7. Heroes and Villains of the Modern Era: America’s War on Terror Continues — Osama bin Laden, the Arab Spring, ISIS, and Middle Eastern Instability (2009–2016)

My Name is Dianne Feinstein: A Life of Service and Difficult Decisions

I was born in San Francisco on June 22, 1933, and I devoted much of my life to serving California. My father was a surgeon, and I grew up understanding the importance of preparation, discipline, and responsibility. At Stanford University, I studied history and graduated in 1955. Women had few places at the highest levels of government, but I saw no reason that public service should belong principally to men. Government made decisions affecting every family. Women needed a voice in those decisions.

The Day My City Changed

I won election to San Francisco’s Board of Supervisors in 1969. Local government taught me that leadership means dealing with practical problems, listening carefully, and making decisions people may strongly oppose. Then, on November 27, 1978, former supervisor Dan White assassinated Mayor George Moscone and Supervisor Harvey Milk. I found Harvey after the shooting and announced the deaths to a stunned public. As president of the board, I became acting mayor and was subsequently chosen to complete Moscone’s term. Grief was everywhere, but the city still needed someone to lead.

Leading Through Crisis

I became San Francisco’s first woman mayor and served until 1988. My responsibilities included public safety, city finances, housing, and the growing AIDS crisis. People needed medical care and a government willing to respond. I also worked to restore our deteriorating cable car system, a project that required cooperation and substantial funding. I believed that a mayor should understand the details. A speech could identify a problem, but budgets, negotiations, and persistent work were what allowed us to address it.

Taking California to Washington

After losing the California governor’s race in 1990, I ran for the United States Senate and won in 1992. I entered a chamber where women remained a small minority. I helped secure passage of the 1994 federal assault weapons ban and championed the California Desert Protection Act. Those battles involved sharply different convictions about rights, safety, and public land. My approach was to prepare thoroughly, defend my position, and find enough common ground to pass legislation. Working across party lines was part of the job.

Security Requires Accountability

In 2009, I became the first woman to chair the Senate Intelligence Committee. We examined threats most Americans could not see and oversaw agencies entrusted with extraordinary powers. The 2011 operation against Osama bin Laden demonstrated the importance of patient intelligence work. Yet protecting the country also required examining misconduct. I led the effort to investigate the CIA’s detention and interrogation program and release its findings in 2014. I supported strong intelligence capabilities, but I believed national security demanded lawful conduct and meaningful congressional oversight.

The Record I Leave Behind

I served until my death on September 29, 2023, at ninety years old. My final years brought serious questions about my health and ability to fulfill my responsibilities. My positions on surveillance, national security, and other issues also drew criticism throughout my career. A public servant’s record deserves scrutiny, including the decisions that disappointed people or failed to achieve their purpose. I would ask students to examine mine honestly: consider what I accomplished, question my judgments, and remember that holding public office means remaining accountable to the people.

A New President, an Unfinished Fight (2009–2010) - Told by Dianne Feinstein

When Barack Obama became president in January 2009, he inherited a campaign against al-Qaeda that had already lasted more than seven years. Osama bin Laden remained at large, and militants operated from difficult terrain along the Afghanistan–Pakistan border. That same month, I became chair of the Senate Intelligence Committee. Our responsibility was to examine the agencies collecting information about these threats and conducting secret operations. A new president could change policies immediately, but dismantling terrorist networks required patient work. We needed to know who was planning attacks, where they were operating, and whether the information reaching Washington was reliable.

The Expanding War Above Pakistan

President Obama expanded the drone campaign begun under President George W. Bush. Remotely piloted aircraft watched suspected militant locations and launched missiles against selected targets, particularly in Pakistan’s tribal areas. Reported strikes increased sharply during 2009 and reached their highest annual level in Pakistan in 2010. Supporters argued that drones could reach dangerous individuals in places where sending American troops would create substantial risks. But a camera could show a vehicle or a building while leaving crucial questions unanswered. Identifying the people inside depended on intelligence that could be incomplete or mistaken.

The Families Beneath the Aircraft

Civilian casualties became a central controversy. Officials emphasized the campaign’s effectiveness against militants, while journalists, researchers, and local residents reported deaths among people who were outside the fighting. Estimates differed considerably because access to strike locations was dangerous and the government disclosed little about individual operations. For an oversight committee, those uncertainties demanded attention. How had a target been identified? What evidence supported the decision? How were deaths investigated afterward? A successful strike against a terrorist could still leave families mourning innocent relatives, and that suffering could deepen hostility toward the United States.

A Passenger Plane Exposes the Gaps

Then came Christmas Day 2009. Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab attempted to detonate explosives aboard Northwest Airlines Flight 253 as it approached Detroit. The plot, linked to al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, showed how the threat extended beyond Pakistan. Our committee investigated and identified fourteen intelligence failures. Agencies possessed information that, handled properly, might have exposed the danger before he boarded. Collecting enormous amounts of information accomplished little if important warnings failed to reach the right people. We needed analysts and agencies to connect evidence, share it, and act on it.

What Congress Needed to Know

Secrecy could protect sources and operations, but it also made independent scrutiny essential. In March 2009, our committee began reviewing the CIA’s detention and interrogation program, including whether the agency had accurately informed Congress and other government officials about its activities. That investigation concerned a different part of counterterrorism, yet it raised questions relevant across intelligence work. Could policymakers trust the explanations they received? Did claimed results withstand examination? By the end of 2010, Obama’s administration was placing greater pressure on terrorist networks, while Congress faced the continuing responsibility of examining the methods, evidence, and human consequences of that campaign.

My Name is Jamal Khashoggi: A Saudi Journalist’s Search for an Open Society

I was born in Medina, Saudi Arabia, in 1958. My country was changing rapidly as oil wealth transformed its cities and its relationships with the world. I traveled to the United States to study at Indiana State University, graduating in 1982. Living abroad gave me another society to observe, but Saudi Arabia remained central to my interests. I wanted to understand where our country was going and how ordinary people could participate in decisions shaping their lives. Journalism became my way of pursuing those questions.

Following the Story Across Borders

My reporting took me to Afghanistan, Algeria, Sudan, Lebanon, and other places where political ambitions and religious convictions collided. I covered the Afghan war and the Gulf War, writing for Saudi and Arab newspapers. To understand political movements, a journalist must listen carefully to what their leaders promise and examine what their followers actually do. Reporting across the region taught me how difficult that work could be. Governments offered official explanations, opposition movements offered their own, and the reporter had to investigate the people and events behind both.

An Editor Tests the Boundaries

In 2003, I became editor of Al-Watan, a Saudi newspaper that opened space for debate about our society. Within two months, I lost the position. I subsequently worked as a media adviser to Prince Turki al-Faisal during his diplomatic service in London and Washington. I knew the Saudi establishment from within and believed reform was possible. Returning to Al-Watan in 2007 gave me another opportunity to encourage discussion, but my second period as editor ended in 2010 amid controversy over the newspaper’s editorial direction. Opening a newspaper to difficult questions carried consequences.

A Television Station Falls Silent

I next helped develop Al-Arab, an Arabic television news channel based in Bahrain. When it began broadcasting in 2015, we hoped to offer viewers a place for serious reporting and discussion. Authorities stopped its broadcasts within hours. Years of preparation had met a government’s power to silence a newsroom. Experiences like this strengthened my concern about the limits placed on public debate. How could citizens judge their leaders’ decisions when journalists could lose their platforms for allowing uncomfortable voices to be heard?

Writing From Abroad

In 2017, I moved to the United States and began contributing to The Washington Post. From abroad, I criticized repression in Saudi Arabia and argued for greater freedom across the Arab world. Distance gave me room to write, although it also separated me from home. My final column called for freedom of expression and greater access to information throughout the region. I believed people needed opportunities to discuss their circumstances openly and to challenge decisions that affected their futures. A government could announce reform, but citizens also needed the freedom to examine its results.

The Door in Istanbul

On October 2, 2018, I entered the Saudi consulate in Istanbul to obtain documents needed for my marriage to Hatice Cengiz. Saudi agents killed me inside. I was sixty years old. Looking back across my life, I would ask students to examine my judgments as carefully as my arguments. My years close to powerful people deserve scrutiny alongside my later criticism of them. A journalist’s responsibility includes reconsidering his own assumptions. The freedom I wanted for others also required accepting their right to question me.

Arab Spring Begins—Tunisia and Egypt - Told by Jamal Khashoggi

The Arab Spring begins with a question that rulers had avoided for years: what happens when people no longer accept the conditions under which they live? As a Saudi journalist, I followed societies where young people struggled to find work while well-connected families enjoyed wealth and influence. In Tunisia and Egypt, corruption made opportunity seem dependent on whom you knew. Political repression made challenging those arrangements dangerous. People wanted employment, but they also wanted dignity, fair treatment, and a voice in their future. Beneath the appearance of stability, frustration had been accumulating for years.

A Street Vendor and a Nation’s Grievances

On December 17, 2010, municipal officials confiscated goods from Mohamed Bouazizi, a young street vendor in Sidi Bouzid, Tunisia. After his confrontation with local authorities, he set himself on fire in protest and later died on January 4. His suffering drew attention to grievances that many Tunisians recognized: official harassment, economic hardship, and the difficulty of obtaining justice. Demonstrations spread beyond his hometown. Lawyers, workers, students, and other citizens joined the movement. Security forces used deadly violence, but repression failed to silence the growing demand for change. A local confrontation had become a national crisis.

The President Who Could Be Removed

President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali had governed Tunisia since 1987. His government restricted political opposition and the press, while his family’s privileges intensified public resentment. As demonstrations expanded, promises of reform failed to restore confidence. On January 14, 2011, he fled to Saudi Arabia. Consider what that meant to people watching elsewhere: a ruler who had appeared firmly established had been forced from power by pressure from the streets. Tunisians still faced the difficult work of rebuilding their government, but their uprising had changed what millions of Arabs believed was possible.

Egypt Fills the Streets

On January 25, Egyptians began major demonstrations against the government of Hosni Mubarak, who had held the presidency since 1981. Years of emergency rule, police abuse, corruption, and economic frustration gave protesters powerful reasons to act. Cairo’s Tahrir Square became the uprising’s best-known gathering place, while demonstrations also spread through other cities. Social media helped organizers communicate, and television carried images across borders, but people themselves sustained the protests. They returned despite arrests, tear gas, and violence. Workers, young activists, and Egyptians with different religious and political outlooks joined in demanding that Mubarak leave.

Eighteen Days—and an Uncertain Beginning

On February 11, after eighteen days of protests, Mubarak stepped down, and authority passed to Egypt’s Supreme Council of the Armed Forces. Crowds celebrated, but removing a president did not automatically establish democracy. The army remained powerful, and citizens disagreed about the country’s next steps. For me, the uprisings demonstrated the importance of allowing Arab societies to debate their futures openly. People needed independent journalism, accountable institutions, and protection for peaceful disagreement. Tunisia and Egypt had shown that rulers could fall. The greater challenge was building governments that would listen after the crowds went home.

My Name is Marie Colvin: Reporting the Human Cost of War

I was born on January 12, 1956, in New York and grew up in Oyster Bay on Long Island. At Yale University, I studied English and wrote for the student newspaper. Journalism offered something that appealed to me immediately: the chance to go somewhere, ask questions, and discover what was actually happening. After graduating in 1978, I eventually joined United Press International. Local reporting came before foreign assignments. Whatever the location, the work required curiosity, persistence, and facts that could withstand examination.

Finding the People Behind the War

I became a foreign correspondent and joined Britain’s Sunday Times in the 1980s. My assignments took me across the Middle East and into conflicts in the Balkans, Chechnya, and Africa. I interviewed leaders, including Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi, but official explanations were only part of the story. I wanted to find the families living beneath the bombardment. Who had disappeared? Where could people find water? What happened when the hospital ran out of supplies? Those questions brought a distant war into focus for readers who might otherwise turn the page.

Refusing to Leave East Timor

In 1999, violence swept through East Timor after its people voted for independence from Indonesia. Civilians sought protection inside a United Nations compound while armed groups threatened the surrounding area. I stayed with other journalists when evacuation would have taken us to safety. Women and children remained inside, and our reporting helped keep international attention on their danger. They were eventually evacuated. Journalists cannot assume that a report will save anyone, but in East Timor, our presence and the stories we sent out mattered.

Losing an Eye, Continuing the Work

In Sri Lanka in 2001, I traveled into territory held by Tamil rebels to report on people whose circumstances were difficult for outsiders to witness. During that assignment, an explosion wounded me, and I lost the sight in my left eye. Afterward, I wore the black eye patch that many readers came to recognize. Recovery was painful, and war left injuries beyond those anyone could see. Still, I returned to reporting. The people living through these conflicts remained there after visiting journalists went home. Their experiences deserved to be recorded.

The Road to Homs

When uprisings spread across the Arab world in 2011, I reported from places where demands for change met violence. In February 2012, I entered the besieged Syrian city of Homs with photographer Paul Conroy. In the Baba Amr district, civilians sheltered from shelling, and medical workers struggled to treat the wounded. I reported what I witnessed, including the death of a young child. Descriptions of military operations could not adequately explain what was happening inside those rooms. Readers needed to understand that ordinary families were enduring the bombardment.

What Bearing Witness Cost

On February 22, 2012, shelling struck the building serving as our makeshift media center, killing me and French photographer Rémi Ochlik. I was fifty-six. Looking back across my life, there is room to acknowledge the fear and grief my work brought to people who loved me. Courage did not make me invulnerable, and determination did not remove the need to weigh a risk. But I believed the suffering of civilians required witnesses. My responsibility was to reach them, listen carefully, and report their lives with the seriousness they deserved.

My Name is Brent Scowcroft: A Life of Service and Strategy

I was born in Ogden, Utah, on March 19, 1925. As a boy, I became interested in West Point and the responsibilities of military service. I graduated from the academy in 1947 and began a career in military aviation. Those early years taught me the importance of discipline and preparation. An officer must understand his assignment, but he must also understand how that assignment serves a larger purpose. That relationship between immediate decisions and long-term objectives would occupy much of my life.

Learning How Other Nations Think

A serious flying accident helped redirect my career toward teaching and strategy. I earned a master’s degree and later a doctorate in international relations at Columbia University. I taught Russian history at West Point, served in Yugoslavia as an assistant air attaché, and headed the political science department at the Air Force Academy. These assignments required me to examine other countries on their own terms. Understanding another government’s fears and ambitions did not require accepting its policies. It did make American decisions better informed.

Serving in the White House

I served as President Richard Nixon’s military assistant, then as deputy national security adviser under Henry Kissinger. In 1975, President Gerald Ford appointed me national security adviser. My responsibility was to help the president weigh competing recommendations and understand their consequences. That required bringing together intelligence, diplomacy, and military planning. I believed advisers should present disagreements honestly and ensure that important alternatives received a hearing. The president needed a dependable process for making decisions under pressure, especially when the available information was incomplete.

Managing the End of the Cold War

President George H. W. Bush brought me back as national security adviser in 1989. Soon, communist governments were falling across Eastern Europe, the Berlin Wall opened, and the Soviet Union approached dissolution. These were extraordinary opportunities, accompanied by considerable danger. We worked to support German reunification and peaceful change while avoiding unnecessary humiliation of Soviet leaders. Nuclear weapons and large armies remained in place. Our task was to help create a more stable international order while an old one was coming apart.

Knowing the Purpose of a War

When Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in 1990, we helped assemble an international coalition to reverse that aggression. The military campaign liberated Kuwait in 1991. We supported ending the offensive after achieving that objective rather than advancing to Baghdad to overthrow Saddam. Occupying Iraq would have introduced different responsibilities, costs, and political problems. In 2002, I publicly opposed a new invasion of Iraq, warning that it could destabilize the region and distract from the struggle against terrorism. Military superiority could win battles; establishing a durable political settlement required much more.

The Responsibilities That Remain

After leaving government, I continued advising, writing, and encouraging serious discussion across party lines. I died on August 6, 2020, at ninety-five. Looking back, I recognize that an emphasis on stability can leave difficult questions about justice and the suffering of people living under repressive governments. Those questions deserve examination, including in my own record. My central lesson remains that leaders must consider what follows their decisions. Before committing a nation’s strength, they should define the objective, examine the alternatives, and accept responsibility for consequences that may endure long after they leave office.

Libya—Rebellion, Intervention, and Gaddafi’s Fall - Told by Colvin and Scowcroft

Marie Colvin: Brent, when I interviewed Muammar Gaddafi with other journalists on February 28, 2011, he insisted that his people loved him. Outside that interview, his country was breaking apart. Protests had begun in Benghazi earlier that month, inspired by uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt. Security forces responded with lethal violence, and rebellion spread. Gaddafi had ruled since 1969, leaving little space for peaceful opposition. Listening to him, I confronted a familiar problem in reporting on dictatorships. The ruler’s description of his country could bear little resemblance to the lives of people challenging his authority.

Benghazi Faces an Advancing Army

Brent Scowcroft: Marie, that gap became an urgent international problem when Gaddafi’s forces advanced toward Benghazi, the opposition’s stronghold. Governments feared a large-scale assault on civilians. On March 17, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1973, authorizing necessary measures to protect civilians and establishing a no-fly zone. It expressly excluded a foreign occupation force. The distinction mattered for planning. Stopping aircraft alone would offer limited protection against tanks and artillery. Leaders considering intervention needed to determine what force could accomplish, how long protection might be required, and what political outcome could sustain it.

Protection From the Air, Danger on the Ground

Marie Colvin: And those decisions had immediate consequences for families below. International military operations began on March 19, with France, Britain, and the United States playing major roles. NATO assumed command of the full operation on March 31. Aircraft struck government forces threatening civilians, while ships enforced an arms embargo. Yet fighting continued in places such as Misrata, where residents endured siege and bombardment. For a reporter, the questions remained painfully practical. Could an ambulance reach the wounded? Could families leave? Protection had to be judged by what happened to people living through the fighting.

The Government Falls Apart

Brent Scowcroft: Those immediate needs also raised the question of what would follow. NATO’s campaign weakened Gaddafi’s military, helping create conditions for rebel advances. In August, opposition forces took most of Tripoli, and his government lost control of the capital. The National Transitional Council sought to guide the country toward a new political order. However, the forces fighting Gaddafi included local armed groups with different leaders and loyalties. A shared enemy had brought them together. Establishing a government would require agreements about authority, security, and the surrender or integration of their weapons.

The Final Hours in Sirte

Marie Colvin: On October 20, fighters captured Gaddafi alive near his hometown of Sirte after NATO aircraft struck his fleeing convoy. He died shortly afterward in circumstances that prompted demands for an investigation. Images of his capture raised serious questions about how he had been treated. His death ended the life of a ruler I had interviewed over many years, but it also tested the promises of the rebellion. Would prisoners receive protection? Would accusations be examined in court? The treatment of defeated enemies would help reveal what kind of country Libya was becoming.

A Victory With Unanswered Questions

Brent Scowcroft: The transitional authorities declared liberation on October 23, and NATO ended its operation on October 31. Libyans now faced the work of restoring services, establishing accountable institutions, and bringing armed groups under public authority. The United Nations had begun assisting that transition, but international support depended on Libyans reaching difficult agreements among themselves. By October’s end, the intervention had helped protect threatened communities and the rebellion had overturned a dictatorship. Whether those achievements would produce lasting security remained an open question for every family hoping to rebuild.

Who Authorized the Libya War? — Obama, Congress, the UN?  - Told by Scowcroft

On March 19, 2011, American forces began striking Libyan air defenses under orders from President Barack Obama. Muammar Gaddafi’s forces threatened Benghazi, and the administration argued that urgent action could prevent a humanitarian catastrophe. Two days earlier, the United Nations Security Council had authorized military measures to protect civilians. Congress, however, had passed no specific authorization for American participation. As a former national security adviser, I would begin with that distinction. The UN resolution provided international authorization, while the decision to commit American forces raised a separate question about presidential authority under our own Constitution.

The President’s Case

The Constitution gives Congress the power to declare war and makes the president commander in chief. Presidents have long claimed authority to undertake some military operations without obtaining advance congressional approval. Obama’s Justice Department argued that protecting regional stability and supporting the Security Council’s credibility served important American interests. It also concluded that the anticipated operation’s limited nature, scope, and duration meant it would fall short of a war requiring prior congressional approval under the Constitution. That was the administration’s legal position. Its critics questioned how far such reasoning could extend presidential power whenever an administration described military action as limited.

A Deadline and a Disputed Word

The War Powers Resolution of 1973 added another issue. It generally requires a report within forty-eight hours when American forces enter hostilities and termination within sixty days unless Congress authorizes continued action, with a possible thirty-day withdrawal extension under specified conditions. Obama reported the operation to Congress on March 21. As the campaign continued, however, his administration argued that America’s reduced role under NATO command fell outside the “hostilities” covered by the sixty-day rule. Officials emphasized the absence of American ground troops and the limited danger to American personnel. Critics challenged that interpretation because American forces still supported the campaign and conducted armed drone strikes.

Congress Sends Conflicting Signals

Congress challenged the president but could not agree on a single response. On June 3, the House demanded further information and declared that Obama had proceeded without congressional authorization. Then, on June 24, it rejected a resolution authorizing limited American participation by 295 votes to 123. That same day, however, the House also defeated a separate bill restricting funding for much of the operation. These votes exposed disagreement over both presidential power and the consequences of withdrawing support during an ongoing campaign. Congress withheld explicit approval while failing to enact the proposed funding restriction that could have constrained American involvement.

What the Outcome Could Not Settle

NATO’s operation ended on October 31, after Gaddafi’s government collapsed and he was killed. The campaign had proceeded without a specific congressional authorization for the use of force. Its conclusion left the dispute over presidential power unresolved. From my strategic perspective, a president should consider congressional support part of preparing for military action. Public debate forces an administration to explain its objectives, expected costs, and plans if events take an unexpected turn. Congress must also accept responsibility for its choices. When American forces enter a conflict, both branches owe the country clear decisions about how far the commitment should extend.

Syria—From Peaceful Protest to Armed Conflict - Told by Brent Scowcroft

Syria’s descent into armed conflict began with protests that its government chose to confront with force. In March 2011, the detention and reported torture of schoolchildren accused of writing anti-government graffiti helped bring demonstrators into the streets of Daraa. Security forces fired on protesters, and deaths brought further demonstrations. As a former national security adviser, I would begin by examining the government’s choices. President Bashar al-Assad faced demands for dignity, accountability, and reform. By treating peaceful opposition as a security threat, his government helped turn a local crisis into a national uprising.

Promises Without Protection

Protests spread to cities including Homs and Hama. Syria had been governed under emergency law since 1963, with extensive powers of detention and severe restrictions on political activity. Assad lifted that law in April 2011, but arrests, shootings, and military operations continued. The government claimed it was confronting armed gangs and foreign interference. Yet investigators documented attacks on unarmed demonstrators and funeral processions. Announcing reform could accomplish little while security forces continued abusing citizens. Each new confrontation weakened the possibility that promises from Damascus would restore public confidence.

When Resistance Took Up Arms

During the following months, some soldiers deserted rather than continue serving the government. In July, defecting officers announced the Free Syrian Army. Armed groups increasingly fought government forces, while peaceful demonstrations continued. This was a critical change: a protest movement was becoming entangled with an armed rebellion. The opposition was also fragmented, with local groups operating beyond any single commander’s effective control. From a strategic standpoint, that fragmentation mattered enormously. Negotiating an end to violence becomes more difficult when leaders cannot reliably speak for—or restrain—the people carrying weapons.

Families Under Fire in Homs

By February 2012, Homs showed the terrible consequences of escalation. Government forces subjected neighborhoods, including Baba Amr, to sustained bombardment. Armed opposition fighters operated in residential districts, but civilians remained entitled to protection. Families struggled to find safe shelter, food, and medical care; some could not escape the areas under attack. These circumstances must remain central to any assessment of policy. A military map might identify a contested neighborhood, but inside it were parents, children, and wounded people whose survival depended on whether the shelling stopped and assistance could reach them.

A Divided World and a Deepening Conflict

International diplomacy failed to halt the violence. On February 4, Russia and China vetoed a UN Security Council draft resolution supporting an Arab League plan for a Syrian-led political transition; the other thirteen members voted in favor. The disagreement exposed the difficulty of organizing a common response. Outside governments faced urgent questions about diplomatic pressure, sanctions, humanitarian access, and the risks of military involvement. My approach would be to insist on clear objectives and careful consideration of consequences. By the end of February, Syria demonstrated how repression, armed resistance, and international division could reinforce one another while ordinary families paid the greatest price.

Yemen: Why Did Obama Back a Saudi-Led War? (2015–2016) - Told by Scowcroft

In March 2015, Saudi Arabia prepared to intervene in Yemen, where Houthi forces and troops loyal to former president Ali Abdullah Saleh were advancing against President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi’s government. Hadi requested military assistance, and Saudi leaders feared an Iran-backed movement gaining power along their southern border. President Obama authorized intelligence and logistical support for the Saudi-led coalition. Washington established a joint planning cell with the Saudis, and American assistance eventually included aerial refueling and weapons transfers. An ally had requested help, and the president committed American resources to its campaign.

The Pressure Behind the Decision

Saudi requests arrived while Obama was negotiating limits on Iran’s nuclear program. Gulf governments feared that an agreement and sanctions relief would strengthen their regional rival. They wanted reassurance that Washington remained committed to their security. Supporting the Yemen intervention helped provide that reassurance, according to subsequent policy analysis. This created pressure on Obama to accommodate an important partner, although the decision remained his administration’s responsibility. From my strategic perspective, the danger was allowing the need to reassure an ally to outrun careful examination of its war plan. What outcome could the coalition achieve, and at what cost?

Why Was There No Authorization Vote?

Obama began supporting the coalition without seeking a specific congressional authorization for that campaign. His administration described America’s initial role as assistance and emphasized that American forces were not directly conducting the coalition’s attacks. That distinction helped frame the policy as support for a partner. Critics argued that refueling aircraft and assisting military operations involved the United States deeply enough to require congressional approval. Unlike his request for authorization for proposed strikes against Syria in 2013, Obama sought no comparable vote before this commitment. Saudi pressure helps explain the diplomatic setting, but the evidence does not establish that Riyadh dictated his approach to Congress.

Congress Challenges the Commitment

Congress retained ways to question and constrain the policy through oversight, funding, and arms-sale reviews. As civilian casualties mounted, lawmakers pressed the administration to explain its support. In 2016, opponents tried to block a proposed tank sale to Saudi Arabia, but the Senate rejected the effort to advance their resolution. Supporters emphasized the Saudi partnership and concerns about Iran. Opponents questioned whether American assistance was prolonging a destructive conflict. These disagreements mattered because approving weapons transfers, withholding funds, and authorizing military involvement were separate decisions with different consequences.

The War Outlasts the Assumptions

By late 2016, the coalition had failed to restore a stable national government, while civilian suffering intensified. After a coalition strike on a funeral gathering in Sana’a killed scores of people in October, Obama ordered a review of American assistance. His administration subsequently halted a planned precision-guided munitions sale while continuing aerial refueling. For a national security adviser, such developments demand a reassessment of the original commitment. An alliance creates responsibilities, including the responsibility to challenge an ally’s judgment. Before supporting a war, a president should explain its objectives to Congress and the public—and establish what would cause American support to end.

Finding Osama bin Laden—The Abbottabad Raid (May 2011) - Told by Dianne Feinstein

For nearly ten years after September 11, American intelligence officers pursued Osama bin Laden, the leader of al-Qaeda. As chair of the Senate Intelligence Committee, I understood how much patient investigation could lie behind a single breakthrough. One important trail involved a trusted courier who carried messages for him. Analysts worked for years to establish the courier’s identity and whereabouts. In 2010, that trail led to a heavily secured compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan. Suddenly, the search had a specific address—but investigators still had to determine who was living behind its walls.

The House That Raised Questions

The compound’s unusual features attracted close attention. High walls and barbed wire surrounded it. Its residents burned their rubbish, and the property lacked apparent telephone and internet connections. The people associated with it seemed unable to explain its expense through ordinary employment. Taken together, these clues suggested that someone important was hiding there. Yet intelligence rarely provides perfect certainty. Analysts could assemble a convincing case without obtaining a clear photograph proving bin Laden’s presence. President Obama would have to decide whether the evidence justified risking American lives inside another country.

A Decision With No Safe Guarantee

After repeated discussions with his advisers, Obama authorized the operation on April 29, 2011. A helicopter raid offered an opportunity to identify the occupants and recover intelligence, but the dangers were substantial. The target might be absent. American personnel could be killed or captured. Pakistani forces could respond to an unexpected foreign military operation. Washington withheld advance notice from Pakistan to protect the mission’s secrecy, adding diplomatic risk to military risk. The president had to weigh those possibilities against the chance of losing a lead that had taken years to develop.

Helicopters in the Darkness

The assault began early on May 2 in Pakistan, while it was still May 1 in the United States. American special operations forces entered the compound, but one helicopter was damaged during the landing and could no longer fly. The team continued the mission. Inside the main residence, American personnel killed bin Laden. They collected documents and electronic material, recovered his body, and destroyed the disabled helicopter before departing. All American personnel returned safely. For those who had planned the operation, success depended on preparation that allowed the team to continue when a major part of the plan went wrong.

An Achievement, and Work Still Ahead

I welcomed the operation and praised the intelligence officers, military personnel, and presidential leadership responsible. For families who had lost loved ones, the news carried enormous significance, although it could never restore those lives. Al-Qaeda still had other leaders, regional organizations, recruits, and supporters capable of violence. Officials also warned of possible retaliation. The material recovered in Abbottabad therefore became the beginning of further investigations. We had removed a central organizer of terrorism, but protecting the public still required tracing networks, sharing intelligence, and preventing the next attack.

Drone War:  Should a President Order a Citizen Killed Abroad? - Told by Scowcroft

On September 30, 2011, an American drone strike in Yemen killed Anwar al-Awlaki, a United States citizen. President Barack Obama described him as a leader of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula who directed efforts to kill Americans. Al-Awlaki had become widely known for extremist preaching, but the administration’s justification centered on his alleged operational involvement in terrorist attacks. He had received no criminal trial before the strike. That fact placed a difficult question before the country. Under what circumstances could the government deliberately kill one of its citizens abroad?

Citizenship, Civilian Status, and War

As a former national security adviser, I would begin by examining the person’s actions and the legal setting. American citizenship carries constitutional protections, including the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee against deprivation of life without due process. Citizenship alone, however, does not prevent someone fighting for an enemy force from becoming a lawful military target. The administration classified al-Awlaki as an operational terrorist leader engaged in an armed conflict covered by Congress’s 2001 authorization against al-Qaeda. Critics disputed applying that wartime framework to this killing in Yemen. Calling him a civilian therefore raises the very question that needed examination—whether his activities made him legally targetable.

The Administration’s Legal Argument

The government argued that lethal force could be lawful when a senior operational leader posed an imminent threat, capture was infeasible, and the operation complied with the laws of war. Attorney General Eric Holder publicly explained these principles in 2012, after the strike. The administration maintained that due process could be satisfied through careful executive review without advance approval from a judge. It also interpreted “imminent” broadly, allowing action without knowing the precise time and place of the next planned attack. Officials argued that waiting for that information could leave Americans exposed to a preventable terrorist attack.

Who Could Challenge the Evidence?

Civil-liberties organizations challenged the secrecy and concentration of power involved. The executive branch identified the target, assessed the intelligence, determined whether capture was possible, and approved lethal force. Al-Awlaki had no opportunity in a criminal trial to contest those allegations. His supporters in litigation argued that this process violated constitutional protections. From a strategic standpoint, intelligence errors make independent scrutiny especially important because a lethal mistake cannot be reversed. The absence of a jury does not automatically make every wartime killing unlawful, but the government’s claim of wartime authority must itself withstand serious examination.

What the Courts Actually Decided

A later lawsuit seeking damages over al-Awlaki’s death and those of two other American citizens was dismissed in 2014. For the deliberate targeting of al-Awlaki, the court declined to create a damages remedy, emphasizing separation-of-powers and national-security concerns. That dismissal left the central constitutional dispute without a definitive ruling approving his killing on its merits. The historically accurate answer is that Obama’s administration considered the strike lawful, while opponents challenged both its legal foundation and its secret decision-making process. A president claiming this authority assumes an extraordinary responsibility to establish reliable evidence, meaningful oversight, and enforceable limits.

After the Uprisings—Why Democracy Struggled (2012–2013) - Told by Khashoggi

After the uprisings, Egyptians and Libyans faced a question that cheering crowds could not settle. Who would govern, and what would prevent new leaders from abusing their power? As a Saudi journalist, I followed these struggles with the conviction that Arabs deserved a voice in their future. Egypt elected Mohamed Morsi president in June 2012, while Libyans elected a General National Congress that July. These were genuine openings after decades of authoritarian rule. Yet elections brought competing movements into governments where distrust remained deep and institutions had little experience protecting peaceful political competition.

Egypt’s President Divides His Country

Morsi came from the Muslim Brotherhood, an Islamist movement with a long history of organization and repression under earlier governments. His supporters saw his election as an opportunity to make government answerable to voters. Many opponents feared that the Brotherhood would dominate the state. In November 2012, Morsi issued a decree shielding his decisions from judicial review, arguing that extraordinary measures were needed to protect the transition. The decree provoked fierce protests. Although he later rescinded it, a disputed constitution moved forward to a referendum. Economic difficulties and growing mistrust made compromise harder. Winning an election had given Morsi authority, but governing required protecting the rights of people who had voted against him.

The Army Returns to Power

On June 30, 2013, enormous demonstrations demanded Morsi’s departure. Supporters of the protests accused him of concentrating power and failing to govern effectively. On July 3, the military, led by General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, removed and detained him, suspended the constitution, and installed an interim president. Many Egyptians welcomed the intervention, while others saw their elected government overthrown. It was a military coup, and the consequences extended far beyond Morsi. In August, security forces killed hundreds while dispersing pro-Morsi sit-ins. Arrests and repression narrowed the space for political participation. The military had become the final judge of who could govern.

Libya’s Ballots Meet Armed Power

Libya faced a different struggle. Gaddafi’s fall left weak national institutions and numerous armed groups that had helped defeat him. The 2012 election offered hope, but the new authorities could not reliably control the country’s weapons, detention centers, or streets. Some militias received government recognition or payment while retaining their own loyalties. Others used force to defend local or political interests. In 2013, armed groups pressured officials as parliament adopted a sweeping law excluding many former Gaddafi-era officeholders from public service. Supporters wanted to prevent the old regime’s return. Critics feared the loss of experienced personnel and the use of exclusion to defeat political rivals.

What Citizens Still Needed

By the end of 2013, both transitions showed how difficult it was to make public authority accountable. In Egypt, the army retained the strength to overturn an elected presidency. In Libya, elected officials struggled to establish authority over competing armed groups. Citizens needed courts able to defend rights, security forces subject to civilian control, and political leaders willing to accept limits on their power. They also needed journalists free to examine every faction. I would ask students to consider the ordinary voter in each country. What protection did that person have when a president, general, or militia rejected the rules? The answer would help determine whether the promise of the uprisings could survive.

Syria’s Chemical Weapons Crisis—“Red Line” Debate (2013) - Told by Scowcroft

In August 2012, President Barack Obama warned that the movement or use of Syrian chemical weapons could cross a “red line” and change American calculations about intervention. Such a warning creates expectations among adversaries and allies alike. As a former national security adviser, I would ask what action the United States was prepared to take if that boundary were crossed. Syria was already engulfed in civil war, with armed factions, foreign supporters, and civilians trapped between them. Any American response would enter that larger conflict, carrying consequences beyond the immediate target.

The Attack in Ghouta

On August 21, 2013, chemical weapons struck communities in Ghouta, outside Damascus. Hundreds died, including children, and images of victims shocked the world. United Nations investigators later confirmed that rockets containing sarin, a deadly nerve agent, had been used. Their mission established the use of chemical weapons without assigning responsibility. The United States separately assessed with high confidence that President Bashar al-Assad’s government had carried out the attack. Damascus denied responsibility. Policymakers now faced urgent demands to respond, while also having to examine the evidence and explain what their response could achieve.

The Argument for Military Action

Supporters of American strikes argued that allowing chemical attacks to pass without consequences would encourage their repetition and weaken the international prohibition against these weapons. Some also feared that failing to enforce Obama’s warning would damage American credibility. On August 31, Obama announced that he favored limited military action and would seek congressional authorization. The proposed operation was intended to deter further chemical attacks and reduce the Syrian government’s ability to conduct them. Those were serious objectives. They also required a clear explanation of how particular military targets and the scale of the attack would produce the intended result.

The Questions After the First Strike

Opponents questioned whether limited strikes would deter Assad or pull the United States deeper into another Middle Eastern war. Americans remembered the costs of Iraq and Afghanistan, and support in Congress was uncertain. My strategic concern would begin with what happened afterward. If Assad used chemical weapons again, would Washington launch a larger attack? How might his allies respond? Could military action place additional civilians in danger? Credibility mattered, but leaders also had to define an achievable objective and prepare for escalation. A decision made under public pressure could create obligations lasting far beyond the first missiles.

A Diplomatic Opening

In September, negotiations offered another course. Secretary of State John Kerry and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov reached a framework agreement on September 14 requiring Syria to disclose its chemical weapons program and accept its elimination under international supervision. Syria moved to join the Chemical Weapons Convention. On September 27, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2118, supporting the disarmament process. Obama held off on strikes while diplomacy proceeded. The agreement offered the prospect of removing weapons through inspections and destruction, although its success depended on Syrian cooperation and an accurate declaration.

The Agreement Must Be Tested

Inspectors from the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons began work alongside the United Nations. By the end of October, they verified that Syria’s declared critical production, mixing, and filling equipment had been rendered inoperable. Removing and destroying the declared chemical stockpile remained a larger undertaking. The word “declared” mattered because inspectors needed to determine whether Syria had disclosed everything. For me, the measure of diplomacy would be verified results and a workable response to violations. Meanwhile, Syria’s conventional war continued, leaving civilians exposed to bombardment, displacement, and deprivation despite progress on chemical disarmament.

ISIS Builds a Terrorist State (2014) - Told by Dianne Feinstein and Brent Scowcroft

Dianne Feinstein: In June 2014, we confronted a dramatic expansion of a terrorist threat. ISIS, also called ISIL, captured Mosul, one of Iraq’s largest cities, as Iraqi security forces collapsed and abandoned their positions. The city fell on June 10, giving the organization access to military equipment, infrastructure, and a large civilian population. ISIS had emerged from earlier extremist networks in Iraq and expanded during Syria’s war. Now it could use captured territory to recruit fighters, gather resources, and prepare further attacks. Understanding its capabilities had become an urgent intelligence responsibility.

Declaring a “Caliphate”

Brent Scowcroft: On June 29, ISIS declared a “caliphate” across territory it controlled in Iraq and Syria, naming Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi its leader. The term invoked a historical form of Islamic leadership, but this declaration gave the organization no legitimate authority over Muslims, many of whom rejected it. Strategically, the announcement served its ambitions: ISIS wanted recruits to believe they were joining a permanent political order. Its territorial gains depended on weakened governments, war, and local divisions. Defeating such an organization would require understanding the conditions that allowed it to establish control.

Families Targeted for Their Faith

Dianne Feinstein: For people living under ISIS, its expansion brought persecution and terror. Christians fled Mosul after demands that they convert, pay a religious tax, or face death. In August, ISIS attacked the Yazidi community around Sinjar, killing civilians and abducting women and children. Thousands escaped toward Mount Sinjar, where they faced dangerous shortages of food and water. Later United Nations investigations established that ISIS committed genocide against the Yazidis. The organization also murdered Shia Muslims and Sunni Muslims who resisted it. These were attacks on entire communities and their ability to survive.

America Returns to Air Operations

Brent Scowcroft: President Obama authorized humanitarian assistance and military action as the crisis intensified. American airstrikes began in Iraq on August 8, initially addressing threats to American personnel near Erbil and helping protect civilians trapped around Sinjar. Aircraft also delivered emergency supplies. These actions could disrupt an advance and create opportunities for rescue, but their limits needed to remain clear. Aircraft could strike ISIS positions; local forces would have to secure territory. Lasting security would also depend on whether Iraq’s communities trusted their government to protect them fairly.

Building an International Coalition

Dianne Feinstein: During September, the United States organized a broader international coalition against ISIS. Partners contributed in different ways, including military operations, training, humanitarian assistance, and efforts to restrict financing and foreign recruitment. On September 23, American forces and Arab partners conducted strikes against ISIS in Syria, extending the campaign across the border. Intelligence sharing was essential because the organization moved people, weapons, and money through a battlefield spanning two countries. The coalition needed to weaken its leadership and resources while helping local partners withstand its attacks.

The Question Beyond the Battlefield

Brent Scowcroft: By the end of 2014, a campaign was underway, but ISIS still controlled substantial territory. We therefore had to ask what would follow military success. Who would govern recovered cities? How would displaced families return safely? Could local authorities prevent another cycle of exclusion and retaliation? These questions belonged within the strategy from the beginning. Removing a terrorist organization’s control was essential; establishing conditions in which it could not readily return would be a longer and more difficult undertaking.

Benghazi — Who Was Responsible for Protecting Diplomats? - Told by Scowcroft

By September 2012, Libya’s revolution had left a weak national government and powerful armed groups. Ambassador J. Christopher Stevens worked to build relations with the country emerging from Gaddafi’s dictatorship. But American personnel in Benghazi operated amid worsening violence, including previous attacks against their own facility and other Western targets. As a former national security adviser, I would begin with the decision to maintain that presence. Diplomacy sometimes requires accepting danger. It also requires matching the mission’s importance with adequate protection, reliable local support, and realistic emergency plans.

The Compound Comes Under Attack

On the evening of September 11, armed attackers overran the American diplomatic compound and set buildings on fire. Stevens and information management officer Sean Smith became trapped in a smoke-filled residence. Diplomatic Security personnel repeatedly tried to find and rescue them, and a security team from the nearby CIA annex came to assist. Smith died, and Stevens was later taken by Libyans to a hospital, where efforts to revive him failed. Surviving Americans withdrew to the annex. Before dawn on September 12, a mortar attack there killed security officers Tyrone Woods and Glen Doherty. Four Americans were dead.

What Responsibility Did Clinton Carry?

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton headed the department responsible for protecting American diplomatic personnel. Her leadership therefore faced legitimate questions about the security arrangements, warnings, and resources available in Benghazi. The claim that she did nothing to seek assistance, however, conflicts with the documented record. That evening, she contacted Libyan President Mohamed Magariaf to coordinate additional protection for Americans. American personnel were also conducting rescue efforts on the ground. Those actions still leave an essential question for investigators—whether the department’s preparations and its leadership’s response were sufficient for the dangers its diplomats faced.

Why Did More Help Fail to Arrive?

A reinforcement team traveled from Tripoli and helped defend the annex, but additional American military forces based outside Libya did not reach Benghazi before the deadly attacks ended. The secretary of state could request military assistance, while deployment orders ran through the president and Defense Department. Later investigations would examine the forces available, their locations, deployment delays, and decisions made throughout the night. The Senate Intelligence Committee concluded that military resources were not positioned to intervene quickly enough. A subsequent House investigation sharply criticized the urgency and execution of the military response. These findings made readiness and decision-making central issues.

The Questions Waiting in Washington

When the survivors returned and the four Americans’ remains came home, Washington owed their families a careful accounting. Why had the mission continued with known security weaknesses? Who received requests for stronger protection, and what did they decide? What assistance was ordered during the attacks, and why did it fail to arrive sooner? Officials’ changing public explanations would also require scrutiny. In the next chapter, investigators would examine cables, testimony, intelligence assessments, and deployment records. Their responsibility was to establish who made consequential decisions, identify failures, and determine what accountability those failures required.

War Without a Clear Ending (2015–2016) - Told by Khashoggi and Feinstein

Jamal Khashoggi: By 2015, the wars of the Middle East were uprooting entire communities. In July, the United Nations reported that more than four million Syrians had become refugees in neighboring countries, while millions more were displaced within Syria. Families fled government bombardment, battles between armed groups, and persecution by ISIS. Most refugees remained in countries such as Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan, although dangerous journeys toward Europe attracted worldwide attention. Behind the numbers were interrupted lives: children missing school, parents searching for work, and families uncertain whether their homes still existed.

Terror Beyond the Battlefield

Dianne Feinstein: Meanwhile, ISIS demonstrated that its threat extended beyond the territory it controlled. On November 13, 2015, coordinated attacks in Paris killed 130 people. On March 22, 2016, bombings struck Brussels Airport and a metro station. American intelligence assessed that ISIS leadership directed these operations. That distinction mattered. Investigators needed to uncover networks, identify people moving between countries, and share information before another attack occurred. Military pressure in Iraq and Syria was essential, but protecting civilians abroad also required close cooperation among intelligence agencies and law enforcement.

An Organization and Its Influence

Jamal Khashoggi: Other attackers drew inspiration from ISIS without receiving direct operational orders. American officials identified San Bernardino in December 2015 and Orlando in June 2016 as examples of this danger. Propaganda could reach people far from the battlefield and encourage them to commit violence where they lived. We must describe that influence accurately without accepting the organization’s claim to represent Islam. Many Muslims were themselves victims of ISIS. The suffering of refugees and the investigation of terrorists required careful reporting; treating whole communities as suspects would obscure the individuals and networks responsible.

Recovering Ground from ISIS

Dianne Feinstein: During 2015 and 2016, local forces supported by the American-led coalition began recovering important territory. Iraqi forces regained Ramadi and Fallujah, among other cities, while coalition aircraft, advisers, and intelligence helped sustain the campaign. These advances weakened ISIS’s territorial control, but they did not eliminate its ability to organize attacks or inspire violence elsewhere. We had to assess both developments together. Progress on a battlefield could be real while the terrorist threat remained serious. The next major objective was Mosul, the Iraqi city whose capture had announced ISIS’s dramatic expansion in 2014.

Mosul’s Families Face Another Battle

Jamal Khashoggi: On October 17, 2016, Iraqi forces opened the offensive to retake Mosul, with Kurdish forces participating in operations around the city and coalition support assisting the advance. For civilians, the prospect of liberation also brought immediate danger. Families faced the possibility of becoming trapped between ISIS positions and approaching forces. Humanitarian preparations mattered alongside military plans: people would need shelter, medical care, and safe routes away from fighting. Recovering a city could not be measured only by which flag flew above its buildings. Its residents would have to survive the battle and rebuild their lives.

An Offensive Begins, but the War Continues

Dianne Feinstein: The opening of the Mosul offensive marked an important turning point, not a completed victory. The coalition’s announcement itself acknowledged uncertainty about how long the battle would take. Even after territory changed hands, authorities would need to protect civilians, restore services, and prevent extremist networks from rebuilding. By the close of this period, we could see meaningful military advances alongside continuing displacement and terrorist violence. That was the difficult reality of 2015 and 2016: the campaign was making progress, but a durable peace remained beyond reach.