18. Heroes and Villains of the Cold War: Reagan, Gorbachev, Fall of the Berlin Wall, & End of the Cold War

My Name is Ronald Reagan: President of the United States

I was born on February 6, 1911, in Tampico, Illinois, and grew up in the small towns of the American Midwest. My father, Jack, was a salesman, and my mother, Nelle, taught me that faith, perseverance, and kindness mattered greatly. We were not wealthy, and my father's struggles with alcohol sometimes made life difficult, but I learned early that America was a place where a person's beginning did not have to determine his destination.

From Radio to Hollywood

After graduating from Eureka College in 1932, I became a radio sports announcer. I learned to describe baseball games so listeners could picture every play in their minds, even when I was working from reports rather than sitting in the stadium. Eventually, Hollywood called. I became an actor and appeared in dozens of films. During World War II, poor eyesight kept me from overseas combat, so I served in the Army Air Forces producing training and informational films. Later, as president of the Screen Actors Guild, I encountered the political struggles surrounding Communism in Hollywood, experiences that helped shape my views.

My Political Journey

I had once been a Democrat and admired Franklin Roosevelt, but over the years my political thinking changed. I became increasingly concerned about the growth of government, high taxation, and the expansion of federal power. In 1964, I delivered a nationally televised speech supporting Barry Goldwater that became known as "A Time for Choosing." Two years later, Californians elected me governor. I served from 1967 to 1975, confronting student protests, state budget problems, and fierce political disagreements during a turbulent period in American history.

The Presidency

In 1980, the American people elected me the 40th president of the United States. The nation faced high inflation, unemployment, an energy crisis, and deep concerns about America's position in the world. I believed Americans had become too accustomed to hearing about limits and decline. My administration pursued tax reductions, deregulation, increased military spending, and a smaller role for the federal government in parts of the economy. Not every American agreed with my policies, but I wanted the country to regain confidence in its future.

Facing the Soviet Union

The Cold War became one of the defining challenges of my presidency. I believed peace depended upon strength, and my administration dramatically increased defense spending while supporting the Strategic Defense Initiative, an ambitious effort to investigate defenses against nuclear missiles. My rhetoric toward the Soviet government could be uncompromising because I believed the struggle involved more than armies and missiles—it involved fundamentally different ideas about human liberty, government, and individual rights.

Mr. Gorbachev and I

Then came Mikhail Gorbachev. When he became Soviet leader in 1985, I saw the possibility of something different. We met in Geneva, Reykjavík, Washington, and Moscow. We argued, negotiated, walked together, and gradually developed enough trust to accomplish things that once seemed impossible. In 1987, we signed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, eliminating an entire class of American and Soviet nuclear missiles. That same year, standing near the Brandenburg Gate in West Berlin, I challenged Mr. Gorbachev to open the gate and tear down the Berlin Wall.

A Wall Comes Down

I left the presidency in January 1989, so I was no longer president when the extraordinary events unfolded later that year. On November 9, East Germans poured toward the border crossings, guards opened the gates, and people climbed upon the Berlin Wall that had divided families and symbolized the Cold War for nearly three decades. Germany reunited the following year, and in 1991 the Soviet Union itself dissolved. Those events had many causes and many authors: Eastern European dissidents, ordinary citizens, Western governments, Soviet reformers, economic pressures, and leaders on both sides all played their parts.

Cold War Heats Up Again: Reagan Confronts the Soviet Union - Told by Reagan

When I entered the White House in January 1981, the Cold War had already lasted more than three decades. The period of détente had weakened, the Soviet Union had invaded Afghanistan in 1979, and Soviet SS-20 intermediate-range missiles had become a major concern in Europe. I believed America had to negotiate with Moscow, but negotiation would mean little if the Soviet leadership believed the United States lacked the strength or determination to defend itself and its allies. My approach was straightforward: rebuild American military strength while leaving the door open to serious arms negotiations.

Peace Through Strength

I often spoke of "peace through strength." By that I meant that military power should deter war, not invite it. My administration supported a major defense buildup, including modernization of nuclear and conventional forces, new aircraft and ships, and improvements to America's military readiness. During my presidency, the defense budget increased substantially. Critics worried that this buildup could intensify the arms race; my administration argued that restoring American military strength would make Soviet leaders less likely to believe they could gain an advantage through pressure or intimidation.

The Battle Over Europe

One of our most dangerous disagreements concerned Europe. The Soviets had deployed SS-20 missiles capable of striking targets across much of Western Europe. NATO had already decided in 1979 that unless negotiations produced an acceptable agreement, the alliance would deploy American Pershing II ballistic missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles in Europe. Huge protests erupted in European cities as people feared their countries might become nuclear battlefields. We continued negotiations, but when no agreement was reached, NATO began the planned deployments late in 1983.

Calling the Soviet System What I Believed It Was

I did not believe our disagreement with Moscow was simply a misunderstanding between two governments. The Soviet state restricted political freedoms, suppressed dissent, and dominated much of Eastern Europe. In March 1983, I described the Soviet Union as an "evil empire." Those words became some of the most controversial of my presidency. Critics believed such rhetoric was dangerously provocative during a nuclear confrontation. I believed Americans should not pretend there were no fundamental moral and political differences between our systems. At the same time, I continued communicating with Soviet leaders and urging negotiations to reduce nuclear weapons.

1983: A Dangerous Year

Then came 1983, one of the tensest years of my presidency. On August 31, Soviet forces shot down Korean Air Lines Flight 007 after it entered Soviet airspace, killing all 269 people aboard. Relations deteriorated further. That November, NATO conducted Able Archer 83, an exercise practicing procedures connected with escalation toward nuclear war. Declassified records later showed unusual Soviet military reactions and serious concern among Soviet officials that the exercise might conceal preparations for an actual attack. With nuclear forces on both sides, miscalculation itself had become a frightening danger.

Could We Defend Instead of Avenge?

Nuclear deterrence rested largely upon a terrible idea: neither side would attack because it knew the other could retaliate with devastating force. I wanted scientists to investigate whether technology could someday provide another option. On March 23, 1983, I announced what became the Strategic Defense Initiative, or SDI—a research effort exploring defenses capable of intercepting ballistic missiles. Reporters and critics soon called it "Star Wars." The Soviets regarded the proposal as potentially threatening to the strategic balance, while supporters saw the possibility of moving away from dependence upon massive nuclear retaliation.

Strength—and a Door Left Open

By 1984, Washington and Moscow remained deeply suspicious of one another. Soviet negotiators had walked out of intermediate-range nuclear talks after NATO missile deployments began, and the Kremlin responded with additional military measures. Yet confrontation was never my only objective. Even during these difficult years, I corresponded with Soviet leaders and supported negotiations over nuclear arms. I believed America needed both strength and diplomacy. We did not yet know it, but soon a new Soviet leader named Mikhail Gorbachev would arrive—and the Cold War would begin moving in a direction few of us could have imagined.

Star Wars and the New Technological Arms Competition - Told by Ronald Reagan

By 1983, the United States and Soviet Union possessed enormous nuclear arsenals capable of devastating one another. For decades, much of our security had depended upon deterrence: if one side launched a nuclear attack, it knew the other side could retaliate. This terrible balance had helped prevent direct war between the superpowers, but I kept returning to a disturbing question. Was our best hope for peace really the promise that we could destroy one another? I wanted to know whether American science could someday give us another choice.

A Challenge to America's Scientists

On the evening of March 23, 1983, I addressed the American people from the White House. Near the end of that speech, I challenged America's scientific community to investigate whether nuclear ballistic missiles might someday be intercepted before reaching their targets. The proposal became the Strategic Defense Initiative, or SDI. It was an enormously ambitious research program involving ideas such as advanced sensors, interceptor missiles, computers, satellites, and other technologies that might detect and destroy incoming ballistic missiles. My hope was to make these weapons less useful as instruments of terror.

Why They Called It "Star Wars"

The proposal sounded so futuristic that critics quickly gave it a memorable nickname: "Star Wars," after the popular science-fiction films. But SDI was not a movie weapon waiting to be switched on. It was a research program, and enormous technical problems stood in the way. An effective system would have to detect missile launches, distinguish real warheads from decoys, track objects traveling thousands of miles per hour, and intercept enough warheads to protect American targets. Scientists, politicians, and military experts fiercely debated whether such a defense could ever work reliably on the scale I envisioned.

Moscow Takes Notice

The Soviet leadership did not dismiss SDI as merely science fiction. Soviet officials worried that if the United States developed effective missile defenses while maintaining powerful offensive nuclear forces, the strategic balance between our countries could change. Moscow also understood that competing with a technologically advanced American defense program might require enormous investments at a time when the Soviet economy already faced serious difficulties. SDI therefore became not only a scientific question, but also an important issue in superpower diplomacy.

The Technology Behind a New Arms Competition

The Cold War was increasingly becoming a competition in laboratories as well as missile silos. Researchers explored infrared sensors, high-speed computing, radar systems, space-based surveillance, interceptor rockets, directed-energy concepts, and other technologies. Some ideas proved more practical than others, and many never approached operational deployment. Yet the program demonstrated how advances in electronics, computers, communications, and space technology were changing military planning. The question was no longer simply how many missiles a nation possessed, but what its technology might allow those missiles—or defenses against them—to do.

The Argument Over Stability

My critics raised an important concern. If both sides believed their vulnerability prevented nuclear war, might building defenses actually make the situation less stable? They also questioned the expense and technical feasibility of SDI and argued that existing arms-control agreements, especially the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, limited certain missile-defense deployments. My administration argued that research could continue while the United States examined what future technology might make possible. This debate would follow SDI throughout the remainder of my presidency.

Technology Meets Diplomacy

By 1984, we had not built an invisible shield over America, nor were we close to doing so. What we had done was introduce a new question into the Cold War: could technological innovation alter the nuclear balance that had dominated international affairs for decades? Soon that question would follow me directly to the negotiating table. When Mikhail Gorbachev became Soviet leader in 1985, SDI became one of the most difficult issues between us. Missiles, satellites, computers, and laboratories had become pieces on the diplomatic chessboard—and the next stage of the Cold War would depend upon what both sides chose to do with them.

My Name is Mikhail Gorbachev: General Secretary of the Soviet Union

I was born on March 2, 1931, in Privolnoye, a farming village in southern Russia within the Soviet Union. My childhood was shaped by collectivized agriculture, hardship, Stalin's rule, and war. When Nazi Germany invaded our country in 1941, the fighting reached our region. I saw what war could do to ordinary families. Those experiences remained with me throughout my life and later strengthened my conviction that another great war, especially a nuclear war, could never be permitted.

My Rise Through the Communist Party

As a young man, I worked alongside my father operating agricultural machinery before attending Moscow State University, where I studied law. There I met Raisa Titarenko, who became my wife and closest companion. I joined the Communist Party and gradually advanced through its leadership. I believed deeply in the possibilities of socialism, but as I traveled and gained responsibility, I also saw serious problems: bureaucracy, inefficiency, shortages, corruption, and a political system that too often discouraged people from speaking openly.

Becoming General Secretary

In March 1985, I became General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. I was 54 years old, considerably younger than several of the leaders who had preceded me. I did not come to power intending to destroy the Soviet Union or abandon socialism. I wanted to renew it. Our economy was stagnating, our government had become rigid, and our society needed change. I believed that if we refused to reform ourselves, history would eventually force reform upon us.

Glasnost and Perestroika

I introduced policies that became known throughout the world as glasnost and perestroika. Glasnost meant greater openness. I wanted Soviet citizens to discuss our problems more freely and confront parts of our history that had long been hidden or distorted. Perestroika meant restructuring. We attempted to reform the economy and political system while preserving socialism. Yet once people were given greater freedom to speak, organize, criticize, and demand change, the transformation moved far beyond what many Soviet leaders had expected.

Reagan and the Nuclear Question

Ronald Reagan and I came from profoundly different political systems, and our first meetings were not easy. Yet we shared one crucial understanding: a nuclear war could not be won and must never be fought. We met at Geneva, Reykjavík, Washington, and Moscow. At times our discussions became intense, but we continued talking. In 1987, we signed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, eliminating an entire class of nuclear missiles. I came to believe that security could not be achieved forever by frightening one's opponent with destruction.

Eastern Europe Chooses Change

By 1989, demands for change were spreading across Eastern Europe. Previous Soviet leaders had used military force to preserve Communist governments, but I rejected the idea that Moscow should dictate every nation's future through tanks and soldiers. Poland changed. Hungary changed. Czechoslovakia changed. East Germans demanded greater freedom. Then, on November 9, 1989, the Berlin Wall opened. The division of Europe that had defined much of the Cold War was beginning to disappear before our eyes.

The Soviet Union Comes Apart

The forces of change also transformed my own country. Soviet republics demanded greater independence, economic problems worsened, and political struggles became increasingly severe. In August 1991, Communist hardliners attempted a coup against me. The coup failed, but the authority of the Soviet government had been badly weakened. Republic after republic moved toward independence. On December 25, 1991, I resigned as president of the Soviet Union. The following day, the Soviet Union formally ceased to exist.

Looking Back

I lived for more than three decades after leaving power and continued speaking about nuclear disarmament, international cooperation, democracy, and peace until my death in 2022. I remained proud that the Cold War ended without a direct war between the United States and Soviet Union and that millions of people gained greater freedom. But I also knew that reform brought instability, economic suffering, political confusion, and consequences I had not intended. For the hardships that accompanied decisions made under my leadership, and for the mistakes I made while trying to transform such an enormous system, I am sorry. History must judge what we achieved and what we failed to achieve.

Gorbachev Takes Power: A Soviet Union in Trouble - Told by Mikhail Gorbachev

In March 1985, I became General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. To the outside world, I had inherited one of the most powerful nations on Earth. We possessed nuclear weapons, an enormous military, influence throughout Eastern Europe, and a vast territory stretching from Europe to the Pacific. Yet behind this appearance of strength were serious weaknesses. Our economy was slowing, our industries were inefficient, shortages frustrated ordinary citizens, and our political system had become burdened by bureaucracy. The Soviet Union was powerful, yes—but power could hide problems only for so long.

A System That Had Stopped Moving

For years, Soviet economic growth had been slowing. Central planners made enormous numbers of decisions about production, prices, and resources, but factories often had little incentive to improve quality or efficiency. Meeting a production quota could matter more than producing something people actually wanted. Agricultural problems forced us to import large quantities of grain. Technology was advancing rapidly in the West, especially in computers and electronics, while many Soviet industries struggled to keep pace. I came to believe that continuing as before was no longer an option.

The Cost of Being a Superpower

We were also carrying the enormous expense of competing with the United States. The Soviet Union maintained large conventional and nuclear forces while supporting allies and commitments abroad. Our military had been fighting in Afghanistan since 1979, a war that consumed resources and lives without producing the quick solution Soviet leaders had once expected. Meanwhile, President Ronald Reagan was overseeing an American military buildup and promoting the Strategic Defense Initiative. We could not ignore the technological competition, but endlessly increasing military expenditures would make our domestic problems even harder to solve.

A Country Afraid to Speak

Our problems were not only economic. The Soviet political system restricted open criticism, and officials often had reasons to tell their superiors what they wanted to hear. Bad news could be hidden, statistics could be presented selectively, and mistakes could survive because challenging authority was risky. I increasingly believed that without greater openness, we could not understand the true condition of our country. A society cannot repair problems that it is unwilling—or afraid—to discuss.

A New Generation Arrives

I was 54 when I became General Secretary, younger than the elderly leaders who had immediately preceded me. Leonid Brezhnev had died in 1982, Yuri Andropov in 1984, and Konstantin Chernenko in March 1985. The rapid succession had become a symbol of an aging leadership. I began promoting younger officials and speaking about acceleration and reform. I was not attempting to abolish socialism or dismantle the Soviet Union. I believed our system could be renewed and made more effective. The challenge was discovering how much change it could survive.

An Enemy Across the Ocean

Then there was Ronald Reagan. He had called the Soviet Union an "evil empire," increased American defense spending, and challenged us with SDI. Many in Moscow regarded his administration with deep suspicion. Yet I also understood something simple: the United States and Soviet Union possessed enough nuclear weapons to make a direct war catastrophic for both countries and much of the world. We could disagree profoundly without allowing disagreement to become annihilation. In November 1985, Reagan and I would meet for the first time in Geneva.

Opening the Door to Change

When I took power, I did not know where reform would ultimately lead. I wanted a stronger economy, a more effective government, greater honesty, and a safer relationship with the West. Soon the world would hear two Russian words repeatedly: perestroika, meaning restructuring, and glasnost, meaning openness. I intended these ideas to strengthen Soviet socialism. Instead, they would help release political and social forces that transformed Eastern Europe and eventually the Soviet Union itself. In 1985, however, that future remained hidden. All I knew was that our country could no longer remain as it was.

Glasnost and Perestroika: Trying to Reform Communism - Told by Gorbachev

When I became General Secretary in 1985, I did not intend to destroy Communism or dissolve the Soviet Union. I wanted to save our system by changing it. Economic growth had slowed, factories were inefficient, agriculture struggled, technology lagged in important fields, and bureaucracy discouraged initiative. Too often officials were rewarded for following instructions rather than solving problems. I believed socialism still had a future, but only if we were willing to admit that the Soviet Union could not continue governing and producing exactly as it had before.

Perestroika: Restructuring the System

We called our effort perestroika—"restructuring." At first, we attempted to improve discipline and productivity, but I gradually concluded that deeper economic changes were necessary. Enterprises received greater independence, managers gained more authority over production decisions, and reforms permitted limited forms of private and cooperative business. The 1987 Law on State Enterprise was an important part of this effort. Yet we were attempting something extraordinarily difficult: introducing elements of decentralization and market activity without abandoning the foundations of a socialist economy.

Glasnost: Opening the Windows

Economic restructuring would accomplish little if people remained afraid to discuss what was wrong. That was the purpose of glasnost—"openness." Newspapers and television began discussing subjects that previously would have been censored. Citizens increasingly debated corruption, economic failures, environmental disasters, Stalin's purges, and other painful chapters of Soviet history. Writers and intellectuals received greater freedom. I wanted criticism to help us improve socialism. But once people discovered that they could speak more openly, they did not limit themselves to criticizing only the problems I wanted them to discuss.

Chernobyl Changes the Conversation

Then, on April 26, 1986, a reactor exploded at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in Soviet Ukraine. Radioactive material spread across large areas of Europe. The Soviet government's initial response was slow and secretive, reflecting precisely the habits glasnost was supposed to change. Chernobyl exposed the dangers of bureaucracy, secrecy, poor communication, and officials who feared reporting bad news. I later regarded the disaster as a major turning point. It became increasingly difficult to argue for openness while hiding information from our own people.

Changing Politics Too

By 1987 and 1988, I was convinced economic reform could not succeed without political reform. We began introducing more competition into elections and reducing the Communist Party's unquestioned control over every decision. At the Communist Party's 19th Conference in 1988, I pushed for major changes to Soviet political institutions. These reforms would eventually help create the Congress of People's Deputies, where voters could choose among competing candidates in many districts. Soviet citizens who had spent decades receiving carefully controlled political choices were beginning to experience something very different.

Reform Creates New Problems

But reform did not produce immediate prosperity. In some ways, it made our economic problems more visible and sometimes worse. The old command system was being weakened before a reliable replacement existed. Shortages continued, government finances deteriorated, and frustration grew. At the same time, glasnost encouraged people in Soviet republics such as Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Armenia, Georgia, and Ukraine to speak more openly about nationalism, independence, historical grievances, and Moscow's authority. The freedom I hoped would renew the Soviet Union was also allowing people to question whether they wanted the Soviet Union in its existing form.

A Door That Could Not Easily Be Closed

By 1988, perestroika and glasnost had changed the atmosphere of Soviet life. I still believed we could create a more democratic and effective socialism while preserving our union. But reform had developed a momentum of its own. Once citizens could criticize their leaders, examine forbidden history, organize politically, and demand greater freedom, simply returning to the old system would require repression on a scale I did not want. We had opened a door because the Soviet Union needed fresh air. What none of us yet knew was how many people would decide to walk through it.

Reagan and Gorbachev: From Enemies to Negotiating Partners - Told by Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev

Two Rivals Finally Meet

Ronald Reagan: When Mikhail Gorbachev became Soviet leader in March 1985, I knew immediately that something had changed. Three Soviet leaders had died during my first term, and now I was facing a younger man who spoke confidently about reform. That November, we met in Geneva, Switzerland. We represented rival superpowers armed with thousands of nuclear weapons, and neither of us trusted the other's political system. Yet we agreed on one enormously important principle: nuclear war could not be won and must never be fought.

Mikhail Gorbachev: Ronald Reagan and I were very different men. He believed strongly in capitalism and American democracy; I was General Secretary of the Communist Party and intended to reform Soviet socialism. Our first discussions were intense. We disagreed about nuclear weapons, human rights, regional conflicts, and his Strategic Defense Initiative. But Reagan was willing to speak directly, and so was I. Geneva did not produce a great arms-control treaty, but something important happened there—we began learning how to talk to each other.

Reykjavík: Almost the Impossible

Ronald Reagan: In October 1986, we met again, this time in Reykjavík, Iceland. What was supposed to be a relatively limited meeting became an extraordinary discussion about reducing nuclear weapons. At one point, we explored proposals that went far beyond what most people expected, including enormous reductions in strategic nuclear arsenals. Suddenly, the possibility of changing the nuclear balance of the Cold War seemed less like a dream and more like something two governments might actually negotiate.

Mikhail Gorbachev: But Reykjavík nearly collapsed over one issue: Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative, or SDI. I wanted strict limits on testing missile-defense technology outside the laboratory. Reagan refused to surrender his vision of developing defenses against ballistic missiles. We left Iceland without the sweeping agreement we had discussed. To many observers, the summit looked like a failure. Yet we had discovered something remarkable—we were much closer on reducing nuclear weapons than either government had previously understood.

Washington and the INF Treaty

Ronald Reagan: We kept negotiating. In December 1987, Gorbachev came to Washington. This time we signed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, known as the INF Treaty. The agreement required the United States and Soviet Union to eliminate their ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. It was not simply an agreement to limit future weapons. We were going to destroy deployed missiles and establish verification procedures so each side could check whether the other was following the agreement.

Mikhail Gorbachev: Verification mattered because trust alone could not protect either nation. Soviet inspectors would visit American facilities, and American inspectors would visit Soviet ones. Eventually, 2,692 missiles were eliminated under the treaty. Only a few years earlier, our governments had been deploying more nuclear missiles in Europe. Now we were destroying an entire category of them. We still disagreed profoundly, but disagreement no longer prevented cooperation.

Enemies Begin Seeing People

Ronald Reagan: Something else was changing. I had spent years criticizing the Soviet system, and I did not suddenly abandon those beliefs. But I increasingly distinguished between opposition to Communist government and hostility toward the Soviet people. When Gorbachev and I talked privately, joked, argued, and walked together, the Soviet Union became more than an abstract enemy on a map. Personal diplomacy could not erase national interests, but it could reduce the danger of misunderstanding them.

Mikhail Gorbachev: I experienced something similar. Soviet propaganda had spent decades portraying the United States as an aggressive capitalist adversary. Yet serious negotiations required us to understand why Americans saw the world differently. We did not need to become politically alike. We needed to recognize that our security was connected. In a nuclear age, destroying your opponent could mean destroying yourself as well.

Moscow: An Extraordinary Reversal

Ronald Reagan: In May 1988, I traveled to Moscow. Imagine how strange that would have sounded only a few years earlier. I walked through Red Square and continued negotiations with the man whose government represented the system I had so fiercely opposed. When a reporter asked whether I still considered the Soviet Union an "evil empire," I said I had been talking about another time and another era. The problems between us had not disappeared, but our relationship had changed.

Mikhail Gorbachev: By the end of 1988, neither of us could know exactly where events were heading. The Soviet Union was changing internally, Eastern Europe was becoming restless, and difficult arms negotiations remained ahead. But between Geneva and Moscow, Reagan and I demonstrated something the Cold War had too often forgotten: adversaries can negotiate without pretending their differences do not exist. Four years earlier our nations had seemed trapped in escalating confrontation. Now we were eliminating missiles together—and soon events in Europe would move faster than either of us could control.

"Tear Down This Wall" and the INF Treaty - Told by Ronald Reagan

On June 12, 1987, I stood near the Brandenburg Gate in West Berlin with the Berlin Wall behind me. That concrete barrier had divided the city since 1961. East German guards watched the border, while families had spent decades separated by a political system that restricted most East Germans from freely traveling west. I had visited the Wall before, but this time Mikhail Gorbachev was leading the Soviet Union and speaking openly about glasnost and perestroika. If those reforms truly represented a new direction, I believed Berlin was the place where that promise could be tested.

"Mr. Gorbachev, Tear Down This Wall!"

During my speech, I addressed Gorbachev directly. I challenged him to come to the Brandenburg Gate, open it, and "tear down this wall!" Some of my advisers had worried that the language was too provocative, especially while delicate arms negotiations with the Soviet Union were underway. I kept it. The Wall was not merely concrete and barbed wire. It represented the division of Germany and Europe into opposing political and military blocs. Yet my words did not cause the Wall to fall. The forces that eventually opened it included East German protesters, reform movements throughout Eastern Europe, changes in Soviet policy, and the weakening of Communist governments.

A Strange Moment in the Cold War

What made 1987 remarkable was that confrontation and cooperation were occurring simultaneously. I could publicly challenge the Soviet-backed order in Eastern Europe while my administration negotiated directly with Moscow over nuclear weapons. Gorbachev and I disagreed about human rights, regional conflicts, Germany, missile defense, and the political systems we represented. But after our meetings at Geneva and Reykjavík, both governments recognized that there were areas where agreement was possible. One of the most important involved the nuclear missiles threatening Europe.

Missiles Aimed Across Europe

During the previous decade, the Soviet Union had deployed SS-20 intermediate-range missiles, while NATO responded by deploying American Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles in Western Europe. These weapons could reach their targets rapidly, leaving leaders little time to determine whether an attack was real or how to respond. Millions of Europeans lived knowing that if the Cold War became hot, their countries could become nuclear battlefields. We had spent years arguing over how many missiles each side could deploy. By 1987, Gorbachev and I were discussing something far more ambitious: eliminating an entire category of them.

Gorbachev Comes to Washington

In December, Gorbachev arrived in Washington for another summit. Crowds gathered to see the Soviet leader, and television cameras followed our meetings closely. On December 8, we signed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty—the INF Treaty. It required both countries to eliminate all of their ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. For the first time, the United States and Soviet Union had agreed not simply to limit a category of nuclear delivery systems, but to eliminate it.

Trust—but Verify

Signing a document was not enough. After decades of suspicion, neither country was expected simply to take the other's word. The treaty therefore established extensive verification measures, including data exchanges and on-site inspections. American inspectors could enter designated Soviet facilities, and Soviet inspectors could do the same at American facilities. Over the next several years, the two countries eliminated 2,692 missiles under the agreement. Diplomacy was being backed by something measurable: inspectors could watch weapons disappear.

A Wall Still Standing

As 1987 ended, the Berlin Wall remained firmly in place. Soviet troops remained in Eastern Europe, Germany remained divided, and neither Gorbachev nor I could know what would happen next. Yet something fundamental was changing. In June, I had stood before one of the greatest symbols of Cold War division and demanded that it disappear. Six months later, Gorbachev and I sat together and signed an agreement eliminating thousands of missiles. The Cold War was not over—but confrontation was beginning to give way to possibilities that only a few years earlier would have seemed impossible.

My Name is Lech Wałęsa: Polish Solidarity Leader

I was born on September 29, 1943, in Popowo, Poland, while my country was occupied by Nazi Germany. My father suffered greatly during the occupation and died not long after the war. Poland was then brought under a Communist government backed by the Soviet Union. I did not grow up among powerful politicians or wealthy families. I came from ordinary people, and that taught me something important: history is not made only in government offices. Sometimes it begins in factories, churches, shipyards, and homes.

An Electrician in Gdańsk

I trained as an electrician and eventually found work at the Lenin Shipyard in Gdańsk. The government claimed that Communist Poland represented the workers, but workers knew that the reality could be very different. Wages were low, shortages were common, and independent political organization was restricted. In December 1970, workers along Poland's Baltic coast protested rising food prices. Security forces opened fire on demonstrators. After seeing what happened, I became increasingly involved in efforts to defend workers and demand change.

Standing Against the Government

My political activities cost me my job at the shipyard in 1976, but they did not end my involvement. I worked with other activists who were creating independent organizations outside Communist control. We distributed information, organized workers, and remembered those who had been killed during earlier protests. The government could dismiss us, arrest us, and watch us, but it could not easily destroy the idea that Polish workers should have the right to speak for themselves.

The Strike That Changed Poland

In August 1980, another wave of strikes began at the Gdańsk shipyard after activist Anna Walentynowicz was fired. I climbed over the shipyard wall and joined the workers. Soon I became one of the strike's leaders. We demanded more than higher wages. We called for independent trade unions, the right to strike, greater freedom of expression, and respect for workers. The government eventually negotiated with us, producing the Gdańsk Agreement. From this struggle came Solidarność—Solidarity.

Ten Million Voices

Solidarity grew with extraordinary speed. Millions of Poles joined, making it far more than a traditional labor union. Workers, intellectuals, students, farmers, and others discovered that they could organize together. My Catholic faith was important to me, and the support of the Polish Catholic Church and Pope John Paul II encouraged many people. We understood, however, that Soviet power remained nearby. Our task was to push for freedom without giving Moscow an excuse to send tanks into Poland.

Martial Law

In December 1981, General Wojciech Jaruzelski imposed martial law. Solidarity was suppressed, its leaders were arrested, and I was detained for nearly a year. The authorities hoped that by breaking the organization they could break the movement. They could not. Solidarity continued underground through publications, secret meetings, international support, and the determination of ordinary Poles. In 1983, I received the Nobel Peace Prize, though I did not travel to Norway because I feared the government might prevent me from returning home.

Negotiating Our Way to Freedom

By the late 1980s, Poland's economy was struggling and the Soviet Union under Mikhail Gorbachev was changing. New strikes showed that Solidarity had survived. In 1989, representatives of the Communist government and opposition met in the Round Table Talks. We negotiated rather than fought a civil war. Solidarity candidates then achieved an overwhelming victory in the portions of the parliamentary elections that were openly contested. Soon Poland had its first non-Communist prime minister of the postwar Communist era, and the political order of Eastern Europe began changing with astonishing speed.

From Shipyard to Presidency

In 1990, the Polish people elected me president. The transition from opposition leader to national leader was difficult. Fighting against a system can unite people; deciding what should replace it can divide them. Poland faced painful economic reforms and intense political disagreements as we built democratic institutions and moved toward a market economy. I served until 1995 and then continued participating in public life.

Looking Back

I began as an electrician, not as a statesman. That is why I have always believed ordinary people possess more power than they sometimes realize when they stand together. Solidarity helped prove that a Communist government could be challenged through organization, persistence, faith, courage, and negotiation. I also made mistakes. My stubbornness, sharp words, and political battles sometimes divided people who had once stood together. For the times when my actions or words unnecessarily deepened those divisions, I am sorry. But I remain convinced of the lesson written across Poland's history: there can be no freedom without solidarity.

Solidarity and the Revolutions of Eastern Europe - Told by Lech Wałęsa

By 1988, Poland's Communist government had spent years trying to destroy Solidarity. Martial law had been imposed in 1981, our organization was outlawed, activists were arrested, and independent publications were driven underground. Yet the movement survived. Poland's economy was in terrible condition, prices were rising, shortages frustrated families, and workers were losing patience. When new strikes erupted in 1988, including at the Gdańsk shipyard, the government faced an uncomfortable truth: after years of repression, it still had to deal with us.

Something Had Changed in Moscow

There was another difference from the confrontations of earlier decades. Mikhail Gorbachev was changing the Soviet Union. In 1956, Soviet forces had crushed the Hungarian Revolution. In 1968, Warsaw Pact armies invaded Czechoslovakia after the Prague Spring reforms. Those memories were never far from us. But Gorbachev was increasingly signaling that Moscow would not automatically use military force to preserve every Communist government in Eastern Europe. Suddenly, movements that once feared Soviet tanks had greater room to challenge their governments.

We Sat Down With Our Opponents

In February 1989, representatives of Solidarity, the Communist government, and other groups began the Polish Round Table Talks. Think about what that meant. Men who had once imprisoned us were now sitting across from us negotiating Poland's political future. We did not agree on everything, and neither side completely trusted the other. But we reached agreements that legalized Solidarity again and permitted elections in which some parliamentary seats would be genuinely contested. Instead of attempting to overthrow the government through violence, we would test how much support it actually possessed at the ballot box.

The Election That Changed Everything

On June 4, 1989, Polish voters gave their answer. Solidarity-backed candidates won virtually every seat they were permitted to contest in the lower house and 99 of the 100 seats in the newly restored Senate. The Communist Party had designed the election so it could not immediately lose complete control, but the results revealed how badly its political authority had eroded. In August, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, one of Solidarity's advisers, became prime minister, leading the first government in the Soviet bloc in decades headed by a non-Communist.

Then the Dominoes Began to Move

Poland was not alone. In Hungary, reformers dismantled parts of the border barrier with Austria and moved toward multiparty democracy. East Germans began escaping westward through Hungary while enormous demonstrations grew inside East Germany. In Czechoslovakia, mass protests during the Velvet Revolution rapidly ended Communist rule, and dissident playwright Václav Havel became president. Bulgaria's longtime Communist leader Todor Zhivkov was removed. Across Eastern Europe, governments that had appeared permanent suddenly discovered how quickly political authority could disappear when people no longer feared them.

Romania Takes a Violent Path

Most of these transformations were remarkably peaceful, but Romania showed that the story could take another direction. Nicolae Ceaușescu ruled through an especially repressive dictatorship and refused to follow the reforms occurring elsewhere. In December 1989, demonstrations became an uprising. Security forces and protesters fought, the regime collapsed, and Ceaușescu and his wife Elena were captured, tried by a military tribunal, and executed. Romania reminded us that Eastern Europe's revolutions shared a desire for change, but they did not all follow the same path.

The Wall Opens

Then came Berlin. On November 9, 1989, after weeks of demonstrations and mounting pressure on East Germany's government, confused announcements about new travel regulations sent crowds toward the Berlin Wall's checkpoints. Border guards eventually opened the crossings. People climbed onto the Wall, embraced strangers, and crossed between East and West Berlin. The Wall had symbolized Communist control and Europe's division for twenty-eight years. Now ordinary people were standing on top of it.

The Power of Solidarity

I have always believed the name of our movement carried the lesson of 1989. Solidarity meant that a shipyard electrician did not stand alone, that one striking factory did not stand alone, and eventually that Poland did not stand alone. Reagan and Gorbachev mattered. Economic weakness and international pressure mattered. But the revolutions of Eastern Europe also belonged to millions of workers, students, clergy, intellectuals, dissidents, and families who decided that governments could no longer rule indefinitely without their consent. In 1989, people who had spent decades living behind the Iron Curtain discovered that the curtain itself could move.

My Name is Helmut Kohl: Chancellor of West Germany

I was born on April 3, 1930, in Ludwigshafen am Rhein, Germany. My childhood unfolded under Adolf Hitler's dictatorship and during the catastrophe of the Second World War. My older brother Walter was killed while serving as a German soldier. I was still a teenager when the war ended in 1945. Germany lay defeated and divided, its cities damaged and its reputation devastated by the crimes of National Socialism. My generation inherited the responsibility of ensuring that such destruction would never again emerge from German soil.

Building a Democratic Germany

After the war, I became involved with the Christian Democratic Union, the CDU. I studied history and political science and earned a doctorate from Heidelberg University. I believed Germany's future depended upon democracy, cooperation with our neighbors, and a close relationship with the nations of Western Europe. I entered politics in my home state of Rhineland-Palatinate and became its minister-president in 1969. Politics, to me, was not simply about winning elections. Germany needed stability, reconciliation, and institutions strong enough to protect democracy.

Becoming Chancellor

In 1982, I became chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany—West Germany. My country stood on the front line of the Cold War. To the east was the German Democratic Republic, supported by the Soviet Union. Berlin itself remained divided by the Wall. I supported West Germany's membership in NATO and its partnership with the United States, while also believing that Germans must never abandon the hope that our divided nation might someday be reunited peacefully.

Germany and Europe

I also believed that Germany's future belonged inside a united Europe. France and Germany had fought terrible wars against one another, yet by my time they had become partners. My relationship with French President François Mitterrand became particularly important. In 1984, we stood together at Verdun, holding hands at a battlefield where Germans and Frenchmen had once slaughtered one another. European cooperation was more than economics. It was a way to make the old rivalries of Europe less likely to return.

The Wall Opens

In 1989, events began moving faster than almost anyone expected. Protesters filled the streets of East German cities demanding reform and freedom. Thousands fled through neighboring countries. Then, on November 9, the Berlin Wall opened. Germans from east and west embraced one another at the checkpoints and climbed upon the structure that had divided them since 1961. I understood immediately that we were witnessing a historic opportunity, but emotion alone could not reunify Germany. We needed diplomacy.

Ten Points Toward Unity

Only weeks after the Wall opened, I presented a ten-point program outlining a possible path toward German unity. The situation was delicate. The United States, Soviet Union, Britain, and France still possessed special rights concerning Germany dating from the end of World War II. Our European neighbors also remembered what a powerful Germany had once meant for their continent. I therefore argued that German reunification must occur peacefully, democratically, and within a stronger European order.

Negotiating with Gorbachev

One of the most important questions was whether Mikhail Gorbachev and the Soviet Union would accept a united Germany. I met with Gorbachev repeatedly, and difficult negotiations followed. At the same time, East and West German representatives worked with the United States, Soviet Union, Britain, and France through what became known as the Two Plus Four process. Agreement was eventually reached, allowing Germany to reunify while remaining within NATO. What had seemed almost impossible only a year earlier became reality.

Germany Reunited

On October 3, 1990, the German Democratic Republic joined the Federal Republic, and Germany was reunited. I became the first chancellor of the reunited Germany and remained in office until 1998. Reunification brought enormous joy, but it also brought difficult economic and social challenges. Industries in the former East collapsed or were transformed, unemployment increased in many communities, and rebuilding required vast amounts of money. Political unity could be declared in a day; creating comparable opportunities and trust would take much longer.

The Fall of the Berlin Wall - Told by Helmut Kohl

When 1989 began, Germany was still two countries. I was chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany—West Germany—while the German Democratic Republic controlled the East. Between us stood one of the Cold War's most recognizable symbols: the Berlin Wall. Built in 1961, it divided streets, neighborhoods, friends, and families. East German border defenses were designed to prevent citizens from escaping westward, and people had been killed trying to cross them. Yet beneath the appearance of permanence, East Germany was beginning to shake.

People Begin to Leave

That summer, Hungary began dismantling barriers along its border with Austria and eventually allowed East German refugees to travel west. Thousands of East Germans also crowded into West German diplomatic missions in Prague and elsewhere, desperately seeking a way out. The East German government could build walls around its territory, but it could not build walls around every neighboring country. A growing stream of its own citizens was voting with their feet.

The Streets Fill With Protesters

Those who remained began challenging the government openly. Leipzig became one of the centers of resistance. After prayers for peace at St. Nicholas Church, demonstrations grew into enormous Monday protests. People demanded freedom to travel, political reform, and democratic rights. On October 9, tens of thousands marched through Leipzig despite fears that security forces might attack. They did not. More people returned the following week. Once citizens realized they could gather in enormous numbers without immediately being crushed, fear began changing sides.

The Government Begins to Crack

East German leader Erich Honecker had resisted the reform movement sweeping through the Communist world, but even his own government could no longer ignore the crisis. He was removed from power in October and replaced by Egon Krenz. The new leadership promised changes, yet demonstrations continued. The government attempted to develop new travel regulations that would ease pressure without surrendering control. Then came one of history's extraordinary moments—when a confused announcement helped turn political crisis into revolution.

November 9, 1989

On the evening of November 9, East German official Günter Schabowski held a televised press conference. Near the end, he announced new rules allowing private travel abroad. Asked when the regulations would take effect, Schabowski, apparently lacking clear instructions about their planned implementation, indicated they were effective immediately. News broadcasts reported that East Germany was opening its borders. Thousands of Berliners heard the announcement and headed straight for the checkpoints.

The Guards Face the Crowd

At crossings such as Bornholmer Straße, East German border guards suddenly faced growing crowds demanding passage. The guards had received no clear plan for handling such numbers. Telephone calls went back and forth while the pressure increased. Finally, shortly before midnight at Bornholmer Straße, officials began allowing people through without the normal restrictions. Other crossings followed. East Germans poured into West Berlin, where strangers greeted them with cheers, embraces, and celebrations. A border that had been defended for twenty-eight years was opening without a battle.

I Wasn't Even in Germany

There is an important detail that reminds us how unexpected all of this was: when the Wall opened, I was not even in Germany. I was visiting Poland for talks with Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki. I interrupted the trip and flew to West Berlin. On November 10, I joined other leaders at a gathering outside West Berlin's city hall. Everywhere I looked, Germans were celebrating. People climbed onto the Wall and began striking it with hammers and chisels. Pieces of concrete that had represented imprisonment became souvenirs of freedom.

The Wall Fell—But Germany Wasn't United Yet

It is tempting to remember November 9 as the day Germany became one country again. It did not. East Germany still existed, Soviet forces remained on German soil, and the four Allied powers of World War II—the United States, Soviet Union, Britain, and France—still possessed special rights concerning Germany and Berlin. Enormous diplomatic questions remained. But something irreversible had happened. The Wall could no longer perform its purpose because the East German government had lost the ability to keep its people behind it. As I watched Germans crossing freely through Berlin, I understood that we had been given a historic opportunity. The next question was enormous: could we turn an opened wall into a peacefully reunited Germany?

From a Broken Wall to a Reunited Germany - Told by Helmut Kohl

When the Berlin Wall opened on November 9, 1989, Germans celebrated as though history had suddenly broken free. But I knew that opening the border and reunifying Germany were very different things. Two German governments still existed. Hundreds of thousands of Soviet troops were stationed in East Germany, and the United States, Soviet Union, Britain, and France retained special rights concerning Germany dating from the end of World War II. If we moved recklessly, the German question could again become a source of conflict in Europe. We had an opportunity—but no guarantee that the world would permit us to take it.

My Ten-Point Plan

On November 28, only nineteen days after the Wall opened, I presented a ten-point program to the West German parliament. I proposed greater cooperation with East Germany, followed by increasingly close political structures that might eventually produce German unity. I had not announced a timetable because events were moving too quickly to predict one. Many governments were cautious. Germany had started two world wars within living memory, and some European leaders understandably wondered what a reunited nation of roughly 80 million Germans might mean for the balance of power.

East Germans Make Their Choice

The future could not simply be negotiated by foreign governments. East Germans had to decide what they wanted. On March 18, 1990, East Germany held its first and only free parliamentary election. An alliance favoring rapid reunification, led by the East German Christian Democratic Union, won the largest share of the vote. The result gave powerful democratic support to moving quickly toward unity. The people who had brought down the old Communist order were now using ballots to determine what would replace it.

The Two Plus Four Table

We still needed international agreement. This produced the Two Plus Four negotiations: the two German states sat with the four Allied powers—the United States, Soviet Union, Britain, and France. Questions that had remained unresolved since 1945 returned to the table. What would Germany's borders be? Would a united Germany belong to NATO? What would happen to Soviet forces stationed in the East? Would Germany possess nuclear weapons? Reunification required answers acceptable not only to Germans, but also to countries whose memories of German power were understandably painful.

The Difficult Conversation With Gorbachev

Mikhail Gorbachev held one of the most important keys. The Soviet Union had sacrificed enormously defeating Nazi Germany, and Moscow had controlled East Germany's security environment for decades. At first, the question of NATO membership was especially difficult. Through months of diplomacy, we reached an understanding. In July 1990, during meetings with Gorbachev in Moscow and the Caucasus, he accepted that a reunited Germany could determine its alliance membership. We also negotiated arrangements for Soviet troops to leave eastern Germany and for German financial assistance connected with their withdrawal and resettlement.

Two Economies Become One

Political diplomacy was only part of the challenge. East and West Germany had developed under radically different economic systems for more than forty years. On July 1, 1990, economic, monetary, and social union took effect, introducing the Deutsche Mark into East Germany. For many East Germans, the western currency represented prosperity and stability. But unification also exposed how uncompetitive many East German enterprises were. Factories closed or were restructured, unemployment rose, and the economic consequences of reunification would continue long after the celebrations ended.

The Final Settlement

On September 12, 1990, the two German states and four Allied powers signed the Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany. Germany confirmed its existing borders, including the border with Poland, renounced nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, accepted limits on the size of its armed forces, and received full sovereignty as the wartime powers relinquished their remaining rights. The diplomatic arrangements that had governed Germany since the defeat of Hitler's regime were finally coming to an end.

October 3, 1990

At midnight on October 3, East Germany joined the Federal Republic of Germany. The black, red, and gold German flag rose before the Reichstag in Berlin as crowds celebrated. Less than eleven months had passed since the Wall opened. I became chancellor of a reunited Germany, but I understood that reunification was not the work of one politician. East German demonstrators, reformers across Eastern Europe, Gorbachev's changing Soviet policies, American support, Allied diplomacy, and millions of ordinary Germans had made this possible. The Wall had fallen almost unexpectedly. Building one Germany from the two societies it left behind would be the much longer task.

The Soviet Union Collapses and the Cold War Ends - Told by Mikhail Gorbachev

By 1990, I was trying to reform the Soviet Union while the country itself was beginning to come apart. Glasnost had given people greater freedom to discuss grievances that had been suppressed for decades, while political reforms weakened the Communist Party's old monopoly on power. National movements grew stronger in Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Georgia, Ukraine, and other Soviet republics. Lithuania declared the restoration of its independence in March 1990. I wanted to preserve a reformed federation, but increasing numbers of Soviet citizens were asking a more fundamental question: why should Moscow continue ruling them at all?

The Economy Turns Against Us

Our economic situation made everything more dangerous. Perestroika had weakened parts of the old command economy without successfully creating a stable new system. Production declined, shortages became increasingly severe, government finances deteriorated, and ordinary citizens spent hours searching for basic goods. People who had expected reform to improve their lives instead encountered uncertainty. I had wanted restructuring to strengthen socialism. Instead, economic frustration was undermining confidence in both my leadership and the Soviet government itself.

Another Russian Leader Rises

My greatest political rival now emerged from within the system: Boris Yeltsin. Once a Communist Party official, he became an outspoken critic of the party leadership and of me. In May 1990, he became chairman of the Russian parliament, and in June 1991 Russian voters elected him president of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic. This created an extraordinary situation. I was president of the Soviet Union, but Yeltsin possessed his own democratic mandate as president of Russia, the largest republic inside that union. Two centers of political authority were competing within the same country.

Trying to Save the Soviet Union

I believed the answer was a new Union Treaty. Rather than preserve the highly centralized Soviet system, I wanted the republics to receive much greater authority while remaining together in a renewed federation. Negotiations were difficult, but by the summer of 1991 several republics were preparing to participate. The treaty was scheduled to be signed on August 20. Communist hardliners, senior officials, and security figures feared that my reforms were destroying the state they had spent their lives defending. They decided to act before the agreement could be completed.

The August Coup

On August 19, while I was vacationing in Crimea, members of my own government announced that I was supposedly unable to perform my duties. In reality, I had been isolated and placed under house arrest. Tanks entered Moscow, and a group calling itself the State Committee on the State of Emergency attempted to seize control. But something remarkable happened. Thousands of citizens resisted. Boris Yeltsin climbed onto a tank outside the Russian parliament building and publicly denounced the coup. Parts of the military refused to support the conspirators. Within three days, the coup collapsed.

I Returned to a Different Country

I returned to Moscow as president, but the Soviet Union I had left only days earlier no longer truly existed in the same political sense. The Communist Party was discredited by the coup, while Yeltsin emerged much stronger. Republics accelerated their movements toward independence. Ukraine declared independence on August 24, and in a December referendum more than 90 percent of participating voters supported it. Without Ukraine, preserving the kind of union I had envisioned became extraordinarily difficult.

The Union Ends Without Me

On December 8, 1991, the leaders of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus—Boris Yeltsin, Leonid Kravchuk, and Stanislav Shushkevich—met in Belarus and declared that the Soviet Union had ceased to exist, proposing the Commonwealth of Independent States in its place. I opposed dissolving the union in this manner, but my authority was rapidly disappearing. On December 21, representatives of most remaining Soviet republics joined arrangements confirming that the old union was ending. There was no longer a country for me to govern.

December 25, 1991

On Christmas Day, I addressed the nation for the final time as president of the Soviet Union and resigned. That evening, the red Soviet flag was lowered from above the Kremlin and the Russian tricolor replaced it. The following day, the Soviet of the Republics formally recognized the dissolution of the USSR. The superpower created from the Russian Revolution and expanded across much of Eurasia had disappeared after nearly seventy years.

The Cold War Passes Into History

The collapse of the Soviet Union was not the result of one person or one policy. Economic stagnation, nationalism, political reform, the failures of central planning, the burden of military competition, popular movements, struggles within the Communist Party, and decisions by the Soviet republics all contributed. I had tried to reform the Soviet system, not destroy it. Yet there was one outcome I considered profoundly important: the confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States ended without the nuclear war that generations had feared. An empire and a political system were disappearing, but the missiles were not flying. After more than four decades of confrontation, the Cold War had come to an end.