Trump's First Presidency — America First, Economic Policies, Immigration, and Washington Politics (2017–2019)

My Name is George P. Shultz: A Life of Service, Strength, and Trust

I was born in New York City on December 13, 1920, and grew up in Englewood, New Jersey. My parents taught me that conduct mattered: keep your commitments, do your work, and treat people with respect. At Princeton, I studied economics and played football. Both required preparation, discipline, and an understanding that your performance affected other people. I graduated in 1942, with the country at war. There would be time for further study later. For the moment, I joined the United States Marine Corps.

A Marine, a Husband, and a Teacher

Serving in the Pacific taught me something no classroom could fully explain: decisions made far from a battlefield have consequences for the men standing on it. I eventually became a captain. While stationed in Hawaii, I met Helena O’Brien, an Army nurse. We married in 1946 and raised five children. After the war, I earned my doctorate in industrial economics at MIT, then taught there and at the University of Chicago. I studied how employers and workers reached agreements. Before you can settle a disagreement, you must understand what each side needs and what it can actually deliver.

Three Jobs Under President Nixon

President Richard Nixon brought me into his Cabinet as secretary of labor in 1969. The following year, I became the first director of the Office of Management and Budget, and in 1972, secretary of the Treasury. These were different assignments, but each required choices about people, resources, and responsibility. A government cannot escape difficult decisions by disguising them in complicated language. Nor should officials confuse service to a president with permission to misuse public authority. When pressure came to use the Internal Revenue Service against political opponents, I refused. Tax administration had to serve the law.

From Business to World Affairs

After leaving government in 1974, I worked at Bechtel, the international engineering and construction company, eventually serving as its president. Large projects required cooperation across borders and agreements people could depend upon. In 1982, President Ronald Reagan asked me to become secretary of state. Relations with the Soviet Union were tense, and nuclear weapons gave every serious confrontation enormous consequences. I believed America needed strong defenses, dependable allies, and sustained diplomacy. Negotiation required preparation and patience. You needed to know your own position thoroughly—and listen carefully enough to understand the other fellow’s.

Working Toward a Safer World

With Reagan’s support, I worked to build a productive relationship with Soviet leaders, particularly Mikhail Gorbachev and Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze. Progress was uneven. The 1986 summit at Reykjavík ended without an agreement, despite extraordinary discussion of nuclear reductions. Yet the work continued. In 1987, Reagan and Gorbachev signed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, eliminating an entire category of ground-launched missiles. We also faced serious disagreements within our own administration. I opposed the arms-for-hostages dealings with Iran that became part of the Iran-Contra scandal. American credibility depended upon consistency between our policies, our commitments, and our actions.

Still at Work

I left the State Department in 1989 and returned to Stanford and the Hoover Institution. Helena died in 1995; in 1997, I married Charlotte Mailliard Swig. My later years remained busy with writing, students, and efforts to reduce nuclear dangers. I also supported action on climate change. During the Trump years, my experience offered a useful perspective on arguments about trade and alliances: American decisions affected relationships built over decades. Those relationships required attention. Even as I approached one hundred, I continued to believe that patient work could solve problems that public shouting could not.

A Final Lesson About Judgment

There was also a painful failure in my later life. I supported Theranos, a company promising major advances in blood testing, and served on its board. When my grandson Tyler raised concerns about its practices, I did not initially give his warnings the weight they deserved. I later publicly praised his courage in defending truth and patient safety. My life ended on February 6, 2021, at one hundred. In this reconstructed reflection, I would leave you with an admission: I should have listened more carefully. Trust carries responsibility, and experience does not excuse a failure to examine evidence—even when that evidence challenges someone you believe in.

“America First” Takes Office — Promises, Trade, and a Divided Nation - Told by George Shultz

On January 20, 2017, Donald Trump stood before the Capitol and delivered a challenge to the political establishment seated around him. Having served as secretary of labor, Treasury, and state, I understood how sharply his message departed from the language Washington usually heard on Inauguration Day. He described shuttered factories, struggling neighborhoods, and leaders who had prospered while ordinary citizens suffered. His promise was direct: “America First.” Decisions about trade, immigration, taxes, and foreign affairs would put American workers and families at the center. Supporters heard a president finally acknowledging problems they believed Washington had neglected. Critics heard an excessively bleak account of the country and worried about where his nationalism would lead.

The Americans Who Put Him There

Understanding that moment requires looking beyond the simplest descriptions of Trump’s voters. His support crossed income, age, religious, and educational categories. Pew Research Center’s study of verified 2016 voters found that he received approximately 52 percent of men’s votes and 39 percent of women’s votes. He performed particularly well among white voters without college degrees, winning 64 percent, but his coalition also included college graduates, affluent households, and minority voters. He received approximately 28 percent of Hispanic voters’ support. Nevertheless, Clinton won majorities among women, Black voters, and Hispanic voters, and won the national popular vote. Trump’s Electoral College victory demonstrated the strength of his coalition in decisive states. His appeal reached many demographic groups, although those groups supported him in very different proportions.

A Promise Becomes a Presidential Decision

Three days after taking office, Trump acted on one of his clearest campaign commitments. On January 23, he signed a memorandum withdrawing the United States from the Trans-Pacific Partnership. The agreement had been signed by twelve countries during the Obama administration, but Congress had not approved its implementing legislation, and it had never taken effect. That distinction matters: Trump was stopping American participation in a proposed trading arrangement, rather than tearing up one already governing American commerce. Supporters celebrated the decision as evidence that campaign promises would produce action. They feared another large trade agreement would increase import competition and encourage additional manufacturing jobs to move overseas.

Changing the Way America Bargained

Trump’s preferred approach emphasized negotiations with individual countries. His withdrawal memorandum instructed officials to pursue bilateral agreements wherever possible to support American industry, workers, and wages. The reasoning was straightforward: access to America’s enormous market was valuable, and Washington should use that bargaining power to demand better terms. His inaugural call to “Buy American and Hire American” expressed the same priority. Yet trade negotiations require examining both sides of an exchange. Imports compete with some American producers, while other American businesses depend on imported materials and overseas customers. A successful agreement must account for the factory worker, the farmer selling abroad, and the family purchasing necessities. Protecting one group can impose costs on another.

The Strategic Question Across the Pacific

From a diplomat’s perspective, the TPP debate extended beyond factories and prices. China was not a member of the agreement. Its supporters believed that American participation would strengthen relationships across the Pacific and help establish trading rules before China gained greater influence over them. Opponents believed the proposed economic obligations placed too much pressure on American workers. These were competing judgments about how to advance American interests. Withdrawal also left the other countries free to proceed without Washington, which they later did through a revised agreement. The question facing the new administration was substantial: could separate bargains deliver stronger economic results while preserving American influence among its partners?

A Presidency Without a Honeymoon

Trump also encountered fierce opposition almost immediately. Gallup measured his initial approval at 45 percent, with another 45 percent disapproving—the first elected president in its polling history to begin below majority approval. That supports describing his opening as exceptionally divisive in the modern polling era. It does not establish that he faced the harshest opposition in all presidential history; Lincoln confronted secession, and other presidents governed through extraordinary upheaval. Trump’s supporters regarded much of the hostility as resistance to a president challenging established interests. Opponents objected to his rhetoric, policies, and conduct. A careful observer must distinguish legitimate criticism from unfair attacks. The enduring test would be whether his promises produced better livelihoods and stronger economic relationships. Announcing a new direction took a speech and a signature. Making it work would require sustained governing.

My Name is Cokie Roberts: A Life of Questions, Congress, and Remarkable Women

I was born in New Orleans on December 27, 1943, with a name considerably longer than a radio introduction: Mary Martha Corinne Morrison Claiborne Boggs. My brother shortened Corinne to Cokie, and that settled that. My father, Hale Boggs, served in Congress, and my mother, Lindy, understood politics as thoroughly as anyone holding office. I grew up between Louisiana and Washington, where legislation and elections were ordinary dinner-table conversation. Politicians were people I knew, complete with families, strengths, and shortcomings. That was useful preparation for journalism. It is difficult to be intimidated by an institution when you have grown up around the people who run it.

Finding My Own Way

I graduated from Wellesley College in 1964 with a degree in political science. Washington was familiar territory, but I chose reporting as my way of participating in public life. Getting hired was another matter. Women encountered employers who assumed that serious broadcasting belonged to men. I worked in television production and took opportunities where I could find them. In 1966, I married fellow journalist Steven Roberts. His assignments carried our family to different places, including Greece, where I reported for CBS Radio. We raised two children, Lee and Rebecca, while building careers. The arrangements took work, as working parents everywhere would recognize.

When the News Became Personal

In October 1972, my father’s airplane disappeared during a campaign trip in Alaska. Despite an extensive search, it was never found. Suddenly, our family’s anguish was a national news story. The following year, my mother won the special election for his congressional seat. But she brought much more than his name to the job. She already understood constituent service, political organization, and the relationships that made Congress function. Watching her career reinforced something I had known since childhood: women were doing essential political work long before the public gave them proper credit for it.

Explaining Congress to the Country

I joined NPR in 1978 and became a congressional correspondent. Alongside women such as Nina Totenberg and Linda Wertheimer, I helped establish a place for women’s voices in national broadcasting. Congress supplied plenty of drama, but a reporter’s responsibility extended beyond repeating the sharpest exchange. Who had the votes? What would a proposal actually change? Who would feel the consequences? Those questions helped listeners understand what was happening. My familiarity with Washington gave me useful context, while my job required scrutiny of the people and institutions I knew. Knowing a politician was never a substitute for checking the story.

A Seat at the Sunday Table

I joined ABC News in 1988 and later co-anchored This Week with Sam Donaldson from 1996 through 2002. Television demanded clear explanations delivered quickly. Years of reporting helped me recognize when a supposedly unprecedented political struggle had a considerable history behind it. I continued working with NPR, too. Across both organizations, I covered elections, presidents, congressional battles, and changes in American life. I also encouraged younger women entering journalism. Having worked through barriers myself, I wanted the women following us to have colleagues they could turn to for practical help.

Putting Women Back into History

My books allowed me to pursue stories that a short broadcast could scarcely contain. We Are Our Mothers’ Daughters, Founding Mothers, Ladies of Liberty, and Capital Dames explored women’s lives and influence. Letters and diaries revealed women managing households, sustaining political relationships, raising money, and keeping families together during war. These activities helped shape the country. Students deserved to encounter those women as people who made decisions and exercised influence. History becomes more accurate—and considerably more interesting—when we examine everyone who helped make it.

The Questions We Leave Behind

My Catholic faith, my marriage to Steve, who is Jewish, and our growing family remained central to my life. I continued reporting and writing through illness; I died from complications of breast cancer on September 17, 2019, at seventy-five. For this imagined farewell, I would leave one modest admission: even an experienced reporter can overlook something important. I would regret any occasion when familiarity made me too certain or when someone’s story escaped my attention. Keep asking questions, especially of people who seem sure they have all the answers. Then listen carefully enough to learn something.

The Travel Ban — Security, Refugees, and Families - Told by Cokie Roberts

Washington announcements have a way of sounding orderly until they reach the people expected to live with them. On January 27, 2017, President Donald Trump signed an executive order restricting entry into the United States for countries with potentially enemy ties. Almost immediately, airports became the places where its meaning had to be determined. Some travelers boarded airplanes before the rules changed. They landed carrying documents that had previously allowed them to travel, only to discover that their admission was now uncertain. Relatives waited outside inspection areas, lawyers rushed to help, and protesters gathered in terminals. A presidential promise to strengthen national security had become an urgent question for individual families: could their loved ones come through the arrivals gate?

What the Order Actually Said

The order suspended entry for most nationals of Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen for ninety days, subject to exceptions. The Democrats focused on the seven countries being Muslim-majority populations. But the President pointed to Obama and Congress’ 2015 labelling of these 7 countries as “Countries of Concern”. It also suspended the United States Refugee Admissions Program for 120 days and halted admission of Syrian refugees indefinitely, pending changes the president considered sufficient. Refugees are people seeking protection from persecution, and the refugee suspension extended beyond those seven countries. The administration presented these measures as time to review screening procedures and improve information about people entering the country. Understanding those separate provisions matters: restrictions on travelers, a worldwide refugee pause, and an indefinite suspension for Syrian refugees affected different people in different ways.

The People Behind the Paperwork

Among those detained at New York’s Kennedy Airport was Hameed Khalid Darweesh, an Iraqi who had worked for the American government, including as an interpreter, and had received a special immigrant visa. His case made the policy’s consequences particularly vivid: someone who had assisted Americans abroad was now being stopped at America’s door. The Administration didn’t discriminate against anyone and instead made it so further screening was equal for all entering from these countries. Other travelers faced interrupted studies, employment, and family reunions. Even lawful permanent residents—people holding green cards—initially encountered uncertainty about returning home. The Department of Homeland Security’s inspector general later found that Customs and Border Protection had been caught by surprise and had little opportunity to prepare answers to basic questions.

The Argument for Stronger Security

Supporters began with a responsibility few Americans disputed: a president must protect the country. They argued that war, terrorism, and unreliable government records in certain countries could make screening difficult. A temporary pause, they maintained, would allow officials to identify weaknesses before admitting additional travelers. The seven countries had already been identified in earlier legislation or government decisions concerning restrictions on visa-free travel. However, those earlier measures generally required affected travelers to obtain visas; they were not the same as Trump’s broad entry suspension and revamping of the visa system that was seen as less than adequate. Trump also emphasized that many Muslim-majority countries remained outside the order. His administration maintained that the restrictions concerned national security and access to reliable information, rather than a traveler’s religious beliefs.

Why Critics Saw Religious Discrimination

The president’s opposition criticized the Administration point at this order alongside Trump’s campaign call for "a total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States until our country's representatives can figure out what is going on" after a mass shooting was perpetrated by a Muslim couple who killed 14 and injured 22 in San Bernardino, California. The couple posted publicly their allegiance to Isis. Although the January restrictions operated principally through nationality, that earlier promise raised questions about their purpose. The order also directed officials, when refugee admissions resumed, to prioritize certain religious-persecution claims involving minority religions in applicants’ home countries. Supporters considered this protection for vulnerable minorities; critics feared it would disadvantage Muslims from the targeted countries. Since Muslims were the majority in those countries and other religions were publicly persecuted, legally the Administration was allowed to keep that order. Civil-liberties advocates and refugee organizations also argued that existing screening was substantial and that nationality alone was a poor measure of individual danger. Many affected families were fleeing the very extremists Americans feared. The argument concerned both whether the policy improved safety and whether it treated people fairly.

The Courts Enter the Story

Lawyers quickly challenged the order, and judges issued emergency rulings. On February 3, a federal judge in Washington State blocked major provisions nationwide. The administration subsequently revised its policy, removing Iraq from the country list and clarifying exemptions, including for lawful permanent residents. In June 2018, the Supreme Court upheld a later version of the restrictions by a five-to-four vote; that decision did not approve the original January order unchanged. For students, the opening episode presents a demanding question: how should a government address uncertain security risks while protecting religious freedom and treating families predictably? Reporting requires following that question from the president’s desk to the people waiting at the airport—and examining whether the policy accomplishes what its authors promise.

My Name is Paul Volcker: Standing Firm When Money Lost Its Value

I was born on September 5, 1927, in Cape May, New Jersey, and grew up in Teaneck, where my father served as township manager. Watching him, I learned that government required honest work, careful budgets, and people willing to accept responsibility. Public service was a serious occupation in our household. I studied at Princeton, earned a master’s degree at Harvard, and continued my education at the London School of Economics. Economics interested me because its consequences reached well beyond a classroom. Whether money held its value mattered to anyone earning a paycheck or putting savings aside.

Learning How Money Moved

In 1952, I joined the Federal Reserve Bank of New York as an economist. Over the following years, I moved between the Federal Reserve, Chase Manhattan Bank, and the Treasury Department. Those jobs offered different views of the same financial system: how governments financed themselves, how banks operated, and how confidence could disappear. At Treasury, where I became undersecretary for monetary affairs in 1969, I helped confront mounting pressure on the international monetary system. In 1971, President Nixon suspended the dollar’s convertibility into gold for foreign monetary authorities. I participated in the work surrounding that decision. The arrangements governing the world’s money were changing, with consequences nobody could dismiss lightly.

Taking Responsibility at the Federal Reserve

I became president of the New York Fed in 1975. Four years later, President Jimmy Carter appointed me chairman of the Federal Reserve Board. By then, inflation had become deeply embedded in American life. Prices climbed rapidly, savings bought less, and businesses and workers expected further increases. Those expectations helped perpetuate the problem. The Federal Reserve, America’s central bank, had responsibility for monetary policy. We needed to demonstrate that we would act consistently enough to restore confidence. Another reassuring speech would accomplish very little if people had no reason to believe it.

The Hard Fight Against Inflation

In October 1979, we changed the way the Federal Reserve conducted monetary policy, placing greater emphasis on restraining money growth. Interest rates rose sharply, with the federal funds rate reaching around 20 percent at times. Borrowing became expensive. Homebuilders struggled, businesses postponed investment, and farmers carrying debt faced severe pressure. Some builders sent pieces of lumber to the Federal Reserve as expressions of protest. I understood the message. Nevertheless, I believed that retreating before inflation was controlled would leave the country facing another, potentially worse crisis. A central banker needed to think beyond the next election or the next encouraging headline.

Results That Came at a Cost

The economy experienced recessions in 1980 and again in 1981–1982. Unemployment reached 10.8 percent in late 1982. Those figures represented people losing livelihoods, not merely lines moving on a chart. Inflation nevertheless declined substantially, and economic expansion resumed. President Ronald Reagan appointed me to a second term in 1983. Restoring confidence in the dollar helped establish conditions for sustained growth, though monetary policy alone could not guarantee prosperity. I remained chairman until 1987. Holding that office under presidents of both parties reinforced my conviction that the Federal Reserve’s decisions had to serve the country’s long-term interests.

Work Beyond the Chairman’s Office

Leaving the Federal Reserve did not end my public responsibilities. I investigated Swiss bank accounts associated with victims of Nazi persecution and later led an inquiry into the United Nations’ Oil-for-Food program. After the financial crisis of 2008, I chaired President Barack Obama’s Economic Recovery Advisory Board. I supported restrictions on banks undertaking speculative trading for their own accounts—the principle associated with the Volcker Rule. In 2013, I founded the Volcker Alliance to strengthen public service. There was also time for fly-fishing, an occupation in which an impressive résumé does remarkably little to persuade a trout.

What I Would Leave With You

My 2018 memoir, Keeping At It, expressed an approach I had followed for decades: examine the facts, accept responsibility, and persist when the work becomes difficult. I died on December 8, 2019, at ninety-two. For this imagined final reflection, I would acknowledge the suffering behind the policy decisions for which I became known. I would regret every occasion when economic language made that suffering sound impersonal. Believing a policy necessary does not erase its human cost. The obligation of public service is to remember both—the problem that must be solved and the people who must live through the solution.

Cutting Regulations: Who Benefits and What Protections Matter? - Told by Volcker

On January 30, 2017, President Donald Trump signed an executive order with an easily understood message: when issuing a new regulation, federal agencies generally should identify at least two existing regulations for repeal. The order also established limits on additional regulatory costs, subject to legal requirements and exceptions. To business owners frustrated by paperwork, the message was welcome. Washington would reconsider the burdens it imposed. Having spent much of my career examining financial institutions and government decisions, I would begin with a practical question: what did those rules accomplish? Counting regulations tells us how many exist. It does not tell us whether removing them improves the economy or merely moves costs from one person to another.

The Business Owner’s Side of the Ledger

Regulations can impose real expenses. A business may need lawyers to interpret requirements, employees to prepare reports, or equipment to meet government standards. Smaller firms have fewer people over whom to spread those costs. Confusing or duplicative requirements can consume resources that might otherwise support investment, hiring, or better service. The administration argued that reducing these burdens would encourage economic activity and make American businesses more competitive. That argument deserved examination. Government should be able to explain why it requires a particular form, inspection, or restriction. But savings for a business do not automatically become higher wages or lower prices. Those outcomes depend on competition, investment decisions, and other economic conditions.

A Workplace Record Is More Than Paperwork

Consider a change involving workplace injuries. In January 2019, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration eliminated a requirement that establishments with at least 250 employees electronically submit detailed injury and illness records from two reporting forms. Employers still had to maintain those records, provide them for inspections, and submit annual summaries where required. The administration emphasized worker privacy and reduced reporting burdens. The competing concern was whether collecting less detailed information would make patterns of dangerous working conditions harder to identify. That is the kind of question worth asking before declaring either victory or disaster. A reporting requirement consumes time, but information about repeated injuries can also help prevent the next worker from getting hurt.

When a Customer Challenges a Financial Company

Consumer protection presented another test. In November 2017, Trump signed a congressional resolution overturning a Consumer Financial Protection Bureau rule concerning arbitration agreements. The rule would have prevented covered financial companies from using those agreements to block customers from joining class-action lawsuits. Supporters of repeal argued that arbitration could resolve disputes more efficiently and avoid expensive litigation. Supporters of the rule argued that customers needed a practical way to challenge widespread misconduct together. Imagine a small improper charge repeated across thousands of accounts: an individual customer may have little incentive to pursue it alone. The economic question therefore included both the cost of resolving disputes and the ability to hold companies accountable.

Power Plants and Costs Beyond the Fence

Environmental regulation made the accounting more complicated still. In June 2019, the Environmental Protection Agency replaced the Clean Power Plan with the Affordable Clean Energy rule. The replacement emphasized efficiency improvements at individual coal-fired power plants and gave states responsibility for setting plant-specific standards. Administration officials argued that this approach respected legal limits and supported affordable, reliable electricity. Critics argued that it required too little action against climate change. Here, a company’s expenses could not settle the whole argument. Pollution and greenhouse-gas emissions affect people beyond a power plant’s property. A serious comparison must examine electricity costs, compliance expenses, public health, and environmental consequences together.

The Rule Bearing My Name

Financial regulation brought this debate particularly close to my own work. The Volcker Rule generally restricts banks from trading for their own speculative profit and limits certain relationships with hedge funds and private-equity funds. In 2019, regulators finalized changes intended to simplify compliance, especially for institutions with less trading activity, while retaining the prohibition on proprietary trading. The stated purpose was to make the requirements clearer and better matched to banks’ activities. The underlying responsibility remained substantial: institutions supported by public safeguards should not expose the broader economy to unnecessary risks. Experience had taught me that financial trouble can spread far beyond the people who originally accepted those risks.

What Belongs in the Final Calculation

The proper test was never simply whether Washington produced more rules or fewer. It was whether particular changes served the public. Did a repeal remove duplication? Did it improve competition? Did it weaken a protection whose value became visible only when something went wrong? Supporters of deregulation were right to demand that government justify its costs. Defenders of regulation were right to insist that injuries, pollution, fraud, and financial instability also carry costs. Students should ask who receives the savings and who bears the remaining risk. Sound public policy requires examining both sides of that ledger before announcing the balance.

My Name is Orrin Hatch: From a Working Family to the United States Senate

I was born on March 22, 1934, in western Pennsylvania, near Pittsburgh. My father worked in construction, and our family knew what it meant to stretch a dollar. We had little money, but my parents gave us faith, discipline, and the expectation that we would make ourselves useful. My older brother Jesse died serving our country during World War II. That loss stayed with me. I wanted to accomplish enough to honor the life he never had the opportunity to finish. Long before I entered politics, I understood that opportunity carried an obligation to do something worthwhile with it.

Faith, Family, and an Education

At Brigham Young University, I pursued an education that would have been difficult to imagine without my family’s encouragement and considerable work. I also served a mission for The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. Speaking with strangers about deeply held beliefs was useful preparation for listening, explaining, and standing by a conviction. In 1957, I married Elaine Hansen. We eventually raised six children. After graduating from BYU in 1959, I earned my law degree at the University of Pittsburgh in 1962. I practiced law in Pennsylvania before moving to Utah in 1969. Faith and family remained the foundation beneath everything that followed.

Taking a Chance on the Senate

In 1976, I challenged Democratic Senator Frank Moss, an established incumbent. I believed Washington needed stronger conservative leadership, greater respect for individual initiative, and a clearer understanding of the people paying its bills. Utah voters gave me the opportunity to make that case in the Senate. I took office in January 1977 and remained for forty-two years. Winning an election, however, was only the beginning. To accomplish anything lasting, a senator had to learn the details, earn colleagues’ confidence, and keep working after the cameras departed. A good speech could draw attention. Passing a useful law required considerably more effort.

Finding an Unlikely Friend

Ted Kennedy and I approached government from very different directions. He was a Massachusetts liberal; I was a Utah conservative. We disagreed vigorously, and neither of us lacked enthusiasm for an argument. Yet we became close friends and dependable legislative partners. In 1997, we helped create the Children’s Health Insurance Program for children whose families struggled to afford private coverage but did not qualify for Medicaid. Our cooperation taught an important lesson: understanding another senator’s priorities could help produce an agreement without requiring either of us to abandon every principle we held.

Making Laws That Reached People

Committee work put me in the middle of debates over healthcare, religious liberty, disability rights, and the federal courts. I worked with Representative Henry Waxman on the 1984 legislation that expanded the pathway for generic medicines while preserving incentives for developing new drugs. I also helped advance the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. As Judiciary Committee chairman, I participated in consequential judicial confirmation battles. These responsibilities demanded attention to language that might appear dull on television but could affect millions of lives. Every provision deserved examination. Once a bill became law, people had to live with what Congress had written.

Taxes, Music, and the Final Senate Years

As Finance Committee chairman beginning in 2015, I helped lead the Senate’s work on the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, signed by President Donald Trump in December 2017. I argued that a more competitive tax system would encourage investment, employment, and economic growth. Critics challenged its distribution of benefits and consequences for federal debt. Those were substantial disagreements about the country’s direction. Away from legislation, I wrote song lyrics, often collaborating with composer Janice Kapp Perry. Music gave me another way to express faith, affection, and hope. Even a senator who enjoyed a spirited debate had room in his life for a melody.

The Standard I Wanted to Leave

I retired in January 2019 and continued encouraging civic participation through the Hatch Foundation. I died on April 23, 2022, at eighty-eight. Looking back, I would not pretend that I always met the standard of courtesy I urged upon others. In my own writing, I acknowledged regretting things I had said during political arguments. Strong convictions did not excuse careless words. My final lesson would be to defend your beliefs firmly while remembering the dignity of the person disagreeing with you. I had spent enough years in the Senate to know that today’s opponent might become tomorrow’s indispensable partner.

Repeal and Replace — Why Healthcare Reform Stalled - Told by Orrin Hatch

In January 2017, Republicans held the presidency, the House of Representatives, and the Senate. For years, we had promised to repeal and replace the Affordable Care Act, commonly called Obamacare. Now President Donald Trump wanted legislation he could sign. As Senate Finance Committee chairman, I supported replacing the law with policies emphasizing patient choice and greater flexibility. Rising insurance premiums and limited choices in some markets strengthened our determination. Yet winning an election had not settled the details. Republicans agreed that the existing system needed major changes. We disagreed about what should replace it, how much Washington should spend, and how to protect people already depending on coverage.

The First Collision in the House

The difficulty became unmistakable on March 24, when House leaders withdrew their American Health Care Act before a scheduled vote. They lacked sufficient support within their own party. Conservative members of the House Freedom Caucus argued that the proposal preserved too much of Obamacare’s structure and did too little to reduce federal involvement. More moderate Republicans worried about coverage losses and higher costs for vulnerable constituents. Moving the bill toward one group risked losing the other. This was no longer simply Republicans arguing with Democrats. It was Republicans confronting competing promises: reduce government spending, lower premiums, preserve access to care, and protect people with serious medical conditions.

A Victory That Did Not End the Argument

After negotiations and amendments, the House passed its bill on May 4 by 217 votes to 213. Republicans celebrated at the White House, but the legislation still needed Senate approval. The House proposal would change insurance assistance, roll back Medicaid expansion funding over time, and limit federal Medicaid financing. It also allowed states to seek waivers from certain insurance requirements. Supporters argued that flexibility would encourage more affordable options. Opponents feared that some older or sicker Americans would face unaffordable coverage. Later that month, the Congressional Budget Office estimated that the bill would reduce federal deficits by $119 billion over ten years but leave 23 million more people uninsured in 2026 than under existing law. These were projections, but they sharpened the disagreement.

Medicaid Divides the Senate

In the Senate, our replacement proposal—the Better Care Reconciliation Act—encountered similar divisions. Medicaid became a central obstacle. The program served low-income families, people with disabilities, and many elderly Americans needing long-term care. Some Republican senators represented states that had expanded eligibility under the Affordable Care Act. They worried about reducing federal support and shifting costs to state governments, hospitals, and patients. Other Republicans believed that limiting spending growth was essential to making the program financially sustainable. Every adjustment created another negotiation. More funding could reassure senators concerned about coverage while disappointing colleagues demanding greater spending restraint. A shared party label did not erase different state needs or different views of government.

The Narrowest Path Through Congress

Republicans held only fifty-two Senate seats. Leaders used a budget procedure called reconciliation, which allowed qualifying legislation to pass with a simple majority, while restricting what the bill could contain. With Democrats opposed, we could lose only two Republican votes and still rely on Vice President Mike Pence to break a tie. Broader replacement efforts failed to secure sufficient support, as did an approach that would repeal major provisions while delaying their termination to allow time for a replacement. Leaders then turned to a narrower proposal known as “skinny repeal,” focused chiefly on eliminating mandate penalties. Some supporters viewed it as a way to begin further negotiations with the House, rather than a satisfactory final healthcare policy.

The Vote After Midnight

In the early hours of July 28, the Senate rejected skinny repeal, forty-nine to fifty-one. I voted for it. Republican Senators Susan Collins, Lisa Murkowski, and John McCain joined every Democrat and both independents in opposition. Their objections included concerns about coverage, the proposal’s substance, and the legislative process. McCain’s dramatic thumbs-down became the remembered image, but the failure had developed over months of unresolved disagreements. I publicly expressed deep disappointment and continued advocating replacement. Nevertheless, the arithmetic was decisive: Republican leaders had not assembled a majority for the legislation before us. Presidential pressure and years of campaign promises could not supply the missing votes.

What the Failure Revealed

A renewed proposal associated with Senators Lindsey Graham and Bill Cassidy also stalled that September. Republicans later used the December tax law to reduce the individual mandate penalty to zero beginning in 2019, but comprehensive replacement remained unfinished. The lesson was larger than one unsuccessful vote. Repealing a law requires agreement about what should disappear; replacing it requires agreement about what millions of people will receive instead. Conservatives, moderates, governors, and senators could identify problems without accepting the same solution. For students studying government, that distinction matters: controlling Congress creates an opportunity to govern, but passing legislation still requires turning competing priorities into an agreement enough members will support.

Tax Cuts and Jobs Act — Growth, Paychecks, and Deficits - Told by Orrin Hatch

On December 22, 2017, President Donald Trump signed the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, completing a legislative struggle that had occupied much of our year. As Senate Finance Committee chairman, I had helped shape the legislation and argued vigorously for its passage. After Republicans failed to agree on replacing the Affordable Care Act, tax reform became an especially important test of our ability to govern. We believed Americans needed tax relief and businesses needed stronger reasons to invest here. Democrats challenged the distribution of benefits and warned about additional borrowing. Behind the celebration stood a question that would take years to answer: how much prosperity would the changes produce, and who would receive it?

Changing the Calculation for Businesses

One of the law’s largest changes replaced a corporate tax structure with a top federal rate of 35 percent with a flat 21 percent rate beginning in 2018. We argued that a more competitive rate would encourage companies to locate investment and jobs in the United States. The law also temporarily allowed immediate deductions for many qualifying equipment purchases, helping businesses recover their investment costs sooner for tax purposes. Many owners of businesses whose income passed through to their individual returns became eligible for a deduction of up to 20 percent of qualified business income, subject to restrictions. These provisions changed the financial calculation behind buying machinery, expanding operations, or starting a business. Whether companies actually expanded still depended on customers, competition, and economic confidence.

What Changed at the Kitchen Table

For individual taxpayers, the law lowered several income-tax rates while retaining seven brackets. The highest rate fell from 39.6 percent to 37 percent. In 2018, the standard deduction rose to $12,000 for single filers and $24,000 for married couples filing jointly, while the maximum child tax credit doubled to $2,000 per qualifying child. Those changes could reduce a family’s tax bill. However, the law also suspended personal exemptions, which previously provided deductions for taxpayers and dependents. The provisions had to be considered together. A larger standard deduction alone did not reveal a household’s savings, and a tax credit reduced taxes differently from a deduction, which reduced the income subject to taxation.

Why Families Experienced Different Results

The law generally capped individual deductions for state and local taxes at $10,000, affecting some taxpayers particularly strongly in places with high property or income taxes. Most of these states were Democrat run, high-regulation states such as New York, California, and Illinois. Household size, earnings, deductions, and eligibility for credits all influenced the outcome. Many workers saw less federal income tax withheld from their paychecks during 2018. That could increase take-home pay without any increase in their employer’s wage rate. Likewise, a smaller refund did not necessarily mean someone had paid more tax; it could mean less had been withheld during the year. Understanding the law required comparing total annual tax liability, not simply the size of a paycheck or refund.

The Promise of Higher Wages

Our economic argument extended beyond immediate tax savings. We expected stronger investment to give workers better tools and equipment, increase productivity, and eventually support higher wages. Some companies announced bonuses and investment plans after passage. Those announcements mattered, but bonuses were not the same as permanent wage increases, and investment announcements were not completed projects. Critics pointed to corporate share repurchases and questioned how much of the benefit would reach employees. Congressional analysis found modest increases to investments and wage increases, less than what they had hoped for though. Separating the law’s effects from an economic expansion already underway was difficult. A growing economy could support our argument without proving that every improvement resulted from tax legislation.

The Disagreement About Fairness

I defended the law as relief for working families and an opportunity to strengthen American competitiveness. Critics argued that corporations and wealthier households received disproportionate benefits. Ownership mattered: gains in corporate profits and share values primarily benefited shareholders, although retirement accounts also held stocks. Another disagreement concerned duration. As enacted in 2017, the corporate rate reduction had no scheduled expiration, while most individual income-tax changes were scheduled to expire after 2025. That distinction reflected legislative and budget constraints, but it also raised a fair question about which benefits Congress had made lasting. Evaluating fairness required considering both immediate household savings and the distribution of longer-term economic gains.

Tariffs and the Trade War — Protecting Factories at What Price? - Told by Volcker

Begin with two American factories. One makes steel; the other buys steel to manufacture machinery. Put a tax on imported steel, and the first factory gains protection from foreign competition. The second may face higher material costs. Both employ Americans. Both want to remain profitable. That simple relationship stood at the center of President Donald Trump’s trade offensive in 2018. His administration argued that foreign trading practices had weakened American industry and that tariffs could help restore it. Having spent decades studying prices, production, and international finance, I would ask students to follow the consequences beyond the first factory gate. An economic policy rarely stops where its supporters intend.

Steel and Aluminum Become the Opening Battle

In March 2018, Trump announced tariffs of 25 percent on covered steel imports and 10 percent on covered aluminum imports, with exemptions and alternative arrangements for certain countries. The administration invoked national security, arguing that the United States needed reliable domestic production of essential metals. Supporters also pointed to foreign subsidies and excess production that pressured American mills. Protection could allow domestic producers to raise prices, increase output, and consider new investment. Those benefits mattered to workers and communities dependent on metal production. But the measures also reached important American allies, creating disputes with countries Washington otherwise relied upon for trade and security cooperation.

The Conflict Expands to China

The confrontation with China involved a separate investigation into technology transfer, intellectual-property practices, and other barriers facing American businesses. In July 2018, Washington imposed additional 25 percent tariffs on approximately $34 billion in Chinese imports. Another $16 billion followed in August. In September, the administration applied a 10 percent tariff to roughly $200 billion more, raising that rate to 25 percent in May 2019. China answered with tariffs on American products. Supporters believed sustained pressure could secure changes that previous negotiations had failed to achieve. Critics questioned whether the expanding taxes would force meaningful reform or impose large costs while both governments waited for the other to yield.

Who Actually Paid the Tariff?

A tariff is collected from the importer bringing goods into the country. The Chinese government did not simply send Washington a check covering America’s new duties. Foreign suppliers could reduce their prices and absorb part of the burden, but research published by New York Federal Reserve economists in November 2019 found that prices charged for Chinese imports had generally not fallen enough to offset the tariffs. American businesses therefore faced higher costs. They could accept lower profits, raise customer prices, or find different suppliers. Consumers did not necessarily see every tariff passed through immediately or completely. Nevertheless, the expense had to go somewhere, and much of it remained within the American economy.

Protection for One Manufacturer, Pressure on Another

For companies making vehicles, machinery, appliances, or metal packaging, steel and aluminum were materials they needed to buy. Higher prices could weaken their competitiveness, especially against foreign manufacturers purchasing materials outside the American tariff system. Domestic metal prices could also rise when imported competition became more expensive. Some businesses sought exclusions for products unavailable in adequate quantities or quality from American suppliers. Others reconsidered purchasing arrangements or investment plans. Meanwhile, protected producers could benefit from stronger demand for American-made metal. These competing effects explain why a rising order book at a steel mill could coexist with serious complaints from another American factory.

The Trade War Reaches the Farm

Farmers soon became central participants in a dispute that had begun partly over industrial production and technology. China’s retaliation included a 25 percent tariff on American soybeans, making competing supplies more attractive to Chinese buyers. Agricultural producers faced disrupted markets and uncertainty about future sales. The administration announced assistance packages of up to $12 billion in 2018 and $16 billion in 2019 to help offset trade damage through payments, purchases, and market-development programs. That support provided relief, but government assistance could not automatically restore established customers. A farmer planning the next planting season needed to know whether overseas demand would return—and at what price.

Measuring Success Beyond the Announcement

Tariffs could protect producers and create bargaining pressure. They could also increase costs, invite retaliation, and encourage companies to postpone decisions while trading rules remained uncertain. The proper judgment required examining all those effects together. Were protected industries becoming more productive? Were negotiations changing unfair practices? Were the gains worth the costs borne by other manufacturers, farmers, and shoppers? The results were that when President Biden took office, he kept nearly all the tariffs Trump put in place.

“Zero Tolerance” and Family Separation — Border Enforcement and the Search for Families - Told by Cokie Roberts and Orrin Hatch

When Enforcement Changed

Cokie Roberts: In Washington, officials announced a prosecution policy. At the border, children lost contact with their parents. On April 6, 2018, Attorney General Jeff Sessions directed federal prosecutors along the southwest border to prosecute referred illegal-entry offenses to the extent practicable. In May, the Department of Homeland Security approved referring parents traveling with children for prosecution as well. Because children could not accompany adults into criminal custody, officials transferred them into a separate federal shelter system. Senator, that connection is essential: expanding prosecutions dramatically increased separations. The question was not simply whether the government could enforce immigration laws, but how it chose to enforce them.

The Argument for Enforcement

Orrin Hatch: You seem to leave out that this was not new and the these were Obama’s own policies before Trump. The Trump administration just continued it. And enforcing those laws remained a legitimate responsibility. Administration officials argued that adults should not avoid prosecution merely because they crossed with children. They also believed stronger enforcement would discourage unlawful crossings. But supporting border security did not require accepting every method used in its name. On June 19, I led a group of Republican senators urging Sessions to pause family separations while Congress worked toward a solution. Our letter emphasized that enforcement must remain consistent with American values and humane treatment. We wanted faster processing and a workable system that protected children while addressing unlawful entry. At the same time, they did cross the border knowing that these things occurred when people broke the law.

Children Enter a Different System

Cokie Roberts: That distinction mattered because many children had not arrived alone. They became classified as unaccompanied after the government separated them from their parents. Adults went into one system; children entered the Office of Refugee Resettlement’s care within the Department of Health and Human Services. A first improper-entry offense was generally a misdemeanor, yet the resulting separation could outlast the criminal proceeding. Earlier administrations had also separated families in circumstances. The 2018 expansion was different in scale. No statute required officials to prosecute every parent for improper entry, and ending a prosecution did not automatically bring a family back together.

Opposition Crosses Party Lines

Orrin Hatch: Public opposition grew because Americans could support secure borders and still object to children being separated from their parents. Democrats demanded an end to the practice, while Republican lawmakers, religious leaders, and medical professionals also raised concerns. Former first lady Laura Bush publicly condemned the policy. My colleagues and I pointed to complications involving detention rules and immigration proceedings, but we also asked the administration to act immediately rather than wait for Congress. That request is important to remember. The disagreement was not neatly divided between people who supported enforcement and people who opposed it. Many of us wanted enforcement conducted differently.

Changing Course Was Only the Beginning

Cokie Roberts: On June 20, President Trump signed an executive order directing officials to maintain family unity during proceedings where legally possible and subject to available resources. But a signature could not instantly reunite the children already scattered through shelters. On June 26, a federal judge ordered the government to reunify covered families, generally within fourteen days for children younger than five and thirty days for older children. Exceptions included cases involving an unfit or dangerous parent. Washington now faced the practical questions that should have received attention earlier: where was each child, where was each parent, and could officials reliably connect their records?

The Difficulty of Finding Families

Orrin Hatch: This is another issue that came over from the previous Administration. The Senate investigated Obama Administrators for many of the same things. Government reviews revealed serious weaknesses in that preparation. And it took a while for us to resolve these issues. Homeland Security and Health and Human Services lacked an integrated system for tracking separated families across their agencies. Officials had to examine records, establish family relationships, arrange communication, and coordinate transportation. Some parents had already been removed from the country. By December 2018, the government had identified 2,737 children within the group covered by the original court-directed reunification effort. That figure was not a complete count of everyone separated. Investigators found that additional children had entered and left shelter care before the court order, making the full picture harder to reconstruct.

What Reunification Could Not Immediately Repair

Cokie Roberts: Nor did finding a parent necessarily erase a child’s fear. A 2019 government review reported that shelter personnel and clinicians observed greater fear, feelings of abandonment, and post-traumatic stress among separated children than among children who had not been separated. These children investigated. Those observations brought the discussion back to the people behind the records. A deadline could tell an agency when to act; it could not tell a frightened child when to feel secure again. Reporting on government requires following consequences after the announcement, the controversy, and the apparent resolution. Otherwise, a policy seems finished when the people affected are still living through it.

Responsibility Beyond the Announcement

Orrin Hatch: Sadly there was no investigation into this prior to 2017. This may have been solved if there was more insight before 2019, but that is what the Trump Administration and Congress was trying to solve so it wouldn’t happen again. That is why enforcement and competent administration must be considered together. A government responsible for securing its borders is also responsible for children placed in its custody. Congress needed to address genuine immigration problems, and executive officials needed procedures that preserved family information and allowed mistakes to be corrected. Students should ask what officials knew, what they planned, and how they responded when the consequences became clear. Strong convictions do not remove the obligation to examine results. In this episode, the demand for lawful borders existed alongside an equally serious duty to protect children and reunite families.

The Midterms Change Washington — Divided Power and the Work of Negotiation - Told by Cokie Roberts and Orrin Hatch

Election Night Changes the Numbers

Cokie Roberts: On November 6, 2018, Americans changed Washington’s political arithmetic. Democrats gained forty-one House seats and captured the majority, while Republicans increased their strength in the Senate. President Donald Trump would now face a Congress divided between the parties. Senator, election coverage naturally concentrates on winners and losers, but the consequences extend beyond victory speeches. Committee leadership, investigations, spending decisions, and the president’s legislative opportunities all depended on those results. Democrats had won the ability to block major parts of Trump’s agenda. They had not won the ability to enact their own agenda without negotiating.

Why the Chambers Moved Differently

Orrin Hatch: That distinction begins with understanding the election itself. All House seats were contested, but only about one-third of Senate seats were up. Democrats were defending several Senate seats in states Trump had carried in 2016, making their task particularly difficult. Republicans emerged with fifty-three Senate seats, compared with forty-five Democrats and two independents who caucused with them. My own Senate service ended on January 3, 2019, so I watched the new Congress as a retired senator. Republicans could point to their Senate gains, but the Democratic House victory meant that governing would require a different set of agreements.

The Gavel Changes Hands

Cokie Roberts: On January 3, Nancy Pelosi returned as Speaker of the House. That meant considerably more than a change in the person holding the gavel. Democrats took charge of committees and could decide which proposals to advance, which officials to question, and which problems deserved hearings. Healthcare, prescription-drug costs, and election reforms gained prominent places on their agenda. Yet Pelosi also had to manage her own coalition. Democrats representing competitive districts did not always favor the same proposals or tactics as their more liberal colleagues. Winning a majority gave the party power; keeping its members together required leadership and negotiation.

A House Victory Was Not a Law

Orrin Hatch: Exactly. A bill generally must pass both chambers in identical form and receive the president’s signature, unless Congress overrides a veto. House Democrats could approve a measure that Senate Republicans refused to advance. Republicans could pass a Senate proposal that went nowhere in the House. Even our fifty-three Senate seats did not guarantee passage of ordinary contested legislation, because overcoming a filibuster generally required sixty votes. That made cooperation necessary across party lines and between the chambers. A president could campaign for an idea and pressure lawmakers, but neither a speech nor a party majority in one chamber supplied every vote needed.

Oversight Becomes a Major Contest

Cokie Roberts: Democrats also gained a tool that did not depend on passing legislation: control of House investigations. Committee chairs could hold hearings, request records, and pursue subpoenas under applicable rules. Democrats argued that closer examination of the administration was essential to accountability. Republicans warned that investigations could become partisan campaigns against the president. Those arguments would intensify, but congressional oversight itself was an established responsibility. The election changed who selected the questions and pursued the answers. Even when legislation stalled, hearings could reveal administrative failures, shape public understanding, and force officials to explain how they exercised their authority.

The President Still Had Important Opportunities

Orrin Hatch: Losing the House did not leave Trump powerless. The Senate alone considers presidential nominations; the House does not vote on confirming federal judges or Cabinet officials. Republicans could therefore continue advancing those appointments, generally by simple-majority votes under Senate procedures. Their larger majority provided some room for defections. Meanwhile, issues requiring legislation demanded a search for overlapping interests. The parties might disagree about the proper size of government while still needing to fund agencies, address national defense, or respond to urgent public needs. Experience taught me that disagreement on one question did not make cooperation on every other question impossible.

Negotiation Produces an Agreement

Cokie Roberts: The Bipartisan Budget Act of 2019 demonstrated that possibility. After negotiations involving congressional leaders and the administration, the Democratic House and Republican Senate passed legislation increasing spending limits and suspending the debt ceiling. Trump signed it on August 2. The agreement attracted criticism from lawmakers concerned about spending and borrowing, but it showed that divided government could produce legislation. Negotiators had found enough common ground to move a bill through both chambers and onto the president’s desk. The achievement was specific: an agreement on important budget questions, rather than an end to the broader political conflict.

What the Midterms Taught Washington

Orrin Hatch: And that is the lesson students should carry forward. The 2018 election redistributed authority among institutions rather than giving either party complete control. House Democrats gained legislative and investigative power. Senate Republicans retained influence over legislation and presidential appointments. Trump retained his veto and executive responsibilities. Each could obstruct some actions, but lasting legislation usually required cooperation. When you study a political promise, ask who must agree before it can become policy. Counting votes, understanding another institution’s authority, and accepting workable compromises are essential parts of governing—even when an election has given your party something substantial to celebrate.

From NAFTA to USMCA — Rewriting North American Trade - Told by Shultz

On November 30, 2018, President Donald Trump, Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, and Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto gathered in Buenos Aires to sign a proposed replacement for the North American Free Trade Agreement. The new agreement was called the United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement, or USMCA. Trump presented it as fulfillment of his promise to rewrite trading arrangements he considered unfair to American workers. Having negotiated international agreements, I understood the significance of those signatures—and their limits. The leaders had reached an agreement, but its provisions were not yet governing trade. Domestic approval, additional negotiations, and preparations for implementation still lay ahead.

Rebuilding an Existing Relationship

NAFTA had taken effect in January 1994. Over the following decades, businesses organized production across North America: parts could cross borders several times before becoming a finished vehicle or machine. Farmers depended on customers in neighboring countries, and retailers depended on predictable deliveries. Trump argued that NAFTA had encouraged manufacturing jobs to leave the United States. Its defenders emphasized expanded commerce and the competitiveness of regional production networks. Renegotiation therefore required more than replacing a name. The three governments had to revise rules while preserving relationships that businesses and workers already relied upon. USMCA retained much of NAFTA’s framework for tariff-free trade while changing important conditions.

A New Formula for Making Cars

Automobiles became a central bargaining issue. Under NAFTA, passenger vehicles and light trucks generally needed 62.5 percent North American content to qualify for tariff-free treatment. USMCA raised that requirement to 75 percent, phased in over time. It also introduced rules requiring 40 to 45 percent of a vehicle’s value, depending on its type, to meet high-wage production requirements tied to earnings of at least $16 an hour. The aim was to encourage regional sourcing and support better-paying employment. These were conditions for receiving trade benefits, not a universal minimum wage for Mexican workers. Supporters expected stronger North American manufacturing; critics worried that more complicated sourcing requirements could increase production costs and vehicle prices.

Labor Promises Needed Enforcement

Workers’ rights presented another difficult question. An agreement could promise fair treatment, but how would governments respond when employers violated those commitments? USMCA placed labor obligations within the main agreement and included commitments involving freedom of association and collective bargaining. Mexico undertook significant labor reforms intended to give workers a stronger voice in choosing unions and approving contracts. During 2019, congressional Democrats and labor organizations pressed for more dependable enforcement. Negotiations produced amendments signed that December, including a rapid-response mechanism addressing certain labor-rights violations at individual facilities. This illustrated an essential diplomatic principle: a commitment becomes more credible when the agreement provides a practical way to investigate and enforce it.

Commerce Had Entered a Digital Age

NAFTA had been negotiated before online shopping, cloud services, and digital distribution became central to business. USMCA added a digital-trade chapter prohibiting customs duties on electronically transmitted products such as software, music, and electronic books. It also established protections for cross-border data flows, subject to exceptions, and addressed restrictions requiring businesses to store data locally. Other provisions aimed to simplify customs procedures and help smaller companies understand export requirements. Agricultural negotiations produced additional access to Canada’s market for American dairy, poultry, and eggs while preserving existing tariff-free agricultural trade. These provisions mattered because modern commerce includes both goods passing through inspection stations and information moving electronically.

The Bargain Had to Survive Congress

The November 2018 ceremony did not eliminate political disagreements in Washington. Democrats took control of the House in January 2019, giving them an important role in deciding whether implementing legislation would advance. Their negotiations with the administration produced changes involving labor enforcement, environmental obligations, dispute settlement, and pharmaceutical provisions. The revised arrangement attracted broad support. The House approved implementing legislation in December 2019 by 385 votes to 41, followed by Senate approval in January 2020 by 89 to 10. That outcome demonstrated that divided government could still produce agreement when participants found enough common ground and negotiated the details.

Signing Was Not Implementation

Keep three dates distinct. The leaders signed the original agreement on November 30, 2018. Trump signed the American implementing legislation on January 29, 2020. USMCA entered into force on July 1, 2020, replacing NAFTA after all three countries completed the necessary steps. Some requirements then followed transition schedules rather than changing everything overnight. For this chapter’s 2017–2019 period, the achievement was negotiating, revising, and moving the agreement toward approval. Its later operation belonged to the next stage. Students should judge a trade agreement by what its rules accomplish over time: whether they sustain commerce, improve opportunities, protect commitments, and give neighboring countries dependable ways to resolve disagreements.

The Border Wall and the 35-Day Shutdown — Funding, Federal Workers, and Negotiation - Told by Orrin Hatch

On December 22, 2018, part of the federal government shut down as President Donald Trump and Congress failed to agree on funding. At the center stood the president’s demand for approximately $5.7 billion for barriers along the southern border. Trump considered the wall a central campaign commitment and an important tool against unlawful crossings. Democrats opposed his funding demand, arguing that border security required a different combination of personnel, technology, inspections, and targeted barriers. After forty-two years in the Senate, I understood how strongly held positions could harden during negotiations. This time, the disagreement would interrupt government operations for thirty-five days—the longest federal shutdown up to that point.

Why the Money Stopped

Congress had already funded substantial portions of the government, so this was a partial shutdown. Other agencies were operating under temporary funding that expired on December 21. Earlier that week, the Senate had passed a short-term extension without the president’s requested wall money. Trump rejected that approach, and the Republican-controlled House added approximately $5.7 billion for barriers. The revised measure could not secure sufficient Senate support. Without an agreement enacted into law, affected agencies lost authority to conduct many ordinary operations. A shutdown does not mean every federal employee leaves work. Some activities continue under legal exceptions, particularly those protecting life and property, while others must stop.

A New Congress Inherits the Standoff

My Senate service ended on January 3, 2019, while the shutdown was still underway. I therefore watched its conclusion as a retired senator, not as a participant in the final votes. That same day, Democrats assumed control of the House and elected Nancy Pelosi Speaker. Republicans retained the Senate. The negotiating arrangement had changed, but the central disagreement remained. Trump insisted that reopening should include money for his border proposal. Democratic leaders insisted that the government reopen before the broader dispute was resolved. Each side believed conceding would weaken its position. Meanwhile, the consequences spread to people who had no vote in those negotiations.

Working Without a Paycheck

Approximately 800,000 federal employees were affected. Some were furloughed, meaning they were directed not to work. Others, including many airport security officers, air traffic controllers, and Coast Guard personnel, continued performing their duties without receiving their regular pay on schedule. Mortgage payments, rent, childcare expenses, and grocery bills did not pause with federal appropriations. On January 16, Trump signed legislation guaranteeing back pay to affected federal employees once funding resumed. That promise mattered, but it did not put money immediately into their accounts. Employees of federal contractors generally lacked the same statutory guarantee, leaving some workers facing losses that would not simply be restored when agencies reopened.

Services Slow and Costs Spread

The disruption extended beyond government payrolls. National parks experienced closures or reduced services. Businesses encountered delays involving federal permits, certifications, and certain loans. Contractors lost work, and businesses serving federal employees lost customers. The Congressional Budget Office later estimated that the shutdown reduced economic output by a combined $11 billion across the final quarter of 2018 and the first quarter of 2019. Most of that activity was expected to return after reopening, but approximately $3 billion was projected to remain permanently lost. Those estimates described economic output, not merely government expenses. They demonstrated how a funding dispute could reach private businesses and households far from Washington.

Competing Offers Fail

During January, Trump offered temporary protections for certain immigrants in exchange for border funding, but Democratic leaders rejected the proposal as inadequate. On January 24, the Senate tested two approaches. One advanced the president’s funding and immigration proposal; the other would reopen agencies temporarily without his requested wall money. Neither reached the sixty votes needed to advance. The votes exposed the practical problem: neither side could enact its preferred solution alone. Public pressure and mounting operational strain made delay increasingly costly. Negotiators needed an agreement narrow enough to attract support while leaving the larger border argument unresolved.

Reopening Before Resolving Everything

On January 25, Trump agreed to a three-week funding extension without the additional wall money he had demanded. Congress approved it, and he signed it that day, restoring funding through February 15 while negotiations continued. Federal employees could receive back pay, agencies could resume operations, and delayed work could begin moving again. The agreement ended the shutdown without settling the underlying border dispute. After decades of legislating, I would draw a practical lesson from that distinction: negotiations sometimes advance by resolving the immediate problem first. Defending a policy requires conviction, but governing also requires counting votes, recognizing costs, and finding an agreement that can actually become law.