democratic senator Jon Tester on the legislation. They did not have to agree on every political question to agree that veterans deserved a department that functioned responsibly. Trump supplied the presidential signature, and Congress supplied the legislation. That is how our constitutional system is supposed to work when elected officials find common ground. Giving the president credit does not require removing the lawmakers from the story, any more than recognizing congressional cooperation requires overlooking the president’s contribution.

 

Giving Managers Tools to Act

The law expanded and streamlined the VA’s authority to remove, demote, or suspend covered employees for misconduct or poor performance. It shortened certain disciplinary timelines and changed procedures for reviewing those decisions. Supporters argued that lengthy processes could prevent managers from addressing serious problems promptly. But understand the distinction: authority to discipline an employee is not evidence that a particular employee deserves punishment. Supervisors still needed facts supporting their decisions. A department serves veterans poorly if it tolerates proven misconduct, and it also serves them poorly if capable employees can be punished on an unreliable accusation.

 

Protecting the People Who Speak Up

The law also established in statute the Office of Accountability and Whistleblower Protection, which Trump had previously created through an executive order. Its responsibilities included receiving disclosures and addressing certain allegations involving senior officials and retaliation. The legislation required whistleblower-protection training as well. Why connect those protections with stronger disciplinary authority? Because the person reporting a problem may be challenging a powerful supervisor. Without safeguards, a tool intended to punish misconduct could be turned against the employee exposing it. Protecting good-faith reporting helps managers discover problems that otherwise might remain hidden.

 

Fair Treatment Is Part of Accountability

Now, demanding better performance does not mean dispensing with fairness. The law retained notice, opportunities to respond, and avenues for review, although procedures differed by employee category and some deadlines became shorter. Those safeguards matter because an accusation can be mistaken, incomplete, or retaliatory. Employees must be able to answer the case against them, and disciplinary decisions should rest on evidence rather than personal hostility. The useful question is not simply whether firing someone became faster. It is whether the department could reach justified decisions promptly while preserving a meaningful opportunity to challenge errors.

 

When Implementation Fell Short

Here is where the story requires an honest assessment. In October 2019, the VA inspector general reported serious problems in the accountability office’s early operations. Investigations suffered from inadequate guidance and concerns about accuracy and thoroughness. Some referrals failed to protect whistleblowers’ identities appropriately, and insufficient safeguards exposed employees to possible retaliation. The report also recognized that new leadership, beginning in January 2019, had started making changes. VA agreed with all twenty-two recommendations. These findings did not erase the reform’s worthwhile goals; they showed that the office responsible for accountability needed accountability itself.

 

Measuring Success Beyond the Signing Ceremony

Trump and the bipartisan lawmakers deserve credit for giving the VA additional tools and protections. Whether those tools achieved their purpose must be judged through results. Counting dismissals alone cannot tell us whether veterans received better service or whether disciplinary decisions were fair. We should ask whether misconduct was substantiated, whether penalties were consistent, whether reporting employees were protected, and whether identified problems were corrected. A presidential signature begins the work. The enduring achievement comes when the department makes those promises real for veterans and the employees who serve them.

 

 

My Name is Carl Levin: Democratic senator and Committee Chair on Investigations

I was born in Detroit on June 28, 1934, into a Jewish family that took public responsibility seriously. My father was a lawyer who helped immigrants and people who could not afford representation. At dinner, my parents asked what we children thought about politics, and they listened to our answers. My brother, Sandy, and I learned that disagreement belonged in a family conversation. You could argue firmly without questioning someone’s worth. We also learned to appreciate America as a refuge for people escaping persecution. Those lessons stayed with me long after our dinner-table discussions became debates in Congress.

 

Learning Whom the Law Should Serve

After graduating from Swarthmore College in 1956 and Harvard Law School in 1959, I returned to Detroit to practice law. I married Barbara Halpern in 1961, and we raised three daughters. In 1964, I became the first general counsel of the Michigan Civil Rights Commission. Civil rights required more than admirable language. Someone had to examine complaints, establish facts, and insist that legal protections meant something in daily life. In 1969, Detroit voters elected me to the City Council, where I later served as president. Local government taught me to measure proposals by what they accomplished for people.

 

Taking Michigan to Washington

In 1978, Michigan elected me to the United States Senate. I began serving in January 1979 and remained for thirty-six years. I was a Democrat, and I believed government had an important role in protecting opportunity, workers, and the public interest. But representing Michigan also required practical judgment. A proposal did not become useful simply because my party supported it. Nor did a Republican idea become worthless because a Republican offered it. My responsibility was to study the consequences, explain my position, and find enough agreement to accomplish something.

 

The Question After the First Answer

Much of my work involved oversight: examining whether powerful institutions were doing what they promised. On the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, we studied financial misconduct, tax avoidance, and failures of government supervision. A hearing might attract television cameras, but the essential work usually happened beforehand, in documents and interviews. After the financial crisis, Republican Senator Tom Coburn and I led a bipartisan investigation that produced a detailed report in 2011. We examined risky lending, weak regulation, credit ratings, and investment banks. If an answer did not fit the documents, there needed to be another question.

 

Before Sending Americans to War

As chairman of the Armed Services Committee, I helped oversee military policy and spending. Supporting service members meant examining the decisions that could place them in danger. In 2002, I voted against the resolution authorizing war with Iraq and offered an alternative emphasizing action through the United Nations. That was an unpopular position with many voters, including during my reelection campaign. Nevertheless, a senator must sometimes distinguish between what is popular and what he believes is right. The responsibility becomes especially serious when the consequences include American lives and a war whose outcome cannot be promised.

 

Leaving Office Without Leaving the Work

I left the Senate in January 2015, but remained interested in strengthening legislative oversight. The Levin Center at Wayne State University Law School gave that work a continuing home, helping lawmakers and staff conduct investigations grounded in evidence and cooperation across party lines. In 2021, I published my memoir, Getting to the Heart of the Matter. That title described what I had tried to do throughout my career: move beyond prepared explanations and determine what actually happened. My life ended in Detroit on July 29, 2021, at eighty-seven.

 

The Standard Applies to Us, Too

Looking back, I would not ask you to assume that experience made every judgment of mine correct. Thirty-six years in the Senate could not provide that guarantee. Public servants should have the humility to recognize their limitations and reconsider when the evidence requires it. I was grateful to Michigan’s voters, to my colleagues and staff, and especially to Barbara and our family. If my example offers a useful lesson, let it be this: listen carefully, prepare thoroughly, and apply the same standards to your own side that you demand of the other. Accountability must include the person asking the questions.

 

 

Charges, Guilty Pleas, and “Witch Hunt” Debate — Told by Levin and Limbaugh

Levin: As Robert Mueller’s investigation produced charges in 2017 and 2018, Americans encountered a procession of unfamiliar legal terms. Indictments, guilty pleas, cooperation agreements—each meant something different. An indictment was an accusation requiring proof. A guilty plea was a defendant’s admission to a particular offense. Neither automatically established that President Trump had committed a crime. The first responsibility of a careful citizen was to ask what each case actually concerned. A headline mentioning a campaign associate and Russia could conceal important distinctions between financial misconduct, false statements, and allegations of election coordination.

 

Limbaugh: And those distinctions were precisely what Trump’s supporters wanted people to notice. Turn on the television, hear that another associate was in trouble, and you might think the central accusation against the president had already been proved. It had not. Trump called the investigation a “witch hunt,” arguing that political opponents were using it to undermine his presidency. I challenged its expanding scope and questioned whether prosecutors were pursuing unrelated wrongdoing to pressure people into providing evidence against him. Those were objections about the investigation’s methods and purpose, not proof that every defendant was innocent.

 

False Statements and Russian Contacts

Levin: Consider George Papadopoulos, a campaign foreign-policy adviser. In October 2017, he pleaded guilty to lying to the FBI about the timing and nature of contacts with people he understood to have Russian government connections. Then, in December, former national security adviser Michael Flynn pleaded guilty to making false statements about conversations with Russia’s ambassador during the presidential transition. These cases involved deception during an investigation. They were not guilty pleas to conspiring with Russia to steal the election. Nevertheless, misleading investigators about relevant contacts could obstruct their ability to establish what happened.

 

Limbaugh: But an admission to lying still did not answer the original election-conspiracy question. Supporters called such offenses “process crimes”—crimes involving the investigation itself—and questioned whether the inquiry was generating cases rather than proving its central suspicion. Flynn’s case later became particularly contentious: he sought to withdraw his plea, the Justice Department moved to dismiss the charge, and Trump pardoned him in November 2020. The court then dismissed the case because of that pardon. Students should know that later history without confusing a pardon with a trial verdict establishing innocence.

 

Money, Taxes, and the Meaning of Conspiracy

Levin: Paul Manafort’s and Rick Gates’s cases involved another category of wrongdoing. Their work for Ukrainian political interests brought financial dealings under scrutiny. Gates pleaded guilty in February 2018 to conspiracy against the United States and making false statements. In August, a jury convicted Manafort on eight tax, foreign-account-reporting, and bank-fraud counts. He later pleaded guilty in a separate case involving financial and lobbying misconduct and witness tampering. “Conspiracy against the United States” sounded dramatic, but here it concerned agreements to violate laws and obstruct government functions—not a conviction for joining Russia’s election operation.

 

Limbaugh: Exactly. Much of that conduct concerned business dealings predating Manafort’s leadership of Trump’s campaign. Trump’s defenders asked why an investigation into Russian election interference was prosecuting older financial offenses. Prosecutors answered that their authorized investigation covered these matters; critics questioned whether that scope had become excessive. The financial offenses were real legal matters, but they could not simply be relabeled proof against Trump. Nor did discovering misconduct mean that every investigative decision was beyond criticism. Investigators needed limits, and the public deserved an explanation of those limits.

 

What Cohen’s Plea Established—and What It Did Not

Levin: In November 2018, Trump’s former attorney Michael Cohen pleaded guilty to lying to Congress about a proposed Trump Tower project in Moscow. He had falsely described the negotiations as ending in January 2016, when they continued into June. That admission established deception about business discussions during the campaign; it did not establish an agreement to participate in Russian election interference. For investigators, however, accurate dates and communications mattered. Witnesses who hoped for reduced sentences required careful scrutiny, and their accounts needed corroboration through documents and other evidence.

 

Limbaugh: Then let us finish with the distinction that mattered most to Trump’s defenders. Mueller’s 2019 report did not establish that campaign members conspired or coordinated with the Russian government in its election-interference activities. That finding deserved clear reporting. It did not erase the crimes proved against particular individuals, just as those crimes did not establish the larger conspiracy allegation. Calling everything a “witch hunt” could not substitute for examining evidence; calling every charge proof of presidential guilt was equally careless. Read the charge, identify the finding, and insist that the conclusion fits the facts.

 

 

Michael Cohen Before Congress—Can a Witness Be Believed? — Told by Mondale

On February 27, 2019, Michael Cohen appeared before the House Committee on Oversight and Reform. For years, he had served as Donald Trump’s personal attorney and defended him fiercely. Now he was accusing the president of misconduct. There was an immediate complication: Cohen had already pleaded guilty to lying to Congress. Imagine being a student watching that hearing. Would you believe a witness who admitted deceiving the very institution questioning him? My experience investigating government misconduct taught me that this was the beginning of an inquiry, not its conclusion. Cohen’s history demanded skepticism, but each claim still required examination.

 

What His Earlier Lie Established

Cohen’s prior dishonesty concerned negotiations for a proposed Trump Tower in Moscow. In 2017, he had told Congress that the project ended in January 2016. In his November 2018 guilty plea, he admitted that discussions continued into June, well into the presidential campaign. That was an established falsehood, supported by his admission in court. It gave lawmakers a substantial reason to question his reliability. However, it did not logically establish that everything he subsequently said was false. Someone who has lied may later tell the truth; someone who apologizes may lie again. The task is to determine which statements the evidence supports.

 

A Check Enters the Record

Cohen brought documents rather than relying entirely on his account. Among them was a copy of a $35,000 check bearing Trump’s signature, dated August 1, 2017. Cohen said it was part of his reimbursement for a payment to Stormy Daniels intended to prevent disclosure of an alleged affair, which Trump denied. The check gave lawmakers something concrete to examine. Yet a document must be interpreted carefully. An authenticated check can establish its amount, date, and signatory; bank records can establish whether it cleared. By itself, it cannot explain every conversation, the complete purpose of a payment, or what someone understood about its legality.

 

Corroboration Means Checking Beyond the Witness

This is where corroboration becomes essential. Investigators should compare a witness’s account with records and information that do not depend solely on his word. In the payment matter, relevant evidence could include bank statements, invoices, accounting entries, communications, and testimony from others involved. Cohen also supplied financial statements while alleging that Trump manipulated descriptions of his wealth. Those documents provided material to investigate, but allegations about improper valuations required examination of the underlying assets, methods, and circumstances. Repeating a claim in several interviews does not create several independent sources. The question is whether separate evidence confirms the particular claim being tested.

 

Motive Matters, but It Does Not Decide Everything

Republicans challenged Cohen’s credibility, questioning whether resentment, publicity, or hopes of favorable treatment influenced him. Democrats emphasized his access to Trump and the documents he supplied. Both considerations were relevant. An insider may possess valuable knowledge while also having reasons to distort it. Representatives Jim Jordan and Mark Meadows subsequently referred alleged new false statements to the Justice Department. That referral was an accusation requiring evaluation, not a conviction. Likewise, Cohen’s testimony against Trump was evidence to assess, not an automatic verdict against the president. Objectivity requires applying that distinction consistently to the witness, his critics, and the person he accuses.

 

Knowing, Suspecting, and Proving

One especially important distinction arose when Cohen said he had no direct evidence that Trump or his campaign colluded with Russia, although he expressed suspicions. Neither side should stretch that statement. It did not prove a conspiracy, and it did not establish that no conspiracy could have occurred. It described the limits of Cohen’s knowledge. Direct observations, secondhand accounts, interpretations, and suspicions carry different evidentiary weight. Circumstantial evidence can also be powerful when independently verified. A congressional hearing helps identify questions and obtain information; it is not a criminal trial. Before accepting any dramatic accusation—or sweeping claim of vindication—ask what was observed, what was corroborated, and what remains uncertain.

 

 

The Mueller Report—Findings and Limits — Told by Ken Starr and Carl Levin

Starr: When the redacted Mueller report became public on April 18, 2019, Americans encountered more than four hundred pages of findings, testimony, and legal analysis. Many wanted a simple verdict. The report, however, addressed separate questions in two volumes. The first examined Russian election interference and possible coordination with Trump’s campaign. The second examined possible obstruction of justice by the president. Understanding that structure is essential. A conclusion about coordination with Russia did not automatically resolve whether someone improperly interfered with the investigation. Each question required its own evidence and legal analysis.

 

Levin: And the starting point was an attack on American democratic processes. Mueller documented Russian operations involving social media manipulation and the hacking and release of Democratic emails. Russian operatives posed as Americans online, while Russian military intelligence officers stole information that reached the public through several channels, including WikiLeaks. These were concrete activities investigators traced through records and communications. But identifying Russia’s actions did not establish that Americans had agreed to participate. Nor did the report determine that Russian interference changed the election’s outcome. Those distinctions prevented one finding from becoming a claim the investigation had not proved.

 

What the Investigation Did Not Establish

Starr: The central finding important to Trump’s defense was that the investigation did not establish that campaign members conspired or coordinated with the Russian government in its election-interference activities. That conclusion deserved plain acknowledgment. Mueller examined conspiracy law rather than treating the political catchword “collusion” as a specific criminal offense. His analysis of coordination required an agreement, whether explicit or understood. Russia wanting Trump to win, or campaign members welcoming damaging information about Clinton, did not by themselves establish such an agreement. Criminal accusations require more than political suspicion or overlapping interests.

 

Levin: Equally, that finding did not mean investigators discovered no contacts or evidence raising concerns. The report described numerous links and interactions, while explaining that some evidence was unavailable, incomplete, or affected by false statements. “Not established” must not be rewritten as “nothing happened.” Yet those limitations also cannot become permission to assume an unproved conspiracy. Investigators had to distinguish what the available evidence supported from what they could not determine. Citizens should do the same. Neither a troubling contact nor an unanswered question supplies every element necessary to prove a crime.

 

Why Obstruction Was a Separate Issue

Starr: Obstruction concerns improper interference with the administration of justice. In general, proving it requires more than showing that a president disliked an investigation or criticized investigators. The applicable offense requires particular elements, including wrongful intent. The report examined episodes involving Comey’s dismissal, efforts to have Mueller removed, and interactions with witnesses. Trump’s defenders argued that presidential authority, frustration with accusations, and alternative explanations for his conduct mattered. They also emphasized that Mueller had not established the underlying election conspiracy. Those arguments required consideration, even though the absence of that conspiracy did not automatically defeat an obstruction inquiry.

 

Levin: Consider the report’s account involving White House Counsel Don McGahn. Mueller found evidence that Trump directed McGahn to seek Mueller’s removal over alleged conflicts of interest; McGahn did not carry out that direction. Investigators also examined later efforts to have McGahn deny the account. These episodes raised questions about intent, evidence, and interference with the inquiry. The report explained that some efforts failed because aides refused instructions. A failed attempt can still warrant investigation, but describing evidence of possible obstruction is different from a court finding someone guilty.

 

Why Mueller Did Not Exonerate Trump

Starr: Mueller operated under Justice Department policy that prohibited indicting a sitting president. His office also considered it unfair to accuse someone who could not then resolve the accusation through a criminal trial. Consequently, Mueller did not make a conventional prosecutorial determination about whether Trump committed obstruction. Attorney General William Barr and Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein separately concluded that the evidence was insufficient to establish an obstruction offense. Their determination was significant, but it must be identified as their judgment—not presented as a conclusion Mueller himself reached.

 

Levin: Mueller also explained that, had investigators been confident the president clearly committed no obstruction, they would have said so. They could not reach that judgment. That is why the report did not exonerate Trump. It did not declare him guilty, either, and defendants are not required to prove their innocence. The responsible reading preserves all three conclusions: Russian interference was documented; campaign conspiracy with Russia was not established; and Mueller left the ultimate obstruction judgment unresolved. Before accepting anyone’s summary, ask which question they are answering—and whether their words accurately describe the report’s finding.

 

 

The Ukraine Call and the Whistleblower — Told by Mondale and Limbaugh

Mondale: On July 25, 2019, President Donald Trump spoke by telephone with Ukraine’s newly elected president, Volodymyr Zelensky. Ukraine was fighting Russian-backed forces and depended on American support. During the conversation, Zelensky mentioned purchasing additional American Javelin antitank weapons. Trump then requested assistance concerning a theory about the 2016 election and later asked about Joe Biden and his son. Biden was seeking the Democratic presidential nomination. Trump also suggested contact with his personal attorney, Rudy Giuliani, and Attorney General William Barr. The conversation raised a consequential question: was the president pursuing legitimate American interests or seeking political assistance?

 

Limbaugh: And that question required evidence, not an automatic assumption that mentioning a political opponent made the conversation improper. Trump’s stated position was that he wanted corruption investigated. Hunter Biden had served on the board of Burisma, a Ukrainian energy company, while his father was vice president and involved in American policy toward Ukraine. That arrangement deserved scrutiny for its potential conflicts of interest. Running for president should not place someone beyond legitimate investigation. But concerns about an arrangement and proof of criminal conduct are different things. The board position alone did not establish wrongdoing by Joe Biden.

 

The Assistance Already on Hold

Mondale: Before the call, the administration had placed a hold on approximately $391 million in congressionally approved security assistance. The hold became central to the controversy because Ukraine urgently needed American backing. Critics alleged that assistance and a possible White House meeting were being used to obtain announcements of investigations that would benefit Trump politically. The distinction between an investigation and a public announcement mattered: announcing an inquiry could damage an opponent even if investigators ultimately found no crime. Congress needed to establish who directed the hold, what conditions were communicated, and why.

 

Limbaugh: Trump denied using assistance to force a political favor. He defended scrutiny of corruption and also argued that European countries should contribute more to Ukraine’s support. His defenders emphasized that the call record contained no explicit statement exchanging military assistance for an investigation. Zelensky publicly said he had not felt pressured. Those points belonged in the evidence. However, Europe was already providing substantial assistance, and an absence of explicit bargaining language could not resolve every question about other communications. The strongest defense required examining the whole record, not simply repeating that the call was acceptable.

 

A Complaint Reaches the Inspector General

Mondale: On August 12, an intelligence-community whistleblower submitted a complaint alleging that Trump was using presidential authority to solicit foreign interference in the upcoming election. The complainant had not personally witnessed most of the events described and relied substantially on information from government officials. That limitation was disclosed. Inspector General Michael Atkinson examined the complaint and found it credible and urgent. Those findings warranted further inquiry; they did not establish every allegation as fact. A whistleblower complaint supplies information for investigators to test through documents and witnesses with direct knowledge.

 

Limbaugh: Trump and his supporters challenged the complaint’s accuracy, its secondhand material, and the possibility of political bias. Those were questions investigators could examine. But secondhand information is not automatically worthless, just as an official complaint is not automatically true. The proper response was to compare its claims with independent evidence. When the White House released its memorandum of the call, readers could assess an important part of the controversy for themselves. The document also carried a caution: it was a record prepared from officials’ notes and recollections, not a word-for-word recording.

 

From Withheld Assistance to an Inquiry

Mondale: The administration lifted the assistance hold on September 11, before Ukraine publicly announced the requested investigations. On September 24, House Speaker Nancy Pelosi announced an impeachment inquiry. The call memorandum became public the next day, followed by the whistleblower complaint on September 26. Democrats argued that the emerging evidence required investigating an abuse of presidential power. Republicans challenged the inquiry’s fairness and maintained that legitimate policy concerns explained Trump’s conduct. The release of assistance was relevant, but investigators still needed to determine the purpose and consequences of the earlier hold.

 

Limbaugh: And opening an impeachment inquiry did not establish guilt or remove the president. Trump’s defenders could reasonably insist on reliable witnesses, complete records, and consideration of explanations favorable to him. His critics could reasonably demand answers about why a political rival figured so prominently in the requests. Students should distinguish the established events—the call, hold, complaint, and release—from disputed conclusions about motive. The central question was whether presidential power served a legitimate public purpose or a personal electoral interest. Answering it required more than either side’s preferred slogan.

 

 

Who Investigates the Investigators? — Told by Ken Starr and Walter Mondale

The FBI Comes Under Examination

Starr: Investigators ask difficult questions, demand documents, and sometimes seek permission to conduct surveillance. But who examines their conduct? On December 9, 2019, Justice Department Inspector General Michael Horowitz released a report addressing that very question. His office reviewed the origins of the FBI’s Russia investigation and four surveillance applications concerning former Trump campaign adviser Carter Page. Its findings resisted a simple partisan slogan. The inspector general found sufficient grounds to open the investigation under FBI rules, while also uncovering serious failures in the applications used to obtain and renew surveillance authority.

 

Mondale: Those conclusions could coexist because they concerned different decisions. Opening an investigation asks whether available information justifies further inquiry. Obtaining a surveillance order requires satisfying additional legal standards. Neither decision gives investigators permission to ignore evidence that weakens their suspicions. From my experience on the Church Committee, I understood why intelligence work needed oversight. Secret investigations can protect the country, but secrecy also makes mistakes harder for the public to discover. Inspectors general examine agency records, interview officials, and report misconduct or deficiencies. Their purpose includes holding government institutions to their own rules.

 

Why the Investigation Began

Starr: The FBI opened Crossfire Hurricane on July 31, 2016, after receiving information from a friendly foreign government concerning campaign adviser George Papadopoulos. The information suggested that Russia might assist Trump’s campaign through the release of damaging information about Hillary Clinton. Horowitz concluded that this met the relatively low threshold for opening an investigation under departmental policy. His review found no documentary or testimonial evidence that political bias or improper motivation influenced that opening decision. He also determined that Christopher Steele’s reporting did not trigger the investigation; the team received it later.

 

Mondale: That finding did not prove the suspicions true. Investigations exist partly to determine whether initial information holds up. Nor did the finding establish that every subsequent action was appropriate. A useful comparison is a fire inspector who receives a credible report of smoke: there may be reason to investigate, but the inspector must still follow the rules when entering private property. Students should keep those stages separate. Justifying the first question does not justify every method used to answer it. Conversely, discovering later misconduct does not automatically establish that the original inquiry lacked grounds.

 

What the Surveillance Applications Left Out

Starr: The surveillance failures were substantial. Horowitz identified seventeen significant inaccuracies and omissions across the initial Carter Page application and its three renewals. Applications omitted information about Page’s previous relationship with another American government agency, including his reporting about contacts with Russian intelligence officers. They also failed to adequately present information undermining the reliability of Steele’s reporting. These were not merely spelling errors. The inspector general concluded that the applications made the evidence supporting probable cause appear stronger than it actually was. Officials reviewing them, and the court, lacked information necessary for an informed assessment.

 

Mondale: Surveillance proceedings make accuracy especially important because the target ordinarily has no representative present to challenge the government’s account when authorization is sought. The government therefore bears a serious obligation to present facts candidly. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court subsequently found that the government had breached that obligation in the Page applications and required explanations of corrective measures. The lesson extends beyond this case: investigators must actively consider evidence that contradicts their theory. An investigation becomes unreliable when officials collect supporting information while overlooking reasons they might be mistaken.

 

From Findings to Accountability

Starr: One failure led to a criminal case. Former FBI attorney Kevin Clinesmith pleaded guilty in August 2020 to making a false statement after altering an email concerning Page’s relationship with another government agency. He inserted language indicating that Page was “not a source” and forwarded it to an FBI supervisor before the final surveillance renewal. That admitted alteration was a specific, established offense. It demonstrated why accountability must reach individual conduct. It did not, by itself, establish that every investigator participated in a political conspiracy. Responsibility must be assigned according to evidence.

 

Mondale: Meaningful accountability also requires examining supervision, document verification, training, and whether corrective procedures actually work. Defenders of the investigation should acknowledge the surveillance failures; critics should acknowledge the inspector general’s finding about its opening. Neither conclusion cancels the other. Citizens need law enforcement capable of investigating foreign interference and powerful officials, while protecting people from inaccurate or misleading government applications. The practical question is whether investigators applied the same care to facts that weakened their case as to facts that strengthened it. That standard should remain constant, regardless of whose campaign is involved.

 

 

Opening Government Data — Citizens Check Government - Told by Limbaugh

Folks, imagine Washington announces that a government program is working wonderfully. There is a polished report, a confident spokesperson, and a chart pointing in the right direction. But how can you check the claim? You helped pay for that program. Shouldn’t you be able to examine the information behind its supposed success? On January 14, 2019, President Donald Trump signed the Foundations for Evidence-Based Policymaking Act. Its OPEN Government Data provisions strengthened requirements for making public federal data accessible and reusable. This was a constructive achievement: giving people outside Washington better opportunities to examine Washington’s work.

 

Cooperation That Deserves Recognition

The legislation emerged from bipartisan work in Congress and became law with Trump’s signature. That deserves recognition alongside the political battles of the period. Republicans and Democrats could disagree over which programs government should operate while supporting better information about their performance. The law also built upon earlier efforts to make federal data available; public access did not suddenly begin in 2019. What changed was the statutory framework governing how agencies organized, managed, and shared their data. Congress and the president helped turn open-government principles into continuing responsibilities for federal agencies.

 

Public Information Must Be Usable

Now, putting information online does not necessarily make it useful. Imagine trying to compare thousands of figures contained in scanned pictures of paper tables. You might see the numbers, but your computer could not readily sort them or calculate patterns. The law required public data assets to be machine-readable and strengthened requirements for open formats. In everyday language, that means providing information in forms that people can process and reuse without retyping every entry. It also required comprehensive agency data inventories and a federal catalog, helping users discover what information existed and where to find it.

 

Following the Evidence Beyond Washington

Consider what people could do with accessible data. A researcher might examine whether a public program reached the communities it was intended to serve. A journalist could compare an agency’s promises with its reported performance. A business might use transportation or economic data to evaluate a location or develop a service. Citizens could investigate trends affecting their neighborhoods and bring better-informed questions to elected officials. These are examples of what open information makes possible, rather than proof that this particular law immediately produced each result. Its value lies partly in allowing people outside government to ask questions officials might never have considered.

 

Making Agencies Responsible for Their Information

The legislation also required agencies to designate chief data officers with responsibilities for managing and improving the use of data. That matters because reliable public information requires work long before anyone downloads it. Agencies must know what they collect, how it is organized, and whether people can understand its meaning. The broader law strengthened planning for evidence building and program evaluation. A department should be able to explain what it hopes to accomplish and how it will assess progress. Still, assigning responsibilities does not guarantee excellent performance. Implementation requires staffing, useful guidance, and continued oversight.

 

Transparency Without Exposing Private Lives

Opening government data does not mean publishing everything in a federal file. Agencies hold personal information, confidential business material, and information involving national security. The law preserved applicable privacy, confidentiality, security, and other disclosure protections. That distinction is essential. Citizens should be able to scrutinize government without having their own protected records exposed. Even removing names may not eliminate every privacy risk if different datasets can be combined to identify individuals. Responsible transparency requires judgment about what can lawfully be released and how to make it useful without compromising those protections.

 

The Numbers Still Need Questions

Here is the final challenge: access to data does not automatically produce a sound conclusion. If conditions improve after a program begins, that alone does not prove the program caused the improvement. Readers must examine definitions, missing information, comparisons, and competing explanations. Trump and Congress deserve credit for strengthening the tools available for that work. Whether those tools fulfill their promise depends on the quality and accessibility of the information agencies provide. For citizens, the opportunity is practical: move beyond accepting a political claim and ask what evidence supports it—regardless of which party occupies the White House.

 

 

Impeachment, Trial, and Acquittal — Told by Ken Starr and Carl Levin

The House Makes Its Accusation

Levin: On December 18, 2019, the House of Representatives impeached President Donald Trump on two articles: abuse of power and obstruction of Congress. The first alleged that he used presidential authority to pressure Ukraine into announcing investigations that would benefit him politically. The second alleged that he directed an unprecedented refusal to cooperate with the House inquiry, blocking documents and testimony. The House approved the articles largely along party lines. These were formal constitutional accusations, however, not criminal convictions. Trump remained president because the Constitution assigns the decision about conviction and removal to a different chamber.

 

Starr: That distinction is fundamental. The House has the sole power of impeachment, exercised through a majority vote. The Senate has the sole power to try impeachments, and conviction requires two-thirds of the senators present. When a president is tried, the chief justice presides; Chief Justice John Roberts performed that role in Trump’s trial. House members called managers presented the accusations, and the president’s attorneys answered them. I served on that defense team. Impeachment began the process of deciding whether removal was justified; it did not accomplish removal by itself.

 

Abuse of Power or Legitimate Policy?

Levin: House managers argued that Trump had placed personal political interests above national responsibilities. They pointed to the withheld security assistance, the proposed White House meeting, and requests involving Joe Biden and the 2016 election. Their argument was that presidential powers, even when ordinarily lawful, could be abused for an improper purpose. They also maintained that impeachable misconduct need not match a particular federal criminal statute. The constitutional phrase “high Crimes and Misdemeanors,” they argued, included serious abuses of public trust that threatened the integrity of elections.

 

Starr: The defense disputed both the interpretation of events and the constitutional case for removal. We argued that Trump had legitimate concerns about corruption and foreign assistance, that the evidence did not establish the alleged bargain, and that Ukraine received the assistance without publicly announcing the requested investigations. We also challenged the breadth of the House’s abuse-of-power theory. My own presentation warned against making presidential impeachment a recurring instrument of partisan conflict. House managers answered that an approaching election could not excuse misconduct allegedly intended to influence that election. Those competing arguments required senators to judge both facts and constitutional standards.

 

Obstruction and the Battle for Evidence

Levin: The obstruction-of-Congress article concerned the House’s ability to investigate. Managers argued that Trump’s categorical resistance prevented Congress from obtaining testimony and records necessary to examine his conduct. The defense answered that the executive branch could raise constitutional objections to congressional demands and that the House had moved forward without completing court battles over disputed subpoenas. This was a conflict between branches with separate responsibilities. Executive confidentiality has a place in government, but Congress also needs information to exercise oversight and its impeachment authority.

 

Starr: The Senate then faced a practical question: should it seek additional evidence? House managers wanted witnesses, particularly former national security adviser John Bolton, and additional documents. Supporters argued that firsthand testimony could clarify disputed presidential decisions. Opponents argued that the House should have completed its investigation before sending the articles and that new disputes over privilege could prolong the trial. On January 31, senators voted 49–51 against permitting motions to subpoena witnesses or documents. No witnesses appeared during the Senate trial, although senators had the House’s existing testimony and documentary record.

 

The Verdict—and Its Limits

Levin: On February 5, 2020, the Senate acquitted Trump on both articles. On abuse of power, forty-eight senators voted guilty and fifty-two voted not guilty. Republican Mitt Romney joined all forty-seven members of the Democratic caucus in voting to convict on that article. On obstruction of Congress, the vote was forty-seven guilty and fifty-three not guilty. With all one hundred senators participating, conviction required sixty-seven votes. Neither article approached that threshold, so Trump remained in office.

 

Starr: Acquittal resolved the constitutional question before the Senate: Trump would not be convicted and removed on those articles. It did not erase the House’s impeachment, nor did it establish that every senator voting to acquit approved every presidential action. Senators could differ over the facts, the seriousness of the conduct, or whether removal was warranted. Students should therefore distinguish accusation, impeachment, conviction, and removal. The House formally accused; the Senate tried the charges and acquitted. Understanding those separate steps explains how a president can be impeached yet continue serving.

 

 

The Senate’s Russia Findings — Told by Carl Levin and Rush Limbaugh

Three Years of Investigation

Levin: On August 18, 2020, the Senate Intelligence Committee released the final volume of its investigation into Russian interference in the 2016 election. More than three years of work had produced five volumes, drawing on interviews with more than 200 witnesses and over a million pages of documents. This was a Republican-led committee conducting a bipartisan investigation. Its task extended beyond asking whether anyone committed a crime: senators wanted to understand how a foreign government tried to influence an American election and where American institutions were vulnerable.

 

Limbaugh: But millions of Americans were asking another question: after all those years, where was the proven Trump–Russia conspiracy? Special Counsel Robert Mueller’s separate investigation had not established that members of Trump’s campaign conspired or coordinated with the Russian government in its election interference. Republican senator Marco Rubio emphasized that the Senate investigation had found no evidence of campaign collusion. Trump’s defenders considered that a powerful answer to accusations that had overshadowed his presidency. An allegation repeated on television does not become an established fact simply because people hear it every evening.

 

Connections Are Not Automatically Conspiracies

Levin: That distinction matters, Rush, but so does another: failing to establish a criminal conspiracy is different from finding no connections. The Senate documented campaign chairman Paul Manafort’s sharing of internal campaign information with Konstantin Kilimnik, whom the committee identified as a Russian intelligence officer. It described Manafort’s access and relationships as a serious counterintelligence threat. Those findings were grounds for concern, but the committee also identified gaps in its knowledge. We should neither erase documented contacts nor assume those contacts prove every allegation made against Trump personally.

 

Limbaugh: And we must not turn the word “threat” into a guilty verdict. Counterintelligence investigators look for vulnerabilities—information someone could obtain, influence someone might exercise, or relationships someone could exploit. Criminal prosecution asks whether evidence supports the elements of a particular offense, with conviction requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The public deserved to hear that distinction clearly. Suspicious circumstances can justify questions without establishing that a president entered a criminal agreement with a foreign government. Trump’s supporters had legitimate grounds to challenge anyone who blurred that boundary.

 

What Did Taxpayers Pay?

Levin: The cost requires careful bookkeeping. The Justice Department’s final accounting for Mueller’s investigation listed approximately $15.97 million in direct and reimbursed expenditures, plus about $15.55 million in supporting departmental costs—roughly $31.5 million combined. That accounting included closing adjustments through February 2020, although Mueller’s office closed in May 2019. Those figures concern the special counsel’s work, not the Senate committee’s separate three-year inquiry. The records consulted here do not establish a separate Senate total, so we cannot honestly label $31.5 million the cost of the Senate report.

 

Limbaugh: Even with that distinction, taxpayers can reasonably question the expense. From the perspective of Trump’s defenders, years of investigation and political controversy failed to establish the central conspiracy allegation while consuming money, attention, and public trust. They argued that Democrats exploited the investigation to weaken an elected president and that the costs outweighed the benefits. That is a serious political criticism worth examining. But calling the entire enterprise a waste is a judgment about its value, rather than a conclusion established merely by its price tag.

 

What Was Proven—and What Was Not

Levin: The committee documented Russian interference and vulnerabilities worth addressing. Its work did not establish that Russia determined the election’s winner or controlled the Trump administration. Yet those limits do not demonstrate that interference had no effects. Nor does political exploitation of an investigation prove that investigating foreign interference served no legitimate purpose. Republicans helped direct this inquiry and supported its factual report. To describe the entire effort as exclusively a Democratic operation would leave those facts out of the story.

 

Limbaugh: Then students should demand precision from every side. Trump’s critics cannot treat unanswered questions as convictions, and his defenders cannot substitute “no connections” for “no established criminal conspiracy.” Readers may conclude that the investigations were too costly, that politicians exaggerated their findings, or that identifying foreign threats justified the work. The test is whether they can support that conclusion with evidence. Taxpayers deserve accountability from investigators as well as presidents—and an honest account of what their money established, what it failed to establish, and what remained unknown.

 

 

Pardons and Presidential Accountability — Told by Ken Starr and Rush Limbaugh

The Power to Forgive

Starr: As Donald Trump’s first presidency approached its end, three familiar names appeared in announcements of presidential clemency: Michael Flynn, Roger Stone, and Paul Manafort. Their cases raised a question older than this administration: when a president forgives an ally, is he correcting injustice or rewarding loyalty? Article II gives presidents broad authority to pardon federal offenses. A commutation reduces punishment; a pardon provides broader forgiveness. Neither requires approval from Congress. But possessing constitutional authority does not settle every question about the judgment behind its use.

 

Limbaugh: And the president’s defenders had a question of their own: what happens when they believe the prosecution itself was unfair? Trump portrayed the Russia investigation as a politically motivated campaign against his presidency. His administration described these men as victims of excessive or unjust prosecution. Supporters therefore viewed clemency as protection against what they considered the political use of legal proceedings—often called “lawfare.” That was their argument. To understand the controversy honestly, students must examine both that claim and what each defendant actually admitted or was convicted of doing.

 

Michael Flynn: Ending an Unfinished Case

Starr: Flynn, Trump’s first national security adviser, pleaded guilty in December 2017 to lying to the FBI about conversations with Russia’s ambassador during the presidential transition. He later sought to withdraw his plea. In May 2020, the Justice Department moved to dismiss the prosecution, disputing the investigation’s basis and the materiality of his statements. The judge had not granted that request when Trump pardoned Flynn on November 25. The pardon ended Flynn’s exposure under its terms, but it was not a court judgment establishing that he had told the truth.

 

Limbaugh: The White House’s explanation was direct: Trump believed Flynn should never have been prosecuted. From the supporters’ perspective, even the Justice Department’s request for dismissal had failed to bring the ordeal to an immediate end. Flynn’s pardon also covered a broad range of potential offenses connected with the special counsel’s investigation. That offered protection against later federal prosecution for covered past conduct, including after Trump left office. Still, we should distinguish that practical protection from an unsupported claim that Trump knew precisely what future prosecutors would attempt.

 

Roger Stone and Paul Manafort: Different Crimes, Similar Arguments

Starr: Stone’s case followed a different path. A jury convicted him in November 2019 of obstructing a congressional investigation, five counts of false statements, and witness tampering. He received a forty-month prison sentence. Trump commuted his sentence on July 10, 2020, and pardoned him on December 23. The administration alleged unfair treatment and potential juror bias; the trial judge had rejected Stone’s request for a new trial. These were competing assessments of an actual prosecution. Stone’s convictions concerned interference with an investigation, rather than an established criminal conspiracy with Russia.

 

Limbaugh: Manafort, Trump’s former campaign chairman, also received a pardon on December 23. His convictions involved financial crimes, while a separate guilty plea included conspiracy against the United States and conspiracy to obstruct justice. They were not convictions for conspiring with Russia to influence the election. Trump’s White House argued that Manafort had suffered prosecutorial overreach and harsh treatment. Supporters saw an investigation pursuing associates through other offenses after failing to establish the central election-conspiracy allegation. Critics answered that independently proven crimes remained serious, regardless of how investigators discovered them.

 

Protection, Loyalty, and the Limits of Clemency

Starr: Here is the constitutional distinction students should remember: a president may pardon past federal offenses before charges are filed, but cannot authorize future crimes. A presidential pardon also does not erase state criminal liability or prevent impeachment. Nor does it automatically erase the historical record or establish innocence. Critics worried that pardoning close associates could encourage people to expect protection for loyalty. That concern deserves scrutiny, but alleging an improper bargain requires evidence; friendship and political association alone do not prove one.

 

Limbaugh: And defending these pardons requires the same discipline. Trump publicly presented them as remedies for injustice, and supporters believed he needed to protect people targeted because of their association with him. The protection could outlast his presidency. But saying every prosecution was political, or that future persecution was certain, goes beyond what those facts establish. The enduring question is whether clemency corrected unfairness or granted favored treatment. Students should test both arguments against the records—and ask whether they would apply the same standard to a president from the other party.

 

 
 
 

Comments


Featured Posts
Check back soon
Once posts are published, you’ll see them here.
Recent Posts
Archive
Search By Tags
Follow Us
  • Facebook Basic Square
  • Twitter Basic Square
  • Google+ Basic Square
bottom of page