2. Heroes and Villains of the Globalization Era: The Gulf War and America's New Global Role

My Name is Brent Scowcroft: National Security Adviser

I was born in Ogden, Utah, in 1925, and as a young man I imagined a life in the skies. I entered the United States Military Academy at West Point during the final years of World War II and graduated in 1947. I joined the newly established United States Air Force and trained as a pilot. My flying career, however, was cut short after an aircraft accident left me seriously injured. I could no longer follow the military path I had expected, so I turned toward something that would define the rest of my life: understanding strategy, international affairs, and how nations protect their interests without stumbling unnecessarily into war.

Learning the World of Strategy

The Cold War taught my generation that national security was rarely simple. The United States faced the Soviet Union, nuclear weapons could destroy entire cities, alliances stretched across continents, and a mistake by one government could produce consequences far beyond its borders. I studied international relations and eventually earned a doctorate from Columbia University. I served in military and government positions where my responsibility was not simply to ask, "What can America do?" but "What should America do, what might happen next, and what will our adversaries do in response?"

Inside the White House

During the 1970s, I entered the highest levels of American national-security policymaking. I served under President Richard Nixon and later became National Security Adviser to President Gerald Ford. My approach was deliberate and strategic. Foreign policy could not be conducted successfully through emotion or slogans. Presidents needed accurate information, competing viewpoints, dependable allies, and advisers willing to tell them when an attractive idea might carry dangerous consequences.

Returning With George H. W. Bush

When George H. W. Bush became president in 1989, I returned as his National Security Adviser. We entered office at an extraordinary moment. Communist governments were weakening across Eastern Europe, the Berlin Wall fell, Germany moved toward reunification, and the Soviet Union itself approached collapse. Our challenge was to manage these transformations without humiliating our former adversaries or allowing excitement to replace careful diplomacy. Great victories can create dangerous mistakes when nations begin believing that power has no limits.

Saddam Hussein Invades Kuwait

Then, on August 2, 1990, Saddam Hussein's Iraq invaded Kuwait. This was not merely a distant border dispute. An entire country had been attacked and occupied, and Iraqi forces now stood close to Saudi Arabia. President Bush gathered his advisers, military commanders, diplomats, and allies. My responsibility was to help him see the entire strategic picture. We sought international cooperation, worked through the United Nations, strengthened Saudi Arabia's defenses, and built a broad coalition rather than treating the crisis as America's alone.

War and the Liberation of Kuwait

When diplomacy and sanctions failed to force Saddam Hussein from Kuwait, coalition forces began Operation Desert Storm in January 1991. The military campaign was extraordinarily powerful. After weeks of air operations, coalition ground forces moved into Kuwait and Iraq, and Kuwait was liberated with remarkable speed. Yet military success creates its own temptation: once an army is winning, people naturally ask why it should stop. Our stated objective was the liberation of Kuwait, not the conquest and occupation of Iraq. We believed changing that objective could fracture the coalition and leave the United States responsible for governing Iraq.

A New American Role

The Gulf War demonstrated that the end of the Cold War did not mean the end of international danger. America possessed tremendous military, diplomatic, and economic power, but I believed power worked best when combined with alliances, clearly defined objectives, and an understanding of consequences. The United States had emerged from the Cold War in an unusually influential position. The question was no longer simply whether America could act, but when it should act, alongside whom, and toward what achievable end.

Saddam Hussein, Iraq, and the Road to the Kuwait Crisis - Told by Brent Scowcroft

When I returned to the White House as National Security Adviser in 1989, much of the world's attention was fixed on Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. But another danger was developing in the Persian Gulf. Saddam Hussein had ruled Iraq through an authoritarian Ba'athist government and had just emerged from eight years of brutal war against Iran. The fighting ended in 1988 without the decisive victory Saddam had sought. Iraq possessed an enormous, battle-hardened military, but behind that military power stood an economy badly damaged by war and burdened by extraordinary debt.

The Bill for Eight Years of War

Wars have a way of presenting their bills after the shooting stops. Iraq had borrowed heavily from neighboring Arab countries during its struggle with Iran. The United States estimated that Iraq owed approximately $37 billion to Gulf creditors by 1990, while broader estimates placed Iraq's total debt considerably higher. Saddam argued that Kuwait and other Gulf states should forgive much of what Iraq owed them because, in his view, Iraq had defended the Arab Gulf against revolutionary Iran. Kuwait did not accept that argument. Saddam therefore emerged from one war needing enormous amounts of money while commanding a military establishment far larger than his weakened economy could comfortably support.

Oil Becomes a Weapon of Argument

Then came the quarrel over oil. Iraq depended heavily upon petroleum exports for revenue, which meant that falling oil prices struck directly at Baghdad's ability to rebuild. Saddam accused Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates of producing more oil than their OPEC quotas permitted, helping drive prices downward. From Baghdad's perspective, every decline in the price of a barrel meant less money for reconstruction and debt payments. Saddam increasingly portrayed Kuwait's production policies not merely as an economic disagreement, but as an attack upon Iraq's recovery.

The Border Beneath the Sand

Money was only part of the dispute. Iraq and Kuwait had long disagreed about portions of their border. Saddam's government accused Kuwait of taking oil from the Rumaila field, which extended along the disputed frontier. Iraq also renewed demands involving Kuwait's Bubiyan and Warbah islands, strategically important because Iraq possessed limited access to the Persian Gulf. These disputes had existed in various forms for decades, but in the economic desperation of 1990, Saddam combined oil, debt, territory, and national grievance into an increasingly threatening case against Kuwait.

An Army Begins to Move

That summer, the rhetoric became more dangerous because Iraqi troops began moving toward Kuwait. Saddam may have believed military pressure could frighten the Kuwaitis into concessions, but from Washington we had to consider something more serious: he might actually use the army he had assembled. The United States conducted naval exercises in the Gulf as a warning against aggression, while diplomacy continued. Even so, American officials did not anticipate that Saddam would launch the full-scale invasion that followed.

Negotiations Fail

In the final days of July, Iraq and Kuwait still attempted negotiations. But the gap between them was enormous. Saddam wanted debt relief, money, territorial concessions, and changes in oil policy. Kuwait was willing to discuss some economic issues but would not simply surrender to Baghdad's demands. Meanwhile, Iraqi forces were positioned close enough to turn political intimidation into military action with very little warning. What appeared to some observers as another tense Arab dispute was becoming something considerably more dangerous.

The Night the Crisis Became a War

On August 2, 1990, the uncertainty ended. Roughly 100,000 Iraqi troops invaded Kuwait, while Republican Guard and special forces moved rapidly against Kuwaiti military positions, airfields, government buildings, and other strategic locations. Kuwait's defenses were overwhelmed, and members of its ruling family escaped into Saudi Arabia. Saddam had transformed a dispute about debts, oil, and borders into the conquest of a sovereign country.

A Crisis Larger Than Kuwait

From the White House, the question immediately became larger than Kuwait itself. Iraqi forces now stood near Saudi Arabia, Saddam controlled substantially greater oil resources, and the world had to decide whether military conquest would be allowed to redraw an international border. The Cold War was ending, but history had certainly not ended with it. Instead, Saddam Hussein had presented the emerging post-Cold War world with one of its first great tests—and we now had to decide how the United States and the international community would answer it.

My Name is Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al Saud: King of Saudi Arabia

I was born in Riyadh in 1921, a son of Abdulaziz Ibn Saud, the founder of modern Saudi Arabia. My childhood unfolded while my father was bringing much of the Arabian Peninsula under one kingdom. I was raised within the traditions of Islam and the responsibilities of the House of Saud. From an early age, I understood that leadership in our kingdom required protecting its security, preserving its religious heritage, and maintaining relationships among families, tribes, and neighboring Arab states.

Preparing to Govern

As a young prince, I represented my country abroad and gradually assumed greater responsibilities at home. In 1953, I became Saudi Arabia's first minister of education, helping oversee the expansion of modern schooling. Later, I served as minister of the interior and then as crown prince. During these decades, oil transformed Saudi Arabia. Roads, hospitals, universities, airports, and new cities expanded rapidly. Our challenge was to use this new wealth to modernize the kingdom while preserving the religious and cultural foundations upon which Saudi society rested.

Becoming King

In 1982, following the death of my brother King Khalid, I became king. I later adopted the title Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, emphasizing my responsibility toward the sacred cities of Mecca and Medina. Saudi Arabia occupied an important position in both the Arab and Islamic worlds, but it also faced serious dangers. The Iran-Iraq War had devastated our region throughout the 1980s. We sought stability in the Persian Gulf while maintaining important relationships with Arab nations, Muslim countries, and Western powers, including the United States.

Saddam Hussein Invades Kuwait

On August 2, 1990, the situation changed dramatically. Saddam Hussein's Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait and quickly overwhelmed the country. Iraqi troops now stood dangerously close to our northern frontier. Iraq possessed a huge, battle-tested military, and I could not dismiss the possibility that Saudi Arabia itself might be threatened. The defense of the kingdom was my responsibility. This was not a theoretical question of diplomacy. Decisions had to be made quickly while the security of our people and the stability of the Gulf hung in the balance.

A Difficult Decision

I agreed to receive American and other coalition forces in Saudi Arabia as part of Operation Desert Shield. It was a consequential decision. Saudi Arabia is the land of Islam's two holiest cities, and the presence of large numbers of non-Muslim foreign troops was sensitive and controversial. Yet Iraqi forces had already demonstrated their willingness to cross an international border and occupy another Arab country. I concluded that protecting the kingdom required cooperation with nations capable of deterring another Iraqi advance. Saudi forces also joined the growing multinational coalition.

Building an Arab and International Coalition

The response could not simply appear to be a conflict between the United States and an Arab country. Saudi Arabia worked alongside Egypt, Syria, Kuwait, the Gulf states, the United States, Britain, France, and many others. The United Nations demanded Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait, while enormous military forces gathered in our region. Saudi Arabia provided bases, resources, financial assistance, and military forces. Our objective was the restoration of Kuwait rather than the conquest of Iraq.

War Comes to the Kingdom

When Iraq refused to withdraw, Operation Desert Storm began in January 1991. The war was no longer something happening beyond our borders. Iraqi Scud missiles were launched against Saudi Arabia, placing our cities and civilians in danger. Coalition aircraft operated from bases throughout the region, and Saudi forces participated in the campaign. In February, coalition ground forces advanced, Iraqi troops were driven from Kuwait, and Kuwait's government was restored. The military campaign was short, but the consequences would continue for years.

August 2, 1990: Iraq Invades Kuwait - Told by King Fahd

Before dawn, Iraqi Republican Guard divisions crossed the border into Kuwait. Within hours, Iraqi forces had seized Kuwait City, and Kuwait's emir and crown prince escaped into my kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Within days, Saddam Hussein's forces controlled virtually the entire country. We had watched tensions between Baghdad and Kuwait grow, but this was no longer an argument over oil, debts, or borders. One Arab state had used its army to conquer another.

An Attack From a Fellow Arab and Muslim Nation

There was something particularly painful about what had happened. Iraq and Kuwait were both predominantly Muslim and Arab countries. They were not divided by the Sunni-Shia distinction in any simple way: Saddam Hussein's government was secular Ba'athist and dominated politically by Sunni Arabs, although Iraq's population contained a Shiite Muslim majority, while Kuwait was ruled by a Sunni dynasty and included both Sunni and Shiite citizens. This was fundamentally a struggle over power, territory, oil, debt, and sovereignty—not a religious war between branches of Islam. Saudi officials later described the invasion as especially bitter because it had come from a fellow Arab and Muslim country that Kuwait and other Gulf states had supported during Iraq's long war against Iran.

From Neighbor to Threat

The betrayal seemed greater because the Gulf Arab states had regarded Iraq as an important barrier against revolutionary Iran during the Iran-Iraq War. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait had provided enormous financial support to Iraq during that conflict. Saddam now turned Iraq's powerful, battle-tested military against Kuwait. The question immediately confronting me was frighteningly simple: if Saddam was willing to destroy the sovereignty of one neighbor, could we be certain he would stop there?

Iraqi Forces Approach Saudi Arabia

Kuwait was small. Saudi Arabia was directly south of it. Once Kuwait had fallen, Iraqi forces stood near our northern frontier, and Baghdad possessed a military hardened by eight years of warfare with Iran. As king, I could not base the security of my country on Saddam Hussein's assurances about what he would or would not do next. American military planners likewise regarded the possibility of an Iraqi advance toward Saudi Arabia seriously. The defense of the kingdom suddenly became an urgent military problem.

The Muslim World Was Divided

Saddam attempted to portray his struggle in broader Arab and Islamic terms, but Muslims did not respond as a single political bloc. Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Syria, Kuwait, and several other Arab governments opposed Iraq's conquest. Other governments took different positions or sought negotiated solutions. This is an important lesson: sharing a religion does not mean sharing the same government, interests, alliances, or interpretation of international events. The crisis divided the Arab world precisely because governments had to decide whether loyalty to another Arab state could excuse the conquest of Kuwait.

The World Responds

The reaction extended far beyond the Arab world. On August 2, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 660, condemning Iraq's invasion and demanding that Iraqi forces withdraw immediately and unconditionally. The resolution passed 14–0, demonstrating how isolated Saddam's government had become internationally. The crisis was rapidly becoming more than a dispute between Iraq and Kuwait. It had become a test of whether one country could seize another by force and keep what it had conquered.

A Decision I Could Not Avoid

I now faced one of the most consequential decisions of my reign. Defending Saudi Arabia might require accepting large numbers of foreign troops onto the soil of the kingdom that contained Mecca and Medina, Islam's two holiest cities. Such a decision would inevitably be controversial. But Saddam had already demonstrated what his army was capable of doing. On August 6, I approved the deployment of coalition forces to help defend Saudi Arabia. American forces began arriving shortly afterward as Operation Desert Shield took shape.

The Crisis Was Only Beginning

The invasion of Kuwait lasted only hours; solving the crisis would take months. Saddam Hussein had expected his army to transform Kuwait's future. Instead, his decision brought American forces, Arab armies, European allies, and eventually hundreds of thousands of coalition troops into the Persian Gulf. On August 2, however, none of us knew exactly where the crisis would lead. We knew only that Kuwait had fallen, Saudi Arabia might be threatened, and the governments of the Arab and Muslim worlds now faced a painful reality: the aggressor was not an outside power, but one of our own neighbors.

America Faces Its First Great Post-Cold War Crisis - Told by Brent Scowcroft

In August 1990, we were watching the Cold War order change before our eyes. Communist governments had fallen across Eastern Europe, Germany was moving toward reunification, and relations with Moscow were improving. Then Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait. Suddenly, the United States faced a very different kind of crisis. This was not Soviet tanks moving across Europe. An important regional power had conquered its smaller neighbor, and Iraqi forces now stood close to Saudi Arabia. The question before us was whether the emerging post-Cold War international system would permit conquest to succeed.

The Saudis Ask for Help

Saudi Arabia was critical. King Fahd's government had to decide whether to permit foreign military forces into the kingdom, home to Mecca and Medina, Islam's two holiest cities. Saudi leaders had long maintained military ties with the United States, but accepting tens of thousands—and eventually hundreds of thousands—of foreign personnel was something altogether different. After consultations with American officials and military commanders, Fahd approved the deployment of U.S. forces to help defend his kingdom. We were not simply marching into Saudi Arabia uninvited. The Saudi government was requesting protection against a danger it believed could cross its northern frontier.

This Was Not America Against Islam

That distinction mattered enormously. Saddam would have benefited politically if he could portray the crisis as the United States attacking a Muslim country. But the reality was considerably more complicated. Kuwait and Saudi Arabia were themselves Muslim-majority Arab countries. Egypt and Syria opposed Iraq's conquest, as did other governments across the Muslim world. At an emergency Arab summit on August 9–10, Arab leaders supported Saudi Arabia's right to defend itself and approved sending Arab forces in response to requests from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states. Egypt, Syria, Morocco, and other Muslim-majority countries eventually contributed forces to the coalition.

But the Arab World Was Divided

We also understood that there was no single "Arab position" or "Muslim position." Some governments strongly supported the coalition, others opposed foreign military intervention, and still others attempted to mediate. Saddam appealed to Arab nationalism and later attempted to connect the Kuwait crisis with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. We therefore needed more than American military strength. We needed Arab participation and international legitimacy. Otherwise, a response intended to defend Kuwait and Saudi Arabia could be portrayed as a Western war against the Middle East.

The United Nations Responds

The international reaction was remarkably swift. On the same day as the invasion, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 660 by a vote of 14–0, condemning Iraq's invasion and demanding an immediate and unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait. That mattered greatly to us. The Soviet Union was no longer automatically blocking American initiatives simply because Washington supported them. One of the striking features of this crisis was that former Cold War rivals could cooperate against Iraq's aggression.

Why America Believed It Had Interests at Stake

Our concerns went well beyond oil, although Persian Gulf energy supplies certainly mattered to the international economy. If Iraq absorbed Kuwait and then intimidated or attacked Saudi Arabia, Saddam would command enormous economic and strategic influence in the Gulf. American allies had been threatened, an internationally recognized state had been occupied, and a dangerous precedent was at stake. If military conquest produced permanent rewards, other governments might draw their own conclusions. President Bush and his advisers therefore saw the crisis as involving regional security, international law, economic stability, American alliances, and the credibility of the developing post-Cold War order.

Operation Desert Shield Begins

On August 7, American forces began deploying to Saudi Arabia under Operation Desert Shield. The name described our immediate mission: defense. Aircraft arrived, soldiers unloaded equipment, naval forces moved into position, and additional coalition troops began gathering. What started with the defense of Saudi Arabia eventually became an enormous multinational deployment. The United States provided the largest military contingent, but we were operating alongside forces from countries with different languages, religions, political systems, and military traditions. The U.S. Army later described Desert Shield and Desert Storm as a major demonstration of America's ability to operate as part of a multinational force.

America's New Role Takes Shape

For four decades, American strategy had been organized primarily around containing the Soviet Union. Now, before the Soviet Union had even formally disappeared, we were confronting a crisis that suggested what the next era might look like. Saudi Arabia and other Gulf governments wanted protection; Arab and Muslim nations were participating in the response; the United Nations was condemning Iraq; and countries that had stood on opposite sides of the Cold War found themselves opposing the same act of aggression. We did not yet know that war was inevitable. But we could already see that America's role was changing. The Cold War was ending, yet America's responsibilities abroad were not disappearing. In some respects, they were becoming more complicated.

Operation Desert Shield: Defending Saudi Arabia - Told by King Fahd

When Iraq conquered Kuwait in August 1990, the danger did not stop at Kuwait's southern border. Saddam Hussein now commanded a large, battle-experienced army positioned near my kingdom. Saudi Arabia had its own armed forces, but Iraq's military was much larger and had just demonstrated how rapidly it could overwhelm a neighboring country. As king, I could not gamble the security of my people on the assumption that Saddam would be satisfied with Kuwait.

We Needed Help—and Quickly

Our problem was not simply finding friendly countries. It was finding nations capable of moving powerful military forces into Saudi Arabia before Iraq could move south. The United States possessed something few countries could match: the aircraft, ships, logistics, troops, intelligence, and equipment necessary to project substantial military power thousands of miles from home. After consultations with American officials, on August 6 I formally approved American military assistance for the defense of Saudi Arabia. The first American forces began moving rapidly into the kingdom.

A Difficult Decision for a Muslim Kingdom

Inviting foreign troops into Saudi Arabia was not a decision I could treat lightly. Our kingdom contains Mecca and Medina, Islam's two holiest cities, and the arrival of large numbers of non-Muslim troops was certain to raise religious and political concerns. Yet Kuwait—a fellow Arab and Muslim country—had already been invaded by Iraq. Saudi Arabia informed the United Nations that the foreign forces were there temporarily, at our request, for defense against the Iraqi threat. We also stated that these forces would not be permitted to use Saudi territory to commit aggression against another country.

The Arab Nations Answer

We were not asking America to fight while the Arab world stood aside. At the emergency Arab summit in Cairo on August 9–10, Arab governments debated the crisis intensely. The final resolution condemned the Iraqi threat, supported Saudi Arabia's right of self-defense, and agreed to our request that Arab forces be sent to help defend Saudi territory. Egypt and Syria became particularly important military contributors, and forces from other Arab and Muslim-majority countries also participated. The Arab world was divided over the crisis, but Saudi Arabia was not defending itself alone.

Why American Power Mattered

Nevertheless, the United States provided capabilities on a scale that our regional partners could not quickly duplicate. American F-15 fighters, an airborne brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division, AWACS surveillance aircraft, carrier battle groups, and enormous quantities of equipment began moving toward the region. More followed. What impressed everyone was not simply the number of soldiers America possessed, but its ability to move soldiers, aircraft, ammunition, fuel, food, vehicles, and communications equipment halfway around the world and make them operational. The U.S. Army later described the deployment as one of the most concentrated and complicated projections of American military power since World War II.

Muslim Soldiers Stand Beside American Soldiers

Soon an unusual coalition was taking shape on Saudi soil. Saudi soldiers stood alongside Egyptians, Syrians, Americans, British, French, and forces from other countries. This was important politically as well as militarily. Saddam Hussein could claim that foreigners had come to dominate an Arab country, but that description ignored why they were there: Saudi Arabia had requested assistance after Iraq had conquered Kuwait. Arab governments had also authorized forces to come to our defense. Saudi Arabia described the arriving troops at the United Nations as "Arab, Islamic and friendly forces" joining our own armed forces in defending the kingdom.

A Shield Across the Desert

The operation was appropriately called Desert Shield. During its first phase, our immediate objective was not to invade Iraq but to make Saudi Arabia extraordinarily difficult to attack. Aircraft guarded our skies. Warships protected the Gulf. Ground troops established defensive positions while tanks, artillery, supplies, and additional soldiers poured into the region. With every arriving unit, Saddam's opportunity to move south became more dangerous for him.

When Friends Answer the Call

The crisis taught us something important about alliances. Saudi Arabia had spent decades developing relations with the United States while also maintaining its place in the Arab and Muslim worlds. In 1990, both relationships mattered. Arab and Muslim soldiers came to our assistance, but American military power provided capabilities essential to building a credible defense with extraordinary speed. We had asked for help because Kuwait's fate showed us what hesitation could cost. When that request came, the United States responded. Operation Desert Shield therefore began not as America's invasion of an Arab land, but as a Saudi-requested multinational defense of a kingdom that feared Saddam Hussein's army might be coming next.

My Name is Colin Powell: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

I was born in Harlem, New York City, in 1937, the son of Jamaican immigrants, and grew up in the South Bronx. I was not the best student in school, and I did not begin life knowing exactly where I was headed. That changed when I attended the City College of New York and joined the Army ROTC. I discovered something important about myself: I responded to responsibility, discipline, teamwork, and leadership. In 1958, I was commissioned as a second lieutenant in the United States Army.

Learning Leadership in Vietnam

My military career took me around the world, including two tours in Vietnam. War stripped away easy theories about leadership. Soldiers needed commanders who could make decisions, accept responsibility, and understand that orders affected real human lives. During my first tour, I was injured after stepping on a punji stake. During my second, I survived a helicopter crash and helped rescue others from the burning wreckage. Vietnam taught me lessons I would carry throughout my career about preparing forces properly and understanding exactly what we were asking soldiers to accomplish.

Rising Through the Ranks

Over the following decades, I moved through increasingly important military and government assignments. I served in Korea, commanded troops, worked at the Pentagon, and eventually became National Security Adviser under President Ronald Reagan. In 1989, President George H. W. Bush appointed me Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I was the first African American to hold that position. My responsibility was enormous: I was the senior military adviser to the president, the secretary of defense, and the National Security Council.

Saddam Hussein Invades Kuwait

On August 2, 1990, Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait. Suddenly, the United States faced one of the first major international crises of the changing post-Cold War world. Iraq possessed a large and battle-experienced army, and its forces now threatened an important region. My responsibility was not to decide foreign policy for the president. My job was to give civilian leaders the clearest military advice possible: what our forces could accomplish, what resources they would require, what the risks were, and what might happen if military action began.

Building Overwhelming Strength

I believed that if America sent its young men and women into battle, we should give them a clear mission and the resources necessary to succeed. We deployed hundreds of thousands of American personnel to the Persian Gulf while our allies contributed substantial forces of their own. General Norman Schwarzkopf commanded the forces in the region, while I worked in Washington with President Bush, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, and our military leadership. We did not want a halfhearted commitment. If war became necessary, the objective had to be clear and the force strong enough to accomplish it.

Operation Desert Storm

In January 1991, after Iraq refused to withdraw from Kuwait by the UN-authorized deadline, the coalition began Operation Desert Storm. An enormous air campaign struck Iraqi military targets before coalition ground forces attacked in February. The ground campaign moved with extraordinary speed. Iraqi forces were driven from Kuwait, and the coalition achieved its central military objective in roughly one hundred hours of ground fighting. Our forces had trained hard, planned carefully, and benefited from technological advantages, coalition cooperation, and overwhelming strength.

Knowing When to Stop

Victory can create pressure to keep going. Some believed coalition forces should march farther into Iraq and remove Saddam Hussein. But our authorized objective had been to liberate Kuwait, not occupy Baghdad or overthrow the Iraqi government. Expanding the war would have meant accepting a different mission with different consequences. One of the most important principles of military leadership is understanding that force is a tool of policy. Winning a battle does not automatically answer what should happen afterward.

My Life After the Uniform

I retired from the Army in 1993 after thirty-five years of service. Later, I returned to government when President George W. Bush appointed me Secretary of State in 2001, making me the first African American to hold that office as well. I died in 2021 at the age of eighty-four. Looking back, there were decisions in my public career that I regretted, especially my later presentation to the United Nations in 2003 concerning Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, intelligence that proved deeply flawed. Leadership does not mean pretending every judgment was correct. It means accepting responsibility, learning from mistakes, and remembering that when leaders make decisions about war, other people must live with the consequences.

Building an International Coalition - Told by Colin Powell

When Saddam Hussein's army invaded Kuwait in August 1990, we understood that the United States possessed enormous military power. But possessing power and using it wisely are two different things. Kuwait's government appealed for international support, and Saudi Arabia agreed with the United States to bring American forces into the kingdom for its defense. From the beginning, however, President Bush's administration wanted something broader than an American operation. If Saddam's aggression was a threat to international order, then the response needed to demonstrate that the world—not simply Washington—opposed what Iraq had done.

Saudi Arabia Asks for Protection

The immediate military problem was Saudi Arabia. Iraqi forces had conquered Kuwait and were now positioned close to the Saudi frontier. King Fahd's government agreed to the deployment of American forces, and on August 7 our troops were already moving toward the kingdom. Within days, American F-15 fighters were patrolling near the Saudi-Kuwaiti border and soldiers of the 82nd Airborne Division were arriving. The United States could move aircraft, troops, ships, weapons, communications systems, and supplies across thousands of miles with extraordinary speed. That capability was one of the principal reasons American assistance mattered so much.

Arab Nations Answer the Call

But Americans were not the only soldiers coming. Following an emergency Arab League meeting in Cairo on August 10, Arab governments agreed to send forces to Saudi Arabia. Egypt and Syria eventually deployed substantial combat formations. Morocco also contributed troops. This mattered greatly. Muslim and Arab soldiers would be standing alongside Americans to defend an Arab Muslim kingdom from an Iraqi army. Saddam could attempt to portray the confrontation as America against the Arab or Muslim world, but the coalition itself demonstrated that the political reality was far more complicated.

Muslim Countries Beyond the Arab World Join

The coalition expanded farther. Pakistan and Bangladesh, both Muslim-majority countries, contributed troops to the forces assembling against the Iraqi threat. Saudi Arabia itself fielded forces and played a central role in the coalition command structure. General Norman Schwarzkopf and Saudi Lieutenant General Khalid bin Sultan shared important command responsibilities, with Khalid coordinating most of the Islamic ground forces. We were not replacing the region's armies. We were combining military capabilities that no single participating nation could provide by itself.

America Brings Something Different

The United States nevertheless carried the largest military burden. Britain and France could deploy major combat forces, and regional countries could provide soldiers, bases, money, local knowledge, and political legitimacy. But America's global transportation network, airpower, naval forces, logistics, intelligence, and large ground formations gave the coalition capabilities that would have been extremely difficult to assemble otherwise. By October, American armored, airborne, air-assault, Marine, naval, and air forces were positioned throughout the theater alongside allied forces. The shield protecting Saudi Arabia was becoming formidable.

Former Enemies Find Common Ground

Something else remarkable was happening. Only a short time earlier, nearly every international crisis had been viewed through the rivalry between Washington and Moscow. Now the Soviet Union, although it did not contribute combat troops to the coalition, joined the United States in condemning the invasion of Kuwait. NATO allies such as Britain and France stood beside Arab states such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Syria. Governments that disagreed profoundly on other issues found common ground in opposing Iraq's conquest. The State Department later described this as an unprecedented international coalition involving Western allies and important Middle Eastern countries.

Thirty-Four Nations, One Objective

Eventually, the coalition opposing Saddam included forces from dozens of countries. Making such a coalition function was never simple. Every government had its own interests, restrictions, military traditions, and political concerns. As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I had to think not only about how American forces would fight, but how our military effort fit into this much larger international undertaking. Coalitions require patience because allies do not surrender their national interests simply because they have agreed to fight beside you.

Strength Through Coalition

That was one of the great lessons of Desert Shield. Saudi Arabia needed immediate protection, and the United States responded with military capabilities few other nations could deploy on that scale or at that speed. But Arab and Muslim-majority nations also answered the call, while European allies supplied powerful forces of their own. We were building something larger than an American army in the desert. We were building an international coalition around a clearly stated objective: defend Saudi Arabia, compel Iraq to leave Kuwait, and demonstrate that conquering a neighboring country would not simply be accepted as a permanent fact.

United Nations, Sanctions, and the Last Attempts to Avoid War - Told by Scowcroft

By the autumn of 1990, hundreds of thousands of troops were gathering around the Persian Gulf, yet war was not inevitable. President Bush and those of us advising him believed Saddam Hussein still had a choice: withdraw from Kuwait and avoid a major conflict. Saudi Arabia had requested military assistance, Kuwait wanted its country restored, and several Arab and Muslim-majority nations had joined the developing coalition. But before military force was used to expel Iraq, an extraordinary international diplomatic campaign attempted to pressure Saddam into leaving voluntarily.

The United Nations Moves Quickly

The United Nations Security Council responded almost immediately to Iraq's invasion. Resolution 660, adopted on August 2, condemned the invasion and demanded Iraq's immediate and unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait. Four days later, Resolution 661 imposed broad economic sanctions against Iraq. Governments were called upon to halt most trade with Iraq and occupied Kuwait. The objective was straightforward: make the economic and diplomatic cost of occupying Kuwait so severe that Saddam would decide withdrawal was preferable to confrontation. (digitallibrary.un.org)

Saudi Arabia Needed Protection While Diplomacy Worked

There was an obvious problem with relying on diplomacy alone: Iraqi troops remained in Kuwait while a powerful Iraqi army stood close to Saudi Arabia. King Fahd's government had therefore accepted American and other coalition forces for its defense. Arab countries including Egypt and Syria sent forces, and Muslim-majority countries outside the Arab world also participated. The United States, however, possessed the airlift, sealift, naval power, aircraft, logistics, and heavy ground forces necessary to build a large defensive shield quickly. Diplomacy therefore took place with a growing coalition army standing behind it.

Saddam Tightens His Grip on Kuwait

As the sanctions took effect, Saddam did not withdraw. Iraq instead announced the annexation of Kuwait and attempted to incorporate the conquered country into Iraq. Foreign citizens were detained, and some were moved to strategic locations in Iraq and Kuwait, prompting international condemnation over the use of civilians as shields. Kuwait itself remained under Iraqi occupation. Every passing week made the crisis more difficult, because Saddam appeared determined to turn a military invasion into a permanent political reality. (history.state.gov)

An Unusual Moment of International Cooperation

What struck me was how different this crisis looked from so many Cold War confrontations. The Soviet Union had been Iraq's major arms supplier, yet Moscow joined Washington in condemning the invasion. China generally abstained on some of the strongest measures rather than vetoing them. Arab governments were divided, but important states such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Syria opposed Saddam. For once, the Security Council was not simply paralyzed by American-Soviet rivalry. The changing Cold War relationship had created an unusual opportunity for international cooperation.

The Deadline Is Set

On November 29, the Security Council adopted Resolution 678. Iraq was given until January 15, 1991, to comply with the earlier resolutions and leave Kuwait. If it did not, nations cooperating with Kuwait were authorized to use "all necessary means" to enforce the Security Council's demands and restore international peace and security. The vote was 12 in favor, two against, with China abstaining. Saddam now knew precisely what he faced: withdraw or risk war with an international coalition. (digitallibrary.un.org)

One Last Meeting

Even then, diplomacy continued. On January 9, 1991, Secretary of State James Baker met Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz in Geneva. The meeting lasted for hours, but Iraq offered no commitment to withdraw from Kuwait. Other governments and international figures also pursued proposals intended to prevent war. Saddam attempted to connect Kuwait's occupation with other Middle Eastern disputes, particularly the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. We rejected the idea that Iraq should receive rewards for withdrawing from territory it had conquered by force. (history.state.gov)

Midnight Passes

January 15 arrived. The deadline passed, and Iraqi forces remained in Kuwait. By then the United States had deployed hundreds of thousands of service members to the region, joined by a broad multinational coalition. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait had sought protection and assistance; Arab, Muslim-majority, European, and other countries had contributed to the response; and the United Nations had spent months demanding Iraqi withdrawal and imposing sanctions. The final choice belonged to Saddam Hussein. He chose not to leave.

The Last Door Closes

We had hoped economic pressure, diplomatic isolation, Arab opposition, Soviet cooperation, and the visible strength of the coalition would persuade Saddam that remaining in Kuwait was impossible. They did not. In the early hours of January 17, coalition aircraft began Operation Desert Storm. The diplomatic phase of the crisis was over. What followed would demonstrate the enormous military power of the coalition—but it is important to remember that before the first aircraft crossed into Iraqi airspace, Saddam Hussein had been given more than five months, repeated United Nations demands, economic sanctions, negotiations, and a final deadline to withdraw from Kuwait without facing the war that was now beginning.

My Name is H. Norman Schwarzkopf: Commander of Coalition Forces

I was born in Trenton, New Jersey, in 1934. My father was a military officer, and because of his assignments I spent part of my youth overseas, including time in Iran. I learned early that the world was much larger and more complicated than the United States alone. I eventually followed my father into military service, graduated from West Point in 1956, and was commissioned into the United States Army. Soldiering became my profession, but leadership became my responsibility.

Learning War in Vietnam

I served two tours in Vietnam, and those experiences stayed with me for the rest of my life. Combat is not a map covered with arrows. It is confusion, exhaustion, fear, and young soldiers depending upon their leaders to make sound decisions. I was wounded during my service and received three Silver Stars, among other decorations. Vietnam convinced me that commanders had an obligation to prepare their troops properly and never treat the lives of soldiers casually. If we were going to fight, we needed to understand the mission and fight effectively.

Preparing for the Middle East

I rose through the Army over the following decades, commanding troops and taking increasingly senior positions. In 1988, I became commander of United States Central Command, responsible for American military planning across a vast region that included the Persian Gulf. We studied the terrain, governments, transportation networks, and military threats of the Middle East. Those preparations became critically important in August 1990, when Saddam Hussein's Iraqi army invaded neighboring Kuwait.

Operation Desert Shield

Iraq had one of the world's largest armies, and Iraqi forces were now positioned near Saudi Arabia. Our first mission was straightforward: defend Saudi Arabia against another possible Iraqi attack. American forces began arriving under Operation Desert Shield, but this quickly became a massive multinational effort. Eventually hundreds of thousands of coalition troops assembled in the region. My headquarters had to coordinate Americans, Saudis, British, French, Egyptians, Syrians, and forces from numerous other nations. Different armies had different equipment, languages, procedures, and political concerns. My job was to make them function toward a common military objective.

Planning Desert Storm

If Iraq refused to leave Kuwait and our governments ordered us to fight, I did not intend simply to charge directly into Saddam Hussein's strongest defenses. We developed a campaign designed to use coalition advantages in airpower, intelligence, mobility, and technology. Beginning in January 1991, coalition aircraft attacked Iraqi military targets for weeks. Meanwhile, we prepared the ground offensive. Part of our plan was deception: Iraqi commanders expected the main attack toward Kuwait, while powerful coalition forces prepared a much wider movement through the desert.

The Ground War

On February 24, 1991, the ground offensive began. While forces attacked toward Kuwait, major American and allied armored formations swept westward and then turned toward the Iraqi army from positions it had not adequately prepared to defend. The maneuver became known as the "left hook." Coalition forces moved rapidly, destroying or bypassing Iraqi formations while Kuwait was liberated. After roughly one hundred hours of ground operations, President George H. W. Bush ordered offensive operations suspended. The mission assigned to us—expelling Iraqi forces from Kuwait—had been accomplished.

Victory and Responsibility

Americans celebrated when our troops returned home, but commanders cannot look at war only through victory parades. Soldiers had died, civilians had suffered, Kuwait had been devastated, and retreating Iraqi forces left burning oil wells and destruction behind them. Saddam Hussein also remained in power. Those realities demonstrated something every military leader eventually learns: military force can accomplish an objective, but it cannot solve every political problem that follows.

January 1991: Operation Desert Storm and the Air War - Told by Schwarzkopf

For more than five months, we had built a shield across Saudi Arabia. We had come because Iraq invaded Kuwait and Saudi Arabia accepted our help in defending the kingdom. Arab and Muslim-majority nations including Egypt, Syria, Morocco, Pakistan, and Bangladesh contributed forces as well. Britain, France, and many others joined us. But the United States possessed the ability to move an enormous modern military force halfway around the world and sustain it there. When the January 15 United Nations deadline passed and Saddam Hussein still refused to leave Kuwait, our mission changed. Desert Shield was about defense. Desert Storm would use force to liberate Kuwait.

The Night the Air War Began

In the early hours of January 17, 1991, coalition aircraft went to war. The opening attack was not simply a mass of airplanes rushing toward Baghdad. It was a carefully coordinated assault involving aircraft, cruise missiles, electronic warfare, aerial refueling, reconnaissance, and other capabilities. Our first priority was to weaken Iraq's ability to see us, communicate, command its forces, and effectively challenge coalition aircraft. The U.S. Air Force describes what followed as the largest air campaign since World War II.

This Was a Coalition War

I commanded an American-led coalition, but I never forgot that we were operating from Arab territory with Arab forces beside us. Saudi Arabia was not a passive spectator. Saudi aircraft flew combat missions, Saudi forces prepared for the ground campaign, and Saudi Lieutenant General Khalid bin Sultan held an important coalition command role. Other Arab forces were preparing as well. Saddam wanted people to believe that this was a Western attack upon the Arab and Muslim world. Yet Saudi Arabia had accepted our forces after Kuwait was invaded, and Arab countries such as Egypt and Syria had joined the coalition opposing Iraq.

Taking Control of the Sky

Our air campaign had several purposes. We struck Iraqi air defenses, command facilities, military communications, airfields, supply networks, and forces positioned in Kuwait and southern Iraq. Coalition aircraft increasingly gained freedom to operate while Iraqi airpower became less effective; some Iraqi pilots eventually flew their aircraft into Iran. As the campaign continued, our attention increasingly shifted toward Iraqi ground forces. We wanted those formations weakened before coalition soldiers ever had to meet them across the desert.

Saddam Strikes Back

Saddam was not simply waiting for us. Iraq began firing Scud ballistic missiles at Saudi Arabia and Israel. The attacks on Israel were particularly dangerous strategically. Saddam hoped an Israeli retaliation might fracture the coalition by making it politically difficult for Arab governments to continue fighting alongside the United States and other Western countries. Israel refrained from entering the war, and the coalition remained together. Iraq also launched Scuds against Saudi Arabia, meaning that the kingdom that had requested our protection was now directly under missile attack.

Technology Did Not Make War Clean

Television audiences saw remarkable images from precision-guided weapons, and the war quickly gained a reputation as a new kind of high-technology conflict. Precision weapons were important, but most weapons dropped during the campaign were not precision-guided, and no technology could eliminate mistakes or civilian suffering. Coalition attacks caused civilian casualties, and friendly-fire incidents also killed coalition personnel. The air campaign demonstrated how dramatically modern warfare had changed, but it did not transform war into something bloodless or perfectly controlled.

Preparing the Battlefield

For weeks, the air campaign continued day and night. Iraqi positions were struck, supply routes disrupted, armored formations attacked, and battlefield defenses weakened. My concern was always what would happen when our soldiers finally crossed into enemy-held territory. Every Iraqi tank destroyed from the air was one less tank our ground troops might have to fight. Every disrupted headquarters made it more difficult for Iraqi commanders to coordinate their defense. Airpower was not the entire war, but it was preparing conditions for what came next.

The Ground War Was Coming

By late February, coalition aircraft had been attacking for more than five weeks. Saddam had failed to break our coalition, failed to drive us from Saudi Arabia, and failed to force Israel into the conflict. Now hundreds of thousands of coalition soldiers waited in the desert. Saudi, Egyptian, Syrian, American, British, French, and other forces were ready. The air campaign had prepared the battlefield, but Kuwait was still occupied. On February 24, we would send the ground forces forward—and the enormous military buildup that began with Saudi Arabia asking for help would finally become a battle to drive the Iraqi army out of Kuwait.

Scud Missiles, Patriot Missiles, and High-Tech Warfare - Told by Colin Powell

When Operation Desert Storm began in January 1991, Americans watching television saw something that looked very different from earlier wars. Aircraft could attack at night, cruise missiles traveled long distances toward predetermined targets, satellites helped commanders communicate and navigate, and television showed grainy images from precision-guided weapons striking buildings and bridges. As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I knew we possessed technological advantages Saddam Hussein's forces could not easily match. But technology did not eliminate danger. Iraq still had weapons capable of striking far beyond the front lines.

Saddam Launches the Scuds

Iraq possessed modified versions of the Soviet-designed Scud ballistic missile. Soon after the air war began, Saddam started launching them against Israel and Saudi Arabia. These missiles were not particularly accurate, but that did not make them harmless. A missile falling into a populated area could kill civilians, damage buildings, and create fear far from the battlefield. More importantly, Saddam understood that missiles could be political weapons. He did not need every Scud to hit a military target if the attacks could break apart the coalition opposing him.

Trying to Bring Israel Into the War

The attacks on Israel presented one of our most serious strategic problems. Saddam hoped Israel would retaliate against Iraq. If Israeli aircraft entered the conflict, some Arab governments participating in the coalition might face intense domestic pressure to withdraw from a military campaign in which Israel was also fighting. President Bush's administration therefore urged Israel to exercise restraint while American forces hunted Iraqi missile launchers and deployed additional Patriot missile batteries. Israel ultimately refrained from launching the major retaliation Saddam wanted, and the coalition remained intact. (history.state.gov)

The Patriot Goes to War

The American Patriot system had originally been developed primarily as an air-defense weapon, but it had been modified to intercept ballistic missiles. During the Gulf War, Patriots were deployed in Saudi Arabia and Israel in an effort to destroy incoming Iraqi Scuds. To people watching television, it sometimes appeared that one missile simply raced upward and knocked another from the sky. The reality was considerably more complicated. Radar had to detect and track an incoming missile, computers calculated an interception, and the Patriot attempted to destroy or disrupt the target before it reached the ground.

A Deadly Reminder in Dhahran

No defensive system was perfect. On February 25, an Iraqi Scud struck a U.S. Army barracks in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, killing 28 American soldiers and wounding about 100 others. Investigators later determined that a software-related timing problem had contributed to the Patriot battery's failure to intercept the incoming missile. It was a terrible reminder that even in a war filled with sophisticated computers, radar, and guided weapons, a small technical problem could have deadly consequences. (gao.gov)

Was the Patriot Really That Successful?

During the war, early reports credited the Patriot with an impressive interception record. Later investigations raised substantial doubts about those claims. The Government Accountability Office concluded that evidence supporting many claimed successful interceptions was limited, while congressional investigators and independent experts debated how often Patriots actually destroyed Scud warheads. That distinction is important for understanding modern warfare: battlefield claims made during a conflict may change when engineers, analysts, and investigators examine the evidence afterward. (gao.gov)

Satellites, Stealth, and Precision Weapons

The Patriot was only one piece of a much larger technological transformation. Coalition forces used GPS navigation, satellite communications, airborne warning aircraft, electronic warfare, laser-guided bombs, cruise missiles, night-vision equipment, advanced tanks, and stealth aircraft. F-117 stealth fighters attacked heavily defended targets while attempting to avoid Iraqi radar. GPS was especially valuable in the featureless desert, helping units navigate across terrain where roads and obvious landmarks were scarce. Technology was changing not merely the weapons soldiers carried, but how commanders could see, communicate, navigate, and coordinate an entire battlefield.

The Lesson Behind the Machines

Desert Storm demonstrated that the United States had entered an era in which information and technology could provide extraordinary military advantages. But I would never tell soldiers that machines win wars by themselves. Someone must maintain the aircraft, interpret the intelligence, repair the computers, drive the tanks, make decisions under pressure, and ultimately accept the risks of combat. The Scud and Patriot duel captured the imagination of the world because it looked like warfare of the future. In many ways it was. But beneath the satellites, radar screens, computers, and missiles remained the oldest reality of warfare: technology matters enormously, but people still determine how it is used.

The Ground War and the Liberation of Kuwait - Told by Norman Schwarzkopf

At 4:00 in the morning on February 24, 1991, our ground offensive began. For more than five weeks, coalition aircraft had pounded Iraqi positions, but Kuwait was still occupied. Now soldiers from the United States, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Syria, Britain, France, Kuwait, and other coalition nations moved forward. Our objective was clear: break the Iraqi defenses, drive Saddam Hussein's forces from Kuwait, and restore Kuwait's sovereignty. We had spent months preparing for this moment. Now the waiting was over.

Don't Attack Where the Enemy Expects

The Iraqis had constructed extensive defenses across Kuwait, including trenches, minefields, bunkers, artillery positions, and barriers. They expected the main coalition attack to come directly north through those defenses. We certainly attacked there—but that was not the entire plan. While Marines and Arab coalition forces pressed toward Kuwait, some of our most powerful American formations had secretly repositioned far to the west. They would drive north into Iraq and then swing east behind Iraqi forces. I called this sweeping movement our "Hail Mary" maneuver.

Across the Desert

The western attack moved with tremendous speed. XVIII Airborne Corps drove deep into Iraq on the coalition's western flank, while VII Corps moved toward Saddam's Republican Guard. American M1 Abrams tanks, Bradley fighting vehicles, helicopters, artillery, and aircraft operated together across terrain that Iraqi commanders had not expected us to use for the main assault. GPS technology helped our forces navigate through a desert where there were few landmarks. The maneuver threatened Iraqi forces from the west while coalition troops simultaneously broke through defenses closer to Kuwait.

The Republican Guard

The Republican Guard contained some of Saddam Hussein's most important formations, and we did not want them simply escaping intact. VII Corps fought major armored engagements as it moved eastward, including the Battle of 73 Easting on February 26. These battles demonstrated the advantages coalition forces possessed in training, night-fighting capability, communications, air support, and armored warfare. Yet describing Desert Storm as effortless would be a mistake. Soldiers were fighting in poor visibility, through smoke and sand, against an armed enemy where mistakes could still kill in seconds.

Arab Forces Enter Kuwait City

One detail is sometimes lost when Americans remember the Gulf War: our plan deliberately gave Arab coalition forces an important role in liberating Kuwait City. Egyptian forces, a combined Saudi-Kuwaiti division, and Syrian forces advanced as part of Joint Forces Command-North, while Saudi-led forces moved along the coast. American Marines also drove north through Kuwait. As our official Army history records, the operation was planned so that Arab forces, rather than Americans, would enter and liberate Kuwait City. That mattered because this was Kuwait's liberation, not an American conquest of an Arab capital.

Kuwait Burns

As Iraqi forces retreated, they left destruction behind them. Hundreds of Kuwaiti oil wells were set ablaze. Thick black smoke rolled across the country, darkening the sky and creating an environmental catastrophe that would take months to bring under control. Coalition forces entering Kuwait encountered damaged infrastructure, abandoned equipment, prisoners, and the consequences of months of occupation. Liberation had come, but Kuwait would carry the scars of the invasion long after our armies stopped moving.

One Hundred Hours

By February 27, the central objective had been achieved: Iraqi forces had been driven from Kuwait and the Kuwaiti government could be restored. President George H. W. Bush announced that offensive operations would cease, effective the following morning. The ground campaign had lasted approximately one hundred hours. We had not been ordered to conquer Baghdad or occupy all of Iraq. Our mission was to liberate Kuwait and defeat the Iraqi forces threatening that objective.

Kuwait Was Free

Four days earlier, hundreds of thousands of soldiers had been waiting across the Saudi desert. Now Kuwait was free, much of Iraq's military in the theater had been defeated, captured, or forced to retreat, and coalition forces occupied positions inside Iraq. It had happened with astonishing speed, but I never regarded that speed as proof that war was simple. Months of preparation, weeks of air attacks, enormous logistical effort, coalition cooperation, technological superiority, and the work of individual soldiers made those hundred hours possible. A successful battle may look sudden when viewed afterward. For the people who prepare and fight it, victory is built long before the first tank crosses the line.

Victory—but an Unfinished War: America's New Global Role - Told by Colin Powell and King Fahd

By February 28, 1991, the great coalition assembled in Saudi Arabia had accomplished its central military objective. Iraqi forces had been driven from Kuwait, Kuwait's government could return, and Saudi Arabia was no longer facing an Iraqi army positioned immediately beyond its northern frontier. As Colin Powell, I looked at a military operation involving hundreds of thousands of American personnel alongside forces from dozens of other countries. As King Fahd, I saw something equally important: Saudi Arabia had asked for assistance in a moment of danger, and American, Arab, Muslim, European, and other nations had answered.

Why We Stopped

Powell: From my position as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, victory did not mean that our armies should simply continue toward Baghdad. Our mission had been to liberate Kuwait, not conquer Iraq and install a new government. Saddam Hussein remained in power, which frustrated many people. But overthrowing him would have transformed a limited coalition war into something very different. We would have had to ask who would govern Iraq, how long American troops would remain, whether our Arab coalition partners would support us, and what would happen if Iraq itself fractured. Military power could defeat Saddam's army in Kuwait. It could not automatically provide satisfactory answers to everything that came afterward.

Saddam Survived

Fahd: From Saudi Arabia, however, Saddam's survival meant the danger had not completely disappeared. Iraq's military had been badly damaged, but Iraq remained our neighbor and Saddam remained its ruler. Following the coalition victory, Kurdish and Shiite uprisings broke out against his government. Saddam's forces brutally suppressed these revolts, producing further suffering and refugee movements. The war had liberated Kuwait, but it had not transformed Iraq into a peaceful neighbor. The Gulf still required vigilance.

Victory Did Not End the Problem

Powell: The ceasefire therefore became the beginning of another chapter. The United Nations imposed conditions on Iraq involving weapons, inspections, and continuing sanctions. During the decade that followed, the United States and its allies repeatedly returned military forces to the region when Iraq appeared threatening. American forces also participated in operations intended to enforce restrictions on Iraqi aircraft. Official Army history describes the years from 1991 to 2001 as a period of continuing deterrence, sanctions, weapons inspections, and recurring American deployments rather than genuine peace with Saddam's government.

The Americans Did Not Completely Leave

Fahd: For Saudi Arabia, there was another consequence. We had invited American forces because Iraq had invaded Kuwait and threatened the security of the Gulf. After the war, most of the enormous Desert Storm force went home, but an American military presence continued in the kingdom and elsewhere in the region. That relationship strengthened Saudi defenses, but it also became controversial. Radical opponents of my government objected fiercely to American forces remaining in the land containing Islam's two holiest cities. During the 1990s, extremist hostility toward that presence would become one element in a much larger and more dangerous story.

America Discovers Its Reach

Powell: The Gulf War also revealed something about the United States itself. For nearly half a century, American military planning had centered heavily on the Soviet Union and the possibility of a major war in Europe. Now we had moved an enormous force to the Middle East, sustained it across thousands of miles, fought alongside a multinational coalition, and achieved the stated military objective with remarkable speed. The Army later regarded Desert Storm as an important demonstration of the power projection, multinational operations, sophisticated weapons, and integration of air, sea, and land forces that would characterize many post-Cold War operations.

America Was Now Part of Gulf Security

Fahd: From Riyadh, the lesson looked somewhat different. When Kuwait was invaded, Saudi Arabia could not find within the region alone all the military capabilities required to counter Saddam quickly. Arab and Muslim countries contributed soldiers and resources, but American airpower, naval strength, logistics, intelligence, and ground forces provided capabilities on a different scale. The crisis therefore deepened a reality that would shape the coming decades: the security of the Persian Gulf had become closely connected to American military power.

A Victory With Consequences

Powell and Fahd Agreed: We could both call Kuwait's liberation a victory, but neither of us could call the larger story finished. Saddam Hussein remained in power. American forces remained involved in the Gulf. Sanctions and weapons inspections continued. Iraq remained a source of confrontation. And the American military presence that reassured some governments angered some radical movements. The Gulf War demonstrated the extraordinary reach of the United States just as the Cold War was ending, but it also demonstrated something more enduring: winning a war and resolving the political problems that produced it are not the same thing. America had entered its new global role with an impressive victory—and with unfinished business that would follow it into the twenty-first century.