17. Heroes and Villains of the Cold War: Détente to Afghanistan: Nixon, China, and a Changing Cold War

My Name is Leonid Brezhnev: Leader of the Soviet Union

I was born in 1906 in Kamenskoye, an industrial city in the Russian Empire, into a working family. I did not come from palaces or aristocracy. I studied engineering, worked among laborers, and joined the Communist Party. The Soviet system gave men like me an opportunity to rise through work, discipline, and loyalty. I believed that our country had paid an enormous price to build socialism, and I would spend my life defending what we had created.

War and the Rise to Power

When the Great Patriotic War came, as we called the struggle against Nazi Germany, I served as a political officer in the Red Army. I saw what invasion meant for our people: ruined cities, burned villages, and millions dead. That experience never left my generation. After the war, I continued rising through the Communist Party. Eventually, I entered the highest circles of Soviet government, and in 1964, after Nikita Khrushchev was removed from power, I became First Secretary of the Communist Party. I intended to bring stability after years of sudden changes.

The Soviet Union Must Remain Strong

I believed peace required strength. The Soviet Union had suffered invasion too many times to permit hostile powers to surround us. When Czechoslovakia's communist leadership introduced reforms in 1968 that Moscow feared could weaken Soviet influence over Eastern Europe, Warsaw Pact forces entered the country. In the West, this policy became associated with what they called the "Brezhnev Doctrine": the idea that the security of one socialist country concerned the entire socialist community. I did not present this as conquest. I presented it as defending socialism and preserving the strategic security for which our people had sacrificed so much.

Détente with the United States

Yet strength did not require endless confrontation. By the early 1970s, the Soviet Union and United States possessed enough nuclear weapons to destroy one another many times over. There could be no sensible victory in such a war. President Richard Nixon came to Moscow in 1972, and we negotiated agreements intended to control parts of the nuclear arms competition. We were competitors, certainly, but competitors must sometimes establish rules. Détente did not require friendship. It required recognizing reality.

Competition Behind the Handshakes

Do not misunderstand détente. I never intended the Soviet Union to abandon communism, surrender its allies, or stop supporting governments and movements we considered friendly to socialism. Nor did the United States abandon its alliances or interests. We negotiated because both superpowers understood the danger of uncontrolled confrontation. At the same time, Moscow strengthened its military position and maintained its influence throughout the socialist world. Peace, from my perspective, could not mean Soviet weakness.

The Helsinki Accords

In 1975, leaders from across Europe, the United States, Canada, and the Soviet Union signed the Helsinki Final Act. I regarded recognition of Europe's postwar political order and borders as an important accomplishment. Western governments emphasized another portion of the agreement: human rights. Over time, dissidents within the communist world would invoke those commitments against Soviet governments. What appeared to us as a diplomatic achievement therefore carried consequences that became increasingly difficult for Moscow to control.

Carter, SALT II, and Growing Tension

When Jimmy Carter became president in 1977, relations became more complicated. His government publicly emphasized human rights while continuing negotiations over nuclear weapons. Carter and I eventually signed the SALT II agreement in Vienna in June 1979. I still believed strategic arms agreements served both countries. But beneath the ceremony, suspicion was increasing. Washington feared Soviet influence was expanding; Moscow believed the United States was attempting to weaken Soviet power.

Afghanistan

Then came Afghanistan. By 1979, its communist government was fighting an expanding rebellion, and Moscow feared losing a neighboring government friendly to the Soviet Union. In December, Soviet forces entered Afghanistan. I publicly defended our actions as assistance requested by the Afghan government and argued that outside interference threatened Soviet security. The United States saw an invasion instead. Carter responded with sanctions, increased assistance to Afghan resistance forces, and a boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympics. Détente, already weakening, suffered a devastating blow.

A New Strategy: Why the Superpowers Turned Toward Détente - Told by Brezhnev

By 1969, the Soviet Union and the United States had spent more than twenty years confronting one another across Europe, Asia, and much of the world. We possessed enormous armies, nuclear missiles, submarines, bombers, and alliances capable of turning a regional crisis into a global war. Yet neither side had defeated the other. Instead, we had reached a dangerous reality: both countries possessed the ability to inflict catastrophic destruction. The question was no longer simply how to become stronger than our opponent. We also had to ask how two nuclear superpowers could compete without destroying themselves.

Détente Did Not Mean Friendship

You must understand what détente meant to us. The French word suggested a relaxation of tension, not the end of competition. The Soviet Union was not abandoning communism, and the Americans were certainly not abandoning capitalism. We continued supporting different governments, different movements, and different visions of the world's future. What was changing was our willingness to negotiate where our interests overlapped. Washington and Moscow could remain rivals while recognizing that preventing nuclear war was in both our interests. American policymakers likewise increasingly approached détente as cooperation on specific matters of mutual interest rather than reconciliation between the two political systems.

The Nuclear Balance Had Changed

For years, the Americans had possessed important advantages in strategic nuclear weapons. But during the 1960s, the Soviet Union greatly expanded its intercontinental ballistic missile forces. By the Nixon administration, Washington increasingly regarded the Soviet Union as having reached rough strategic parity with the United States. This changed diplomacy. When neither side could confidently eliminate the other's ability to retaliate, nuclear war became increasingly difficult to imagine as anything other than catastrophe. Strength remained essential, but strength could now create a reason to negotiate.

The Missile Race Could Not Continue Forever

There was another problem. Every American technological advance encouraged a Soviet response, and every Soviet advance encouraged another American program. Of particular concern were anti-ballistic missile systems designed to shoot down incoming nuclear weapons. If one country believed it could defend itself after launching a first strike, the entire strategic balance might become less stable. The arms race consumed enormous resources while producing weapons that we hoped never to use. Formal Strategic Arms Limitation Talks—SALT—therefore began in Helsinki on November 17, 1969. For the first time, our governments began the long process of negotiating limits on major components of the strategic nuclear competition.

China Changes the Great-Power Game

Meanwhile, another development was changing my calculations: China. The Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China were both communist states, but ideology had not prevented our relationship from becoming increasingly hostile. Armed clashes occurred along the Sino-Soviet border in 1969. Then Washington began cautiously improving its relationship with Beijing. American officials recognized that the Sino-Soviet split gave them an opportunity: better relations with China could provide leverage in negotiations with us. From Moscow, we now had to consider not simply an American adversary in the West, but a potentially hostile China in the East and the possibility that Washington might maneuver between us.

Quiet Conversations Behind Closed Doors

Some of the most important diplomacy did not occur before television cameras. Henry Kissinger, Nixon's national security adviser, established a confidential channel with our ambassador in Washington, Anatoly Dobrynin. They discussed arms control, Berlin, Vietnam, China, and the possibility of a summit between Soviet and American leaders. These private discussions allowed both governments to test proposals without immediately making public commitments. This was diplomacy conducted carefully, because neither government trusted the other enough to move quickly.

1971: The Pieces Begin Moving

By 1971, several negotiations were beginning to connect. SALT had moved from stalemate toward progress. Discussions over Berlin were advancing. Nixon was preparing an opening toward China, and in July the world learned that he intended to visit Beijing. American records show that Washington viewed China, SALT, Vietnam, and a possible Soviet-American summit as interconnected pieces of a broader strategy. We understood that the international balance was changing as well. If the Americans could speak with Beijing, Moscow had every reason to ensure that Washington could also speak seriously with us.

Peace Built on Interests

Do not mistake what happened for sudden trust. Nixon did not trust me, and I did not suddenly trust the United States. We negotiated because circumstances had changed. Nuclear parity made uncontrolled confrontation increasingly dangerous. The arms race was becoming more complicated and expensive. China had become an independent great-power factor. Europe needed stability. Each government still intended to protect its own system and interests. Détente emerged precisely because we remained rivals. Between 1969 and 1971, we began discovering that sometimes the most effective way to compete with a powerful enemy was not to threaten him louder—but to sit across a table from him and determine where rivalry could be restrained.

My Name is Deng Xiaoping: China's Emerging Leader

I was born in 1904 in Sichuan Province, when China was weak, divided, and struggling against foreign influence. As a young man, I traveled to France, where I worked, studied, and became involved with Chinese communist revolutionaries. I later traveled to the Soviet Union before returning to China. I had reached a simple conclusion: China could not remain poor and powerless. Our nation needed unity, strength, and development. I joined the Communist movement because I believed revolution could rebuild China.

War, Revolution, and the Long March

Revolution is not made with speeches alone. I fought through years of civil war, participated in the Long March, served during China's war against Japan, and helped Communist forces during the final struggle against Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalists. When the People's Republic of China was established in 1949, we had won political power, but victory did not mean our work was finished. China remained overwhelmingly poor. A revolution that could seize a country still had to learn how to govern and develop it.

Rising—and Falling

I rose through the Communist Party because I valued organization, discipline, and practical results. But Chinese politics could change rapidly. During Mao Zedong's Cultural Revolution, I was condemned as following the wrong political path. I lost my positions, my family suffered, and I was sent away from political power. Later I returned, only to be removed again. Some men would have allowed bitterness to consume them. I learned another lesson: survive, observe, and wait. China was larger than the political struggle of any one moment.

China Needed a New Direction

After Mao died in 1976, I returned to leadership. I did not believe China's future could be secured merely by repeating old slogans. Our agriculture was inefficient, our technology lagged behind advanced nations, and many Chinese people remained desperately poor. China needed modernization. Agriculture, industry, science and technology, and national defense became the Four Modernizations. We would rely primarily upon ourselves, but we could also learn from other countries, acquire advanced equipment, welcome useful knowledge, and eventually encourage foreign investment. China did not have to become Western in order to learn from the West.

The United States and a Changing Cold War

For decades, China and the United States had treated each other as enemies. President Nixon's 1972 visit opened a door, but full diplomatic relations had not followed immediately. By the late 1970s, I believed normalization could benefit China's development and strengthen our strategic position. We also faced a powerful Soviet Union along our northern frontier. China would make its own decisions, but improved relations with America could alter the international balance.

Normalizing Relations with America

In December 1978, I became personally involved in the final negotiations with President Jimmy Carter's administration. China insisted that the People's Republic be recognized as the sole legal government of China, while the United States maintained that it wanted unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan. An agreement was reached, and on January 1, 1979, our nations formally established diplomatic relations. We remained different countries with different systems. That did not prevent us from cooperating where our interests met.

My Journey to America

In January 1979, I traveled to the United States. I met President Carter, members of Congress, business leaders, scientists, and ordinary Americans. The photographs of me wearing a cowboy hat attracted considerable attention, but I had not crossed the Pacific merely for photographs. I wanted technology, scientific exchange, trade, education, and a stronger relationship between our countries. Agreements were reached concerning science, technology, academic exchanges, and other forms of cooperation. China needed to see how advanced nations operated if we intended to catch them.

Reform and Opening

At home, we began changing China's economic direction. Farmers received greater freedom over production, experiments with markets expanded, foreign technology entered the country, and China gradually opened itself to international trade and investment. I was less interested in whether every economic method carried the correct ideological label than whether it improved China's condition. Policies should be judged by what they accomplish. Development would take decades, and mistakes would occur, but poverty could not be China's destiny.

The Cost of Strength

I spent my life believing China had to become strong enough that foreign powers could never again dictate its future. Revolution, unity, modernization, and national independence shaped nearly every decision I made. Yet determination can become rigidity. In defending order and the authority of the state, leaders can underestimate the aspirations and suffering of individuals. My generation inherited a fractured and impoverished China and helped transform its direction, but our achievements did not erase the human costs of political campaigns, repression, conflict, and decisions made in the name of stability. A nation must learn from success, but it must also have the courage to learn from its mistakes.

The Sino-Soviet Split and America's Opening to China - Told by Deng Xiaoping

To understand why China eventually opened a door to the United States, you must first understand something that surprised many Americans: communist countries did not automatically remain friends. China and the Soviet Union had once appeared united against the West, but disagreements over ideology, leadership of the communist world, national interests, and security steadily drove Beijing and Moscow apart. By the late 1960s, the Soviet Union was no longer simply our socialist neighbor. From China's perspective, it had become one of our most dangerous strategic threats.

1969: Shots Along the Border

The disagreement was no longer confined to speeches and political arguments. In March 1969, Chinese and Soviet forces fought around Zhenbao, or Damansky, Island on the Ussuri River. Additional confrontations followed elsewhere along the frontier. Two nuclear-armed communist powers were now exchanging fire. American assessments later concluded that these clashes helped convince Chinese leaders that their greatest immediate security danger increasingly came from Moscow rather than Washington. China faced an uncomfortable strategic problem: Soviet military power stretched along thousands of miles of our northern border while American forces and allies remained positioned elsewhere in Asia.

An Enemy Can Become Useful

China had fought American troops during the Korean War and fiercely opposed American policy in Vietnam and Taiwan. We did not suddenly decide that the United States shared our political beliefs. That would have been absurd. But foreign policy cannot be conducted entirely according to old emotions. If relations with Moscow had become dangerous, reducing hostility with Washington could improve China's strategic position. The Americans were making a similar calculation. President Nixon's administration saw the Sino-Soviet split as an opportunity to improve America's position against the Soviet Union and began easing some restrictions on travel and trade with China.

Small Signals Across a Great Divide

Neither government could simply announce that twenty years of hostility had ended. The process began cautiously. Messages passed through intermediaries, including Pakistan. American restrictions were gradually relaxed. Then came an unexpected public symbol: table tennis. After encounters between American and Chinese players at the 1971 World Table Tennis Championships in Japan, China invited an American team to visit. "Ping-Pong Diplomacy," as it became known, attracted enormous attention. Behind these public gestures, however, much more serious diplomacy was taking place.

The Secret Visitor

In July 1971, Henry Kissinger secretly traveled to Beijing and met Premier Zhou Enlai. His journey was concealed from the public while our governments discussed the possibility of something once almost unimaginable: an American president visiting the People's Republic of China. On July 15, Nixon announced that Kissinger had been in Beijing and that he himself would travel to China. The announcement shocked much of the world. Moscow now had to consider the possibility that its two greatest rivals might improve relations with each other.

China Takes Its Seat

Another major change followed in October 1971. The United Nations voted to recognize representatives of the People's Republic of China as China's representatives at the organization, replacing the representatives of the Republic of China government on Taiwan. Beijing also assumed China's permanent seat on the Security Council. The United States had opposed removing Taiwan's representatives even as it supported PRC participation, but the final vote nevertheless marked China's emergence from years of diplomatic isolation from much of the international system.

Nixon Arrives in China

Then, on February 21, 1972, President Richard Nixon landed in Beijing. Think about what that meant. An American president who had built much of his political career opposing communism had traveled to communist China and met Chairman Mao Zedong. Nixon and Zhou Enlai held extensive discussions about Asia, the Soviet Union, Taiwan, and relations between our countries. We remained divided by profound political differences, but both governments understood that the international balance had changed.

The Shanghai Communiqué

At the end of Nixon's visit, our governments issued the Shanghai Communiqué. We did not pretend that our disagreements had disappeared. In fact, the document openly stated several of them. China insisted that Taiwan was part of China and that the Taiwan question remained the principal obstacle to normal relations. The American side stated its own position while emphasizing a peaceful resolution. More broadly, both governments declared opposition to any power establishing hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region—a formulation with obvious importance amid our shared concerns about Soviet power.

The Triangle Had Changed

We had not become American allies in 1972, and full diplomatic relations would not come until 1979. But the Cold War could no longer be understood simply as Washington against Moscow with Beijing permanently standing beside the Soviets. There were now three major powers maneuvering around one another. American officials themselves later recognized that common concern about the Soviet Union was a major force bringing Washington and Beijing together during 1969–1972. That is one of the great lessons of this period: ideology matters, but nations also act according to security and national interest. When the balance of power changes, yesterday's enemy may become tomorrow's negotiating partner.

Nixon Goes to China: The Diplomatic Earthquake of 1972 - Told by Deng Xiaoping

On February 21, 1972, something happened that only a few years earlier would have seemed almost impossible: Richard Nixon stepped from Air Force One onto Chinese soil. He was the first sitting American president to visit the People's Republic of China. I was not among the Chinese leaders receiving him—I had been removed from national leadership during the Cultural Revolution—but I understood the significance of what Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai were attempting. China and America had spent more than two decades separated by war, ideology, Taiwan, and deep suspicion. Now an American president had crossed the Pacific to speak with us rather than threaten us.

Why Would China Welcome Nixon?

We had not suddenly become capitalists, nor had Nixon become a communist. Nations do not need identical political systems to recognize common interests. By 1972, China's relationship with the Soviet Union had deteriorated badly. Chinese and Soviet troops had fought along our border in 1969, and Moscow possessed tremendous military power near China. Washington had its own rivalry with the Soviet Union. Beijing and Washington therefore had reason to reconsider whether permanent hostility toward each other served either country's interests. American records from the period show that concern about Soviet power was an important part of this emerging strategic relationship.

Nixon Meets Mao

Only hours after arriving, Nixon was summoned to meet Chairman Mao. The meeting lasted about an hour and included Premier Zhou Enlai and Henry Kissinger. Mao was already in declining health, but the symbolism was unmistakable. The man who led China's communist revolution sat across from an American president famous for his earlier anti-communism. Their countries still disagreed over Taiwan, Vietnam, political ideology, and the future of Asia. Yet Nixon and Mao discussed the larger international balance and the possibility of building a different relationship.

The Real Work Begins

The photographs were dramatic, but diplomacy is not accomplished through photographs. Nixon spent much of his visit negotiating with Premier Zhou Enlai. Between February 21 and 28, they discussed Taiwan, Vietnam, Korea, Japan, the Soviet Union, and the future relationship between China and the United States. The conversations were serious because neither side intended to surrender its basic interests. China wanted American forces eventually removed from Taiwan and insisted that Taiwan was part of China. Nixon wanted improved relations without abruptly abandoning longstanding American commitments.

The Soviet Union Watches

There was another audience watching these meetings carefully: Leonid Brezhnev and the Soviet leadership. Nixon was scheduled to visit Moscow only a few months later. Suddenly the Soviet Union faced an American president capable of negotiating with both major communist powers. Publicly, Washington denied that Nixon's China trip was directed against Moscow. Privately, however, the triangular relationship mattered enormously. China feared Soviet power, while the United States recognized that better relations with Beijing could improve its strategic position. The Cold War was becoming a three-sided contest rather than a simple confrontation between two rigid blocs.

The Shanghai Communiqué

On February 27, the two governments issued what became known as the Shanghai Communiqué. It was unusual because instead of pretending that disagreements had disappeared, both governments openly stated many of them. China declared its position that Taiwan was part of China. The American side acknowledged that Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait maintained there was one China and stated that Washington did not challenge that position, while emphasizing peaceful settlement. Both sides also opposed efforts by any country to establish domination, or hegemony, in the Asia-Pacific region.

A Door Opens—but the Problems Remain

When Nixon departed on February 28, China and America were not allies, and they had not even established full diplomatic relations. Taiwan remained a major obstacle, and serious ideological disagreements continued. Yet something fundamental had changed. The two governments agreed to maintain contact and continue working toward normalization. The diplomatic door that had been largely closed since 1949 was now open, and it would not easily be shut again.

The Earthquake Felt Around the World

That is why Nixon's journey was more than a presidential visit. It changed the strategic geometry of the Cold War. Moscow now had to consider Washington's relationship with Beijing; Washington could negotiate separately with Moscow and Beijing; and China had gained greater room to maneuver between the superpowers. Seven years later, when I was again in national leadership, President Jimmy Carter and I would complete the normalization process by establishing formal diplomatic relations between our countries. But the road to that moment passed directly through February 1972. Nixon came to China for one week. The consequences of that week lasted for decades.

Nixon Goes to China: The Diplomatic Earthquake of 1972 - Told by Deng Xiaoping

On February 21, 1972, President Richard Nixon arrived in Beijing. For more than twenty years, China and the United States had been separated by revolution, the Korean War, Taiwan, Vietnam, and profound ideological hostility. Nixon was the first sitting American president to visit mainland China. I was not then among the leaders meeting him, having been removed from power during the Cultural Revolution, but the importance of the moment was unmistakable. An American president had come not with soldiers or threats, but to negotiate.

Why China Opened the Door

Do not confuse negotiation with friendship. China remained communist, America remained capitalist, and our disagreements were substantial. But the international situation had changed. Our relationship with the Soviet Union had deteriorated so severely that Chinese and Soviet troops had fought along our border in 1969. The Americans also regarded Moscow as their principal global rival. Both Beijing and Washington therefore saw strategic value in reducing hostility toward one another. American records confirm that distrust of Soviet intentions became an important area of common interest.

Nixon Meets Mao

Within hours of Nixon's arrival, Chairman Mao Zedong met with him. The symbolism was extraordinary: Mao, the leader of the Chinese Communist Revolution, sat across from an American president known for his long opposition to communism. But the most extensive negotiations during the visit occurred between Nixon and Premier Zhou Enlai. They discussed Taiwan, Vietnam, the Soviet Union, Asia, and the possibility of normalizing relations. Neither side surrendered its principles. That was precisely what made the negotiations significant—we were searching for areas of cooperation despite fundamental disagreements.

The Problem of Taiwan

Taiwan remained the greatest obstacle. After the Communist victory in 1949, Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist government had retreated to Taiwan, while the United States continued diplomatic relations with the Republic of China there. Beijing insisted that Taiwan was part of China and opposed any arrangement creating "two Chinas." Washington was not prepared simply to abandon its existing relationship with Taiwan. The two sides therefore had to find language that allowed progress without pretending this dispute had disappeared.

The Shanghai Communiqué

The solution came in the Shanghai Communiqué, issued on February 27. It was remarkable because the document openly recorded areas where our governments disagreed instead of disguising them with pleasant diplomatic language. China stated its position on Taiwan. The United States acknowledged that Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait maintained there was one China and that Taiwan was part of China, while emphasizing its interest in a peaceful settlement. The communiqué also established a framework for continued contacts, exchanges, trade, and movement toward normalized relations.

Moscow Was Watching

Nixon's aircraft may have landed in Beijing, but the shock was felt in Moscow. The Cold War could no longer be viewed simply as two great blocs confronting one another. China and the Soviet Union were communist powers, yet we had become rivals. Now Washington could communicate separately with Beijing and Moscow. Nixon was scheduled to visit the Soviet Union only months after leaving China. The Americans had gained greater diplomatic flexibility, while China had gained additional room to maneuver against Soviet pressure.

The Moscow Summit and SALT I (1972) - Told by Leonid Brezhnev

On May 22, 1972, President Richard Nixon arrived in Moscow. Only three months earlier, he had made his dramatic journey to China. I understood what the Americans were doing: Washington was maneuvering between Moscow and Beijing, just as every great power seeks advantages where it can find them. But the Soviet Union was not going to watch from the sidelines. Nixon had come to negotiate with us because America understood what we understood—the Soviet Union and the United States had become the world's two principal nuclear superpowers, and neither could ignore the other.

Years of Negotiations Come to a Head

The agreements we were preparing had not appeared overnight. Formal Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, or SALT, had begun in 1969. For more than two years, our negotiators argued over intercontinental missiles, submarine-launched missiles, anti-ballistic missile defenses, verification, and the meaning of strategic equality. Shortly before Nixon's arrival, Henry Kissinger secretly met with me in Moscow. We worked through remaining disagreements because I wanted major agreements ready for the summit. Contemporary records show that I pressed for the agreements to be completed and signed while Nixon was in Moscow.

The Strange Logic of Nuclear Defense

One of the most difficult questions involved anti-ballistic missile systems, or ABMs. These weapons were designed to intercept incoming nuclear missiles. You might assume that better defenses would automatically make the world safer. In nuclear strategy, matters were not so simple. If one superpower developed a massive defensive shield, its leaders might someday believe they could attack first and then defend themselves against the weakened retaliation. The other country would respond by building still more offensive weapons to overwhelm those defenses. We therefore considered limiting defenses as one way of preserving deterrence and preventing an even larger arms race.

May 26: We Sign SALT I

On May 26, Nixon and I sat together in the Grand Kremlin Palace and signed the two agreements that became the foundation of SALT I. The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty restricted each country to two ABM deployment areas under the original agreement, with no more than 100 interceptors at each site. One could protect the national capital and another an ICBM field. The accompanying Interim Agreement placed temporary limits on certain American and Soviet strategic offensive missile launchers. For the first time in the Cold War, Washington and Moscow had formally agreed to restrict important portions of their strategic nuclear forces.

But We Did Not Disarm

Do not misunderstand what we signed. SALT I did not eliminate nuclear weapons. It did not even stop every form of nuclear expansion. The Interim Agreement froze certain categories of land- and submarine-based missile launchers for five years, but modernization remained possible, and the agreements did not solve the growing problem of missiles carrying multiple independently targetable warheads, known as MIRVs. Both governments therefore continued possessing enormous destructive power. SALT was not disarmament. It was an attempt to place boundaries around an arms competition that had become increasingly dangerous.

How Could We Trust Each Other?

There was also an obvious problem: verification. Neither government was prepared to allow foreign inspectors to wander freely through its most sensitive military installations. Instead, the agreements recognized the use of "national technical means" of verification—principally technologies such as reconnaissance satellites and other remote intelligence systems. We also agreed not to interfere with those means or deliberately conceal activities in ways that obstructed verification. In other words, we did not need to trust one another completely. We needed methods for checking whether the other side was following the agreement.

More Than a Nuclear Agreement

The Moscow Summit went beyond missiles. Nixon and I discussed Vietnam, Europe, trade, scientific cooperation, and the broader relationship between our countries. The summit became a symbol of détente—the attempt to make Soviet-American competition more predictable and less dangerous. Confidential diplomacy between Kissinger and Soviet ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin had already helped produce progress on Berlin and arms control, and the Moscow meeting brought much of that diplomacy into public view. We were demonstrating that two governments could remain ideological enemies while negotiating when their interests demanded it.

Détente Under Pressure: Cooperation Without Friendship - Told by Brezhnev

By 1973, President Richard Nixon and I had demonstrated that the Soviet Union and United States could negotiate seriously. SALT I had placed limits on portions of the nuclear competition, trade was expanding, and diplomatic contacts were becoming more frequent. But anyone who believed détente meant friendship misunderstood international politics. We remained competitors. America supported its allies; we supported ours. The purpose of détente was not to eliminate disagreement. It was to prevent those disagreements from producing a catastrophic confrontation.

I Come to America

In June 1973, I traveled to the United States for another summit with Nixon. We met in Washington, at Camp David, and later in California. During the visit, we signed eleven agreements covering matters ranging from scientific cooperation to nuclear questions. Most important was the Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War. We committed ourselves to conduct our policies in ways intended to avoid dangerous military confrontations and nuclear war. This was an important achievement. Yet even as Nixon and I spoke about peace, events elsewhere were preparing to test whether détente could survive a genuine international crisis.

War Explodes in the Middle East

On October 6, 1973, Egypt and Syria attacked Israeli forces in the Sinai Peninsula and Golan Heights. The Middle East suddenly became a test of Soviet-American relations. Moscow had supplied Egypt and Syria with weapons; Washington supported Israel. As losses mounted, we began resupplying our Arab partners, while the Americans launched a major airlift to Israel. Soon Israeli forces crossed the Suez Canal and threatened Egypt's Third Army. A regional war involving our respective partners was now bringing the two superpowers dangerously close to direct confrontation.

A Message That Shook Washington

We worked with the Americans on a ceasefire through the United Nations, but the fighting continued. On October 24, I sent Nixon an urgent message suggesting that Soviet and American forces could jointly help enforce the ceasefire and warning that Moscow might consider unilateral steps if Washington refused. The American response was dramatic: U.S. military forces, including nuclear forces, were placed on heightened worldwide alert. For a brief period, détente appeared capable of collapsing into something far more dangerous. The crisis eased after the United Nations arranged another ceasefire and peacekeeping force.

The Lesson of October

Think about the contradiction. Only four months earlier, Nixon and I had signed an agreement intended to prevent situations capable of producing nuclear confrontation. Now our countries had approached precisely such a confrontation because of a war neither of us had directly started. The October crisis demonstrated both the weakness and the necessity of détente. Our interests could still collide violently, but communication between Moscow and Washington helped keep a regional war from becoming a superpower war. Détente survived, although the trust surrounding it had been badly shaken.

Trouble Inside the United States

There was another problem I could not negotiate away simply by speaking with Nixon: American domestic politics. Members of Congress increasingly challenged the administration's policy toward us. Senator Henry Jackson and others sought to connect improved trade relations with changes in Soviet emigration policies, particularly restrictions affecting Soviet Jews. From our perspective, this was interference in Soviet internal affairs. From their perspective, trade privileges should not be separated from human rights. By 1974, what had begun as diplomacy between governments had become a major political argument inside the United States itself.

Another Summit, but Growing Doubts

Nixon returned to Moscow in June 1974. We continued discussing strategic arms, economic relations, and ways of controlling the nuclear competition. Yet the atmosphere was different from 1972. The Middle East crisis had exposed our continuing rivalry, arms-control negotiations remained difficult, and Nixon was increasingly weakened by the Watergate scandal. Détente continued, but the political foundations supporting it were becoming less secure.

Cooperation Without Illusions

That was the reality of détente in 1973 and 1974. We could sign agreements in the morning and confront each other over another part of the world by evening. We could discuss limiting nuclear weapons while continuing to build powerful military forces. We could increase trade while arguing over human rights and political systems. Détente survived because neither side could afford to ignore the other, not because our differences had disappeared. Perhaps that is the most important lesson of these years: peace between powerful rivals does not always require friendship. Sometimes it requires something more difficult—the discipline to compete without allowing competition to become war.

The Helsinki Accords and the Human-Rights Question (1975) - Told by Brezhnev

On August 1, 1975, I joined President Gerald Ford and leaders from across Europe and North America in Helsinki, Finland, to sign the Helsinki Final Act. Thirty-five countries participated, including the United States, Canada, the Soviet Union, and nearly every European state. To us, this was one of détente's greatest diplomatic achievements. Europe had been divided by war, occupation, revolution, and ideology for thirty years. Now East and West were sitting together and attempting to establish principles for living with that division without allowing another European war to erupt.

What Moscow Wanted

The Soviet Union had sought a European security conference for many years. One of our most important objectives was greater acceptance of Europe's postwar territorial and political order. After World War II, borders had changed dramatically, Germany had been divided, and Soviet influence extended throughout Eastern Europe. The Final Act included principles concerning sovereignty, territorial integrity, the inviolability of frontiers, nonintervention, and peaceful settlement of disputes. From Moscow's perspective, these provisions strengthened the international legitimacy of the European order that had emerged after 1945.

The Price of an Agreement

But diplomacy is an exchange. Western governments were not going to give us what we wanted without obtaining commitments of their own. The Helsinki negotiations developed several groups of issues often described as "baskets." Security occupied one major area, while economic, scientific, technological, and environmental cooperation occupied another. Then came the subject that would prove far more important than many in Moscow expected: humanitarian contacts and human rights. The Final Act included principles concerning human rights and fundamental freedoms and provisions touching such matters as family reunification, travel, information, and cultural exchanges.

Human Rights Enter the Cold War

We regarded questions concerning Soviet society as internal matters. Western governments, however, increasingly argued that the commitments signed at Helsinki gave them legitimate grounds to raise questions about freedom of religion, movement, expression, and treatment of dissidents. This created an uncomfortable contradiction. We wanted Western governments to respect principles of sovereignty and noninterference, while they pointed to the human-rights commitments that we ourselves had signed. At Helsinki, I publicly emphasized noninterference, but the agreement now contained language that critics of Soviet policies could also invoke.

The Dissidents Discover a Weapon

The most surprising consequences came from inside the communist world. Soviet dissidents realized that they no longer needed to appeal only to abstract ideas of freedom; they could ask whether our government was honoring an international agreement bearing its own signature. In May 1976, physicist Yuri Orlov and other activists created the Moscow Helsinki Group to monitor Soviet compliance. Similar groups and movements appeared elsewhere. American intelligence assessments later concluded that the human-rights provisions became a rallying point for Soviet and Eastern European dissidents.

A Document We Could Not Simply Ignore

The Helsinki Final Act was politically binding rather than a treaty requiring the same kind of legal enforcement mechanism, but it established a continuing process. Follow-up conferences would examine how participating countries were implementing their commitments. That mattered. Dissidents could document violations, Western governments could raise them internationally, and Moscow could be challenged using the language of an agreement we had voluntarily accepted. The Soviet leadership had calculated that the human-rights provisions would not create serious internal difficulties; subsequent American assessments concluded that this calculation proved mistaken.

Victory—or an Unexpected Challenge?

When I signed the Final Act in Helsinki, I had reason to regard it as a Soviet diplomatic success. We had achieved long-sought recognition of important elements of Europe's postwar status quo and strengthened the broader process of détente. Yet history sometimes gives agreements consequences their authors do not anticipate. The same document that seemed to strengthen Soviet security also gave dissidents a powerful international standard against which Soviet behavior could be measured. Helsinki did not bring down communism in 1975. But it introduced a question that would become increasingly difficult for us to answer: if the Soviet Union had publicly promised respect for fundamental freedoms, what would happen when its own citizens demanded that those promises be kept?

My Name is Jimmy Carter: President of the United States

I was born in Plains, Georgia, in 1924 and grew up on my family's farm. We did not have electricity or indoor plumbing during much of my childhood, and work was simply part of life. My father taught me responsibility, my mother taught me compassion, and my Christian faith became central to the way I understood right and wrong. Growing up in the segregated South also exposed me to injustices that America would eventually have to confront. I came to believe that a nation, like a person, should be judged not only by its strength, but by how it uses that strength.

From the Navy to Georgia

I graduated from the United States Naval Academy in 1946 and became a naval officer. I eventually worked in the developing nuclear submarine program under Admiral Hyman Rickover, a demanding man who expected preparation, discipline, and honesty. When my father died in 1953, I returned to Georgia to operate the family business. Politics came later. I served in the Georgia State Senate and eventually became governor. By the 1970s, Americans had endured Vietnam and Watergate, and many had lost confidence in Washington. I ran for president in 1976 promising something simple but important: I would tell the American people the truth.

Becoming President

I entered the White House in January 1977 knowing that America remained enormously powerful but that power alone could not provide leadership. I wanted our foreign policy to reflect American principles, especially human rights. I believed we should oppose political imprisonment, torture, and repression whether committed by our enemies or our friends. That sometimes complicated diplomacy, particularly with the Soviet Union, but I believed America's moral principles should not disappear when they became inconvenient.

Peace Through Negotiation

I did not believe every international conflict required military force. At Camp David in 1978, I brought Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin together. For nearly two weeks, the negotiations were difficult, and at times they nearly collapsed. I carried messages between the two sides, searched for compromises, and refused to let either leader simply walk away. The resulting Camp David Accords helped lead to a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel. It reinforced my conviction that determined diplomacy could sometimes accomplish what armies could not.

Opening the Door to China

Another important change was occurring in Asia. Richard Nixon had begun opening relations with the People's Republic of China, but my administration completed the process. After negotiations with China's leaders, the United States and the People's Republic established full diplomatic relations on January 1, 1979. Deng Xiaoping soon visited America. China was still communist, and we had serious disagreements, but diplomacy did not require agreement on everything. Normalization altered the strategic relationship among Washington, Beijing, and Moscow and became an important part of the changing Cold War.

SALT II and Brezhnev

I also continued negotiations with Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev over nuclear weapons. Neither of us could ignore what nuclear war would mean. In June 1979, Brezhnev and I met in Vienna and signed SALT II, placing additional limits on strategic nuclear forces. I hoped arms control could continue even while we challenged Soviet policies elsewhere. But détente was becoming increasingly fragile. Our nations disagreed over human rights, Soviet activities abroad, and the military balance between East and West.

Afghanistan Changes Everything

In December 1979, Soviet troops entered Afghanistan. I regarded the intervention as a serious threat, particularly because Afghanistan lay near the Persian Gulf and important oil routes. My administration responded by asking the Senate to postpone consideration of SALT II, restricting grain sales to the Soviet Union, supporting resistance to Soviet forces, and backing an American boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympics. In January 1980, I declared that an outside attempt to gain control of the Persian Gulf would threaten vital American interests. The hope that détente could steadily reduce Cold War tensions had suffered a tremendous blow.

Iran and the Limits of Presidential Power

At the same time, revolution transformed Iran. American diplomats were seized at our embassy in Tehran in November 1979 and held hostage. I felt responsible for bringing every American home safely. Diplomacy dragged on, and in April 1980 I authorized a military rescue attempt. It failed in the Iranian desert, and eight American servicemen died. I accepted responsibility. The hostages remained captive throughout the rest of my presidency, and I lost the 1980 election to Ronald Reagan. They were finally released on the day I left office.

Looking Back

I left Washington disappointed, but public office was never the only way to serve. Rosalynn and I continued working for peace, human rights, democracy, public health, and housing, and that work eventually took us around the world. Looking back, I remain proud of Camp David, relations with China, arms-control efforts, and putting human rights more prominently into American foreign policy. But leadership also requires admitting shortcomings. I sometimes attempted too much at once, and I did not always communicate effectively with the American people—a concern I later acknowledged when reflecting on my administration. I learned that a president can command armies and negotiate treaties, but he cannot control history. He can only make the best decisions he can, accept responsibility for them, and never forget that peace is worth pursuing even when achieving it is difficult.

Carter Enters the Cold War: Human Rights and Foreign Policy - Told by Carter

When I became president on January 20, 1977, the United States had recently emerged from Vietnam and Watergate. Many Americans questioned not only their government, but also the way our country had exercised power abroad. I believed America needed strength, but I also believed our foreign policy should reflect our principles. In my inaugural address, I made clear that the United States could not be indifferent when people elsewhere were denied basic freedoms. Human rights would not be a decoration attached to my foreign policy. I intended to make it part of how America dealt with the world.

What Did Human Rights Mean?

Human rights could sound like an admirable slogan, but governing required us to define what we meant. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance explained that our policy included protection from torture and arbitrary imprisonment, access to basic human needs such as food and shelter, and civil and political freedoms. We also understood that we could not force every country to change overnight. Our influence differed from country to country. The objective was to use diplomacy, economic assistance, public statements, and international institutions where they could produce practical results.

Challenging Moscow

The Soviet Union quickly discovered that I intended to speak publicly about dissidents and political prisoners. Early in 1977, I criticized the imprisonment of Soviet dissident Aleksandr Ginzburg, and my administration raised concerns about restrictions on Jewish emigration and other human-rights issues. Leonid Brezhnev's government considered this interference in Soviet internal affairs. I knew speaking out could complicate relations with Moscow, but I rejected the idea that arms negotiations required silence about repression. At the same time, I acknowledged that America could not simply use military force to change another nation's internal system. Progress would have to come through persistent pressure and diplomacy.

America Had Its Own Record to Face

I did not claim that the United States had always lived according to the principles we promoted. Our own history included slavery, segregation, discrimination, and other failures. That mattered. If America was going to speak about freedom abroad, we had to recognize our shortcomings at home. At Notre Dame in May 1977, I argued for a foreign policy rooted more openly in democratic values and human dignity. I also said that America should move beyond an excessive fear of communism that had sometimes encouraged us to support authoritarian governments simply because they opposed Moscow.

Putting Principles into Policy

Words alone were not enough. During 1977 and 1978, my administration built human-rights considerations more directly into decisions concerning American economic and military assistance. Our embassies were instructed to report more carefully on abuses, and government agencies examined whether aid should continue to countries with serious human-rights records. This created difficult choices. Some governments accused us of moralizing, while critics at home argued that we were inconsistent because strategic interests still influenced our decisions. Both criticisms revealed the central problem: foreign policy rarely offers choices between perfect good and obvious evil.

Détente Was Not Abandoned

Some people believed my human-rights policy meant I wanted to end détente with the Soviet Union. I did not. I continued negotiations over strategic nuclear weapons because preventing nuclear war remained one of the greatest responsibilities of the presidency. In 1978, I explained that American-Soviet relations would remain competitive but also had to contain cooperation. We could challenge Soviet conduct while negotiating arms limitations. That balance was difficult, and Brezhnev strongly disliked my public emphasis on Soviet human rights, but silence would also have carried a price.

The World Was Larger Than Moscow

My foreign policy was also intended to move beyond seeing every international question simply through the American-Soviet rivalry. We pursued peace negotiations in the Middle East, worked toward new relations with China, strengthened cooperation with democratic allies, negotiated the Panama Canal Treaties, and addressed economic and humanitarian issues affecting developing nations. By 1978, I had also decided to pursue full diplomatic normalization with the People's Republic of China. The Cold War still mattered enormously, but the world was becoming too complicated to divide every nation neatly between Washington and Moscow.

America and Communist China Establish Diplomacy - Told by Deng Xiaoping

When Richard Nixon visited China in 1972, he and Chairman Mao opened a door that had been closed for more than twenty years. But opening a door is not the same as walking through it. By 1978, the People's Republic of China and the United States still did not have full diplomatic relations. We had liaison offices rather than embassies, and Washington continued formally recognizing the Republic of China government on Taiwan. I believed this arrangement had lasted long enough. China was beginning a new period of modernization, and a normal relationship with the United States could serve both our economic development and our strategic security.

Three Conditions Stood in the Way

The Taiwan question remained the greatest obstacle. Beijing insisted that Washington recognize the People's Republic as the sole legal government of China, end formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan, and terminate the 1954 U.S.-Republic of China Mutual Defense Treaty. We would not accept a permanent arrangement suggesting that there were "two Chinas." The Americans, however, wanted to preserve commercial, cultural, and other unofficial relations with Taiwan and remained deeply concerned about Taiwan's security and future. Those positions were difficult to reconcile, but not impossible.

Secret Negotiations Become Serious

President Jimmy Carter decided in 1978 to push normalization forward. His national security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, visited Beijing in May, and American representative Leonard Woodcock conducted confidential negotiations with us. By December, I became personally involved as negotiations accelerated. Carter was prepared to meet China's central conditions, but the Americans also made clear that they expected the Taiwan question to be settled peacefully and intended to maintain unofficial relations with the people there. We did not accept an American right to determine China's internal affairs, but we were prepared to move ahead despite these differences.

December 15: The World Hears the News

On December 15, 1978, Washington and Beijing simultaneously announced their historic agreement. Beginning January 1, 1979, our governments would recognize one another and establish full diplomatic relations. The United States recognized the government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal government of China. At the same time, Washington stated that Americans would continue cultural, commercial, and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan. The communiqué also reaffirmed principles from the 1972 Shanghai Communiqué, including opposition to any country seeking domination, or hegemony, in Asia or elsewhere.

The Decision Had a Price

This agreement was celebrated in Beijing and Washington, but not everywhere. Taiwan's government strongly opposed the American decision. Washington terminated diplomatic relations with Taipei and gave notice that the mutual defense treaty would end according to its provisions. The United States nevertheless intended to maintain substantial unofficial relations with Taiwan, and Congress soon created a new legal framework for those ties through the Taiwan Relations Act. The disagreement over Taiwan had therefore not disappeared. Normalization had created a new way of managing it.

I Go to America

Then came my turn to cross the Pacific. On January 29, 1979, I arrived in Washington for a visit that would take me not only to the White House but also to Atlanta, Houston, Seattle, and Los Angeles. I met President Carter and American political and business leaders. The images Americans remembered included my visit to a Texas rodeo, where I put on a cowboy hat. I understood the value of such gestures, but I had not traveled thousands of miles merely to entertain television audiences. China needed technology, investment, scientific knowledge, education, and contact with an advanced industrial economy.

Turning Diplomacy into Something Practical

President Carter and I signed agreements on scientific and technological cooperation and cultural exchange. Other officials reached agreements concerning consular relations, student and scholarly exchanges, agriculture, space technology, and high-energy physics. This was what interested me. China could not modernize by isolating itself from the world's knowledge. We would remain socialist and determine our own political future, but there was no wisdom in refusing to learn from countries that possessed technologies and methods we needed.

The Cold War Triangle Changes

Normalization also changed the strategic balance. The common concern that had first drawn Washington and Beijing closer was the Soviet Union, although by 1979 the relationship had become broader than that single issue. Moscow now confronted a reality it could not ignore: the United States had diplomatic relations with both major communist powers, while China was pursuing an independent course increasingly opposed to Soviet influence. We had not become American allies, nor had our disagreements vanished. But on January 1, 1979, nearly thirty years of abnormal relations came to an end. China had stepped farther into the international system—and we intended to use that opening to help transform our country.

SALT II and the Crumbling of Détente (1979) - Told by Jimmy Carter

When I entered the White House, American and Soviet negotiators had already spent years trying to build upon SALT I. I believed controlling nuclear weapons was one of the greatest responsibilities any president could carry. The United States and Soviet Union possessed enough destructive power to devastate each other and much of the world. Leonid Brezhnev and I disagreed about human rights, Soviet activities abroad, and the meaning of détente, but nuclear war would not distinguish between communists and capitalists. We therefore continued negotiating.

The Problem Was More Than Counting Missiles

SALT II was enormously complicated. We argued over intercontinental missiles, submarine-launched weapons, strategic bombers, cruise missiles, multiple-warhead missiles known as MIRVs, and methods of verifying compliance. One particularly difficult disagreement concerned the Soviet Tu-22M "Backfire" bomber, which Moscow insisted was not an intercontinental strategic bomber. Eventually, compromises allowed us to finish the treaty. SALT II established an overall ceiling of 2,250 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles for each side, together with additional restrictions on systems carrying multiple warheads.

Brezhnev and I Meet in Vienna

In June 1979, I traveled to Vienna, Austria, for my first summit meeting with Brezhnev. We spoke privately as well as with our advisers, and our disagreements were obvious. Nevertheless, on June 18, we sat together and signed SALT II. I regarded it as an important contribution to reducing the danger of nuclear war and hoped it could provide a foundation for further negotiations. Brezhnev likewise spoke of the treaty as an opportunity for improving Soviet-American relations. For a moment, détente appeared to have achieved another major success.

Now I Had to Convince the Senate

Signing the treaty was only part of my task. Under the Constitution, a treaty required the approval of two-thirds of the senators present before the United States could ratify it. And SALT II faced determined opposition. Critics questioned whether its limits adequately protected American security, whether Soviet compliance could be verified, and whether Moscow was exploiting détente while expanding its influence elsewhere. I argued that the agreement was verifiable and that rejecting it could damage future arms-control efforts. But I knew from the beginning that winning Senate support would be difficult.

Détente Was Already Fraying

The political atmosphere continued to deteriorate. Americans were concerned about Soviet involvement in conflicts in Africa and elsewhere, the treatment of dissidents inside the Soviet Union, and the overall military balance. Then controversy erupted over evidence of a Soviet combat brigade in Cuba. I told the American people that the brigade did not represent an immediate threat, but its presence intensified suspicions about Moscow at precisely the moment I needed senators to trust an arms-control agreement. Détente depended upon cooperation, yet events repeatedly reminded Americans that the Soviet Union remained our principal military rival.

Can Arms Control Survive Rivalry?

This was the central difficulty. I never believed SALT II meant that our competition had ended. The United States and Soviet Union possessed conflicting political systems and frequently conflicting interests. But I believed that was precisely why arms control mattered. We did not negotiate nuclear limitations because we trusted Moscow completely. We negotiated because the consequences of uncontrolled competition were too dangerous. Even while disagreements multiplied, both governments still shared an overwhelming interest in preventing nuclear war.

December Changes Everything

By December, the treaty was already in serious political trouble. On December 17, nineteen senators wrote to me expressing concerns about the strategic military balance and SALT II. Then came the event that transformed the debate. On December 25, Soviet forces entered Afghanistan. From Washington, this was not merely another disagreement with Moscow. Soviet military forces had crossed into a neighboring country at a strategically sensitive location near Iran, Pakistan, and the Persian Gulf. Whatever political strength remained behind détente was now rapidly disappearing.

A Treaty Without Ratification

After the Soviet intervention, I asked the Senate in January 1980 to postpone consideration of SALT II. The treaty was never ratified. Yet something revealing happened afterward: both Washington and Moscow generally observed its central limits for years despite its failure to enter into force. SALT II therefore became both an achievement and a symbol of failure. We had demonstrated that the superpowers could negotiate detailed limits on some of the most dangerous weapons ever created, but we had also discovered that arms control could not exist separately from the larger Cold War. By the end of 1979, détente was no longer merely under pressure. Afghanistan was about to push it toward collapse.

My Name is Zbigniew Brzezinski: National Security Adviser

I was born in Warsaw, Poland, in 1928, the son of a Polish diplomat. My childhood taught me something fundamental about international affairs: geography matters. Poland existed between Germany and Russia, two great powers whose ambitions repeatedly shaped the fate of smaller nations. When the Soviet Union tightened its control over Eastern Europe after World War II, returning permanently to communist Poland was no longer the future I wanted. I eventually settled in North America, studied political science, and devoted myself to understanding Soviet power and the changing international system.

Studying the Soviet System

I became a scholar because ideas matter, but ideas without an understanding of power are dangerous. At Harvard and later Columbia University, I studied communism, nationalism, Soviet politics, and the divisions developing within the communist world. I did not regard the Soviet Union as an unstoppable monolith. Moscow controlled an empire containing different peoples, interests, and ambitions. China was already demonstrating that communist governments could become rivals. American strategy had to understand these differences rather than simply treating every communist country as identical.

Meeting Jimmy Carter

During the 1970s, I helped establish the Trilateral Commission, bringing together leaders from North America, Western Europe, and Japan. There I came to know Jimmy Carter. I initially underestimated him, but I soon discovered a politician who was serious about foreign affairs and willing to consider unconventional ideas. During his presidential campaign, I sent him advice on foreign policy. Before long, he was describing me as his principal foreign-policy adviser. After his victory in 1976, he appointed me Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

Inside the White House

My responsibility was not simply to provide the President with information. It was to ensure that he understood his choices and their strategic consequences. I normally began early, reviewed intelligence, and briefed Carter personally in the morning. I wanted American foreign policy to combine principle with power. Human rights could challenge the ideological legitimacy of Soviet domination, while military strength, alliances, diplomacy, and economic influence could protect American interests. Carter and I did not agree on everything, but I respected his willingness to make difficult foreign-policy decisions.

The Strategic Importance of China

China presented an extraordinary opportunity. The Soviet Union and China had become bitter rivals, and improved American relations with Beijing could fundamentally alter the global balance of power. I traveled to China in 1978 and met Chinese leaders as the Carter administration moved toward normalization. This was not sentimentality. The United States and communist China remained profoundly different societies. But diplomacy is not conducted only among friends. In January 1979, Washington and Beijing formally established diplomatic relations, strengthening America's position within the triangular relationship among the world's three great powers.

Détente Had Limits

I was more skeptical than some in Washington about détente with Moscow. Negotiating with the Soviet Union was necessary, particularly when nuclear weapons were involved, but negotiation must never become an excuse for ignoring shifts in power. I believed Soviet activities in Africa, Asia, and elsewhere demonstrated that Moscow still intended to expand its influence where opportunities appeared. Arms control could be useful, but the United States also needed strong alliances, military credibility, and the willingness to resist geopolitical expansion.

Afghanistan Changes the Equation

In December 1979, Soviet forces entered Afghanistan. To me, this confirmed that the United States had to respond firmly. Afghanistan stood near Iran, Pakistan, and the approaches to the Persian Gulf. We could not examine it as an isolated country on a map. I supported measures to impose costs on Moscow and assistance to Afghan resistance forces. Carter also withdrew SALT II from immediate Senate consideration, imposed economic measures, strengthened America's regional posture, and announced what became known as the Carter Doctrine. The period of détente had given way to a renewed strategic confrontation.

The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan and the Collapse of Détente - Told by Brzezinski

Afghanistan had once occupied only a modest place in American strategy, but by 1979 that was changing rapidly. A communist government had seized power in Kabul in April 1978, and its radical reforms helped provoke armed rebellion across the country. Moscow supplied the government with advisers, weapons, and assistance, while the Afghan leadership became increasingly unstable. By July 1979, President Carter had authorized a modest covert program providing cash, communications equipment, and other non-lethal assistance to Afghan insurgents through Pakistan. We were watching a local revolution become an international crisis.

The Warning Signs Grow

Throughout 1979, Soviet involvement deepened. Afghan communist leaders Nur Muhammad Taraki and Hafizullah Amin turned against one another, and Amin ultimately seized power after Taraki was killed. Moscow no longer trusted the government it was trying to preserve. Soviet forces began concentrating near Afghanistan while additional personnel entered the country. In Washington, we debated whether the Kremlin would actually risk a full military intervention. I regarded the danger seriously. Afghanistan was not important merely because of Afghanistan itself; geography placed it beside Iran and Pakistan and relatively close to the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean.

Christmas 1979: Moscow Makes Its Move

Then the calculation changed completely. Beginning in late December, thousands of Soviet troops poured into Afghanistan. Soviet special forces attacked key installations in Kabul, Hafizullah Amin was killed, and Babrak Karmal was installed as the country's new leader. Moscow described its actions as assistance to a friendly government. From Washington, we saw something much more consequential: the Soviet military had directly intervened outside the established Soviet bloc to preserve a communist regime. Afghanistan had ceased to be merely an internal conflict. Soviet divisions were now operating much closer to the strategic heart of Southwest Asia.

Look at the Map

My argument to President Carter was straightforward: do not judge this only by what Brezhnev claimed his intentions were. Examine the strategic consequences. On December 26, I warned Carter that Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan together constituted a regional crisis. If Soviet control of Afghanistan became permanent and Pakistan were intimidated, Moscow's strategic position toward the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf would improve dramatically. The Persian Gulf contained oil resources essential to the global economy and America's allies. A great power must consider not merely where an adversary stands today, but where that position might allow it to stand tomorrow.

Washington Strikes Back

We therefore sought to make Soviet intervention costly without beginning a direct American-Soviet war. Carter condemned the invasion and pursued diplomatic pressure, economic sanctions, and expanded covert assistance to the Afghan resistance. On December 27, he authorized lethal covert assistance to the Mujahideen, with Pakistan becoming crucial to the effort. The administration also restricted grain sales, pressed allies to condemn Moscow, strengthened assistance to Pakistan, and supported a boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympic Games. We were not sending American divisions into Afghanistan. We intended instead to ensure that Soviet occupation would encounter sustained resistance.

The Carter Doctrine

The crisis also required a broader strategic response. On January 23, 1980, Carter addressed Congress and declared that an attempt by an outside power to gain control of the Persian Gulf region would be regarded as an assault on vital American interests and would be resisted by whatever means necessary, including military force. This became known as the Carter Doctrine. Within the administration, we were simultaneously considering stronger regional defenses, closer cooperation with Pakistan and other states, increased military capabilities, and a long-term American security framework for the Persian Gulf. Afghanistan had changed America's understanding of the strategic map.

Détente Collapses

Only months earlier, Carter and Brezhnev had signed SALT II. Now Carter asked the Senate to postpone consideration of the treaty. The invasion reinforced the argument that détente could not be separated from Soviet behavior elsewhere in the world. The United States and Soviet Union would still need to communicate, particularly because both possessed enormous nuclear arsenals, but the optimism surrounding détente had largely disappeared. Afghanistan became a watershed in the deterioration of Soviet-American relations.

A War That Would Not End Quickly

The Kremlin apparently hoped it could stabilize Afghanistan, preserve a friendly government, and secure its position. Instead, Soviet forces became trapped in a war that lasted nearly a decade. The Mujahideen continued fighting, Pakistan became the essential conduit for outside assistance, and American support expanded greatly during the Reagan administration. Soviet forces finally withdrew in 1989. Yet there is a lesson here that strategists must never forget. We wanted to impose costs on Soviet expansion, and in that objective the resistance eventually succeeded. But great-power competition can unleash forces whose future consequences cannot be neatly controlled. Afghanistan helped weaken Soviet power, but the war also devastated Afghanistan itself. Strategy must look several moves ahead—and history often continues moving long after the strategists have left the room.