16. Heroes and Villains of the Cold War: The Middle East and the Cold War: Oil, Revolution, and Superpower Rivalry (1948–1979)

My Name is David Ben-Gurion: Israel and the Search for Security

I was born David Grün in 1886 in Płońsk, then part of the Russian Empire. From my youth, I believed that the Jewish people could not depend forever upon the tolerance of others for their safety. Across Europe, Jews had endured discrimination, persecution, and violence. My father was active in the Zionist movement, and I came to believe that our people needed more than promises of protection. We needed a homeland where Jews could determine their own future.

Building a Nation Before It Existed

In 1906, I traveled to Ottoman-controlled Palestine. I worked as a laborer, became active in Zionist politics, and eventually adopted the Hebrew name Ben-Gurion. The task before us was enormous. A nation could not simply be declared; it had to be built. We organized workers, established communities, developed institutions, and prepared ourselves politically and economically. After the First World War, Britain governed Palestine, and tensions increasingly grew among the British authorities, Jewish immigrants, and the Palestinian Arab population.

The Holocaust Changes Everything

Then Europe descended into catastrophe. Nazi Germany murdered six million Jews during the Holocaust. To me, this confirmed with terrible force what I had argued for years: a people without the ability to defend itself could be placed at the mercy of others. Survivors emerged from Europe with families destroyed and communities erased. Britain continued restricting Jewish immigration into Palestine. I became increasingly determined that the Jewish people would establish their own state.

Israel Declares Independence

On May 14, 1948, I stood in Tel Aviv and declared the establishment of the State of Israel. We knew war could follow almost immediately. It did. Armies from neighboring Arab states entered the conflict, while Palestinian Arabs and Jews were already fighting throughout the former British Mandate. Israel survived. For Israelis, the war became our War of Independence. For Palestinians, it became the Nakba—the catastrophe—as hundreds of thousands fled or were expelled from their homes. A Jewish state had been established, but the struggle over the land was far from finished.

Security Above Everything

As Israel's first prime minister and minister of defense, I believed survival required strength. Israel was geographically small, surrounded by hostile governments, and filled with immigrants and refugees who had arrived from Europe, the Middle East, and North Africa. We built the Israel Defense Forces, strengthened government institutions, encouraged immigration, and sought weapons and international allies. My policy was based upon a difficult calculation: Israel could not afford to lose a major war. One catastrophic defeat might mean the destruction of the country itself.

The Suez Crisis

By the 1950s, Egypt's Gamal Abdel Nasser had emerged as the most powerful voice of Arab nationalism. Egyptian-supported fedayeen attacks and growing regional tensions convinced many Israelis that another major confrontation was coming. In 1956, after Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, Israel secretly coordinated with Britain and France and invaded Egypt's Sinai Peninsula. Militarily, Israeli forces advanced rapidly, but international pressure—especially from the United States and Soviet Union—forced Britain, France, and Israel to withdraw. The crisis taught us that even military victories could be overturned by the politics of the Cold War.

Caught Between the Superpowers

Israel's relationship with the great powers was complicated. The Soviet Union had initially supported Israel's creation, but Moscow increasingly developed relationships with Arab governments and supplied them with weapons. Israel gradually moved closer to France and later the United States. Yet I did not believe Israel should simply become a piece on someone else's Cold War chessboard. Great powers pursue their own interests. Israel, I believed, had to pursue its own survival.

Israel Is Born and the First Arab-Israeli War (1947–1949) - Told by Ben-Gurion

By 1947, I had spent much of my life working toward the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine. The Holocaust had murdered six million Jews, while survivors searched desperately for places where they could rebuild their lives. Britain, exhausted by war and unable to resolve the growing conflict between Jews and Palestinian Arabs, announced that it would end its mandate. The question that had divided this land for decades was approaching a decisive moment: what would happen when Britain left?

The United Nations Divides the Land

On November 29, 1947, the United Nations General Assembly approved Resolution 181, recommending that Palestine be divided into independent Jewish and Arab states, with Jerusalem placed under a special international arrangement. Jewish leaders accepted partition despite serious reservations about the borders. Arab leaders rejected it, arguing that the Arab majority of Palestine should not be compelled to surrender a large portion of the country to a Jewish state. Almost immediately, fighting between Jewish and Palestinian Arab forces intensified. Before Israel formally existed, a civil war had already begun.

The Road to Independence Becomes a Battlefield

Roads were attacked, communities were isolated, and both Jewish and Arab civilians lived under growing fear. Jerusalem became particularly dangerous because Jewish neighborhoods depended upon supply convoys traveling through contested territory. Jewish forces, including the Haganah, expanded military operations to secure roads and territory. Palestinian Arab communities suffered heavily as the fighting spread. Some residents fled because they feared approaching battles; others were expelled by Jewish forces. Massacres and atrocities, including the killing of civilians at Deir Yassin in April 1948, intensified panic. What Israelis would remember as the struggle for independence was already becoming what Palestinians would remember as the Nakba, or catastrophe.

May 14, 1948

Britain prepared to leave, and we faced an extraordinary decision. Some warned that declaring independence would bring invasion by neighboring Arab armies. I believed waiting presented an even greater danger. On May 14, 1948, in Tel Aviv, I read Israel's Declaration of Independence and proclaimed the establishment of the State of Israel. The United States recognized the new state within minutes. The Soviet Union soon granted recognition as well. For one remarkable moment, the emerging Cold War rivals both supported Israel's existence.

Five Arab Armies Enter the War

The following day, forces from Egypt, Transjordan, Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq entered the fighting. Israel now faced conventional armies from several directions. The situation appeared desperate. Yet the Arab coalition was divided by competing objectives and lacked unified command, while Israeli forces increasingly came under centralized control as the Israel Defense Forces. Weapons obtained from abroad, including important shipments from Czechoslovakia, helped strengthen our position. After periods of fighting interrupted by truces, Israeli forces gained the advantage and captured additional territory beyond that allocated to the proposed Jewish state under the UN partition plan.

Victory for One People, Catastrophe for Another

By the time armistice agreements were reached in 1949, Israel controlled approximately 78 percent of the former British Mandate of Palestine, excluding Transjordan. Jordan controlled the West Bank and East Jerusalem, while Egypt controlled the Gaza Strip. But there was another consequence that cannot be removed from this story: roughly 700,000 Palestinian Arabs had fled or been expelled from territory that became Israel. Hundreds of Palestinian villages were depopulated or destroyed. Meanwhile, Jewish communities were also displaced from areas captured by Arab forces, including Jerusalem's Old City.

A War Ends Without Peace

The agreements of 1949 were armistices, not peace treaties. Israel had survived its first war and secured something generations of Zionists had sought: an independent Jewish state capable of defending itself. But the Palestinian Arab state envisioned by the United Nations was not created. Palestinian refugees remained scattered across Gaza, the West Bank, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and elsewhere, while Arab governments refused to accept the permanence of Israel's victory. We had won independence, but we had not created peace.

The Beginning of a Much Larger Struggle

When students study 1948 only as an Israeli victory or only as a Palestinian catastrophe, they see only half of the history. For Jews who had endured centuries of persecution culminating in the Holocaust, Israel represented national survival and self-determination. For Palestinians who lost homes, communities, property, and political control over their homeland, those same events represented dispossession and exile. And hovering over this conflict was a changing international order. The United States and Soviet Union would soon compete for influence throughout the Middle East, supplying allies with weapons, money, and diplomatic support. The Arab-Israeli conflict had begun before the Cold War fully entered the region, but it would not remain separate from it for long.

My Name is Mohammad Reza Pahlavi: Iran, Oil, and the Western Alliance

I was born in Tehran in 1919, the eldest son of Reza Shah Pahlavi. My father believed Iran had to become a strong, modern nation, independent of foreign domination. I was educated partly in Switzerland and trained from childhood to rule. In 1941, during the Second World War, British and Soviet forces occupied Iran and forced my father to abdicate. At only twenty-one years old, I became Shah of Iran.

Oil and the Struggle for Power

Iran possessed one of the greatest prizes of the modern world: oil. Yet much of its production was controlled by British interests. In 1951, Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh nationalized the Iranian oil industry. Many Iranians celebrated this as an assertion of national independence, but Britain fiercely opposed it. Political conflict consumed the country, and my own authority weakened. In 1953, American and British intelligence services supported a coup that removed Mosaddegh. I returned with greater power, and from that moment my reign became closely connected with the Western alliance.

Iran and the Cold War

Look at a map and you will understand my concerns. Iran shared a long border with the Soviet Union. Moscow had already attempted to maintain influence inside northern Iran after the Second World War, and communists were active within our country. I believed neutrality without strength would leave Iran vulnerable. Therefore, I aligned Iran with the United States while insisting that Iran itself become a regional power. American weapons, military training, investment, and technology helped us build one of the strongest armed forces in the Middle East.

The White Revolution

I did not intend Iran merely to remain an oil-producing monarchy. Beginning in 1963, I launched what became known as the White Revolution. We redistributed land, expanded education, promoted industrial development, created literacy programs, and extended voting rights to women. I envisioned what I called a Great Civilization: an Iran that combined its ancient heritage with modern science, industry, infrastructure, and military strength. Oil revenues gave us the resources to pursue this transformation at extraordinary speed.

The Price of Control

Modernization created enemies as well as supporters. Landowners resented reform. Religious leaders opposed aspects of my social policies and the growth of Western cultural influence. Leftists condemned my alliance with the United States. Nationalists remembered Mosaddegh and accused me of surrendering Iranian independence. My government responded forcefully. SAVAK, Iran's intelligence and security organization, pursued political opponents, and censorship and imprisonment became associated with my rule. I believed disorder could destroy everything we were building, and I chose stability over political openness.

Iran Becomes a Regional Power

During the 1970s, rising oil revenues transformed Iran. We purchased advanced aircraft, tanks, missiles, and other weapons, while constructing factories, universities, roads, and modern cities. Washington increasingly regarded Iran as a pillar of stability in the Persian Gulf. But rapid change brought inflation, inequality, corruption, and cultural disruption. The faster I attempted to transform Iran, the more some Iranians felt that their country was changing without their consent.

The Revolution

By 1978, demonstrations spread across Iran. Religious conservatives, liberals, students, nationalists, and Marxists—groups that agreed on very little—found common cause in opposing me. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini became the most powerful symbol of the revolution. In January 1979, I left Iran, believing my departure might prevent greater bloodshed. Within weeks, the monarchy collapsed. The Islamic Republic replaced the system my father and I had built, and one of America's strongest Cold War allies in the Middle East became one of its fiercest opponents.

The Judgment of History

I died in exile in Egypt in 1980. I remained convinced that Iran needed modernization, military strength, education, economic development, and independence from Soviet domination. Yet a ruler must judge not only where he wishes to take his country, but whether his people believe they are traveling there with him. I moved Iran forward rapidly, but I allowed too little room for peaceful opposition and relied too heavily upon centralized power and security forces. I believed I was protecting Iran from chaos. In the end, I did not sufficiently understand how much anger had accumulated beneath the order I had created. That is perhaps the hardest lesson of my life: a nation may become richer and stronger while its government simultaneously loses the confidence of its people.

Oil, Iran, and the 1953 Coup (1951–1953) - Told by Mohammad Reza Pahlavi

In the early 1950s, I was Shah of a country sitting upon one of the world's most valuable resources: oil. Yet many Iranians believed that foreigners benefited from our petroleum more than Iran itself. The British-controlled Anglo-Iranian Oil Company dominated production and operated the enormous refinery at Abadan. To many of my people, this was no longer simply an economic arrangement. Oil had become a question of sovereignty: who truly controlled Iran?

Mosaddegh Challenges Britain

In 1951, the Iranian parliament chose Mohammad Mosaddegh as prime minister. He was an intense nationalist and a determined opponent of British influence. His greatest cause was nationalizing Iran's oil industry. Parliament approved nationalization, and Mosaddegh moved against the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. Crowds celebrated. Britain responded with economic pressure, an international campaign against Iran's actions, and an effective boycott of Iranian oil. Production and exports collapsed, depriving our government of desperately needed revenue.

The Shah and the Prime Minister

Mosaddegh and I represented competing centers of authority. He believed that Iran's elected government should control the military and major decisions of state. I believed the monarchy possessed constitutional powers that could not simply be swept aside. Our confrontation became increasingly dangerous. Mosaddegh's supporters demanded greater democracy and reduced royal authority. Conservatives, military officers, religious figures, and others feared where his government was taking the country. Meanwhile, the communist Tudeh Party became increasingly visible, alarming both Iranians and Western governments.

The Cold War Arrives in Tehran

Iran shared a long border with the Soviet Union. Only a few years earlier, Soviet forces had resisted withdrawing from northern Iran and had supported separatist movements there. American officials therefore viewed instability in Iran through the larger struggle against Soviet expansion. The British wanted their oil interests restored and Mosaddegh removed. The administration of President Dwight Eisenhower increasingly feared that continued economic and political disorder could eventually strengthen communist influence. What began as an Iranian struggle over oil and constitutional power was becoming part of the Cold War.

Operation Ajax

In 1953, the CIA and Britain's MI6 worked to undermine Mosaddegh in an operation commonly known as Operation Ajax. Money was used to influence politicians, newspapers, organizers, and other participants in Iranian politics. I signed decrees dismissing Mosaddegh and appointing General Fazlollah Zahedi as prime minister. The first attempt to remove Mosaddegh failed, and I left Iran. For several days, it appeared that I might have lost my throne.

Then, on August 19, the situation reversed. Pro-Shah crowds, military units, political organizers, and opponents of Mosaddegh moved through Tehran. Fighting erupted. Mosaddegh's residence was attacked, his government collapsed, and Zahedi assumed power. I soon returned to Iran.

Who Really Overthrew Mosaddegh?

For years afterward, arguments continued over exactly how much credit—or blame—belonged to foreign intelligence agencies and how much belonged to Iranians themselves. There were genuine domestic opponents of Mosaddegh, serious constitutional disputes, economic hardship, military involvement, and competing political movements. But there is no longer serious question that American and British intelligence actively participated in the effort to overthrow him. Declassified records have confirmed the CIA's role. Foreign intervention did not create every division inside Iran, but it deliberately exploited those divisions.

The Consequences of 1953

Mosaddegh was arrested, tried, and sentenced to imprisonment before spending the remainder of his life under house arrest. My position became considerably stronger. Iran moved closer to the United States, Western oil companies returned under a new consortium arrangement, and American military and economic assistance increased. Washington increasingly regarded my government as a barrier against Soviet influence in the Middle East. For the West, Iran appeared to have been secured. For many Iranians, however, 1953 became evidence that foreign governments would interfere in Iran when their strategic and economic interests were threatened.

A Victory With a Long Shadow

At the time, I believed Mosaddegh's removal had saved Iran from political collapse and possibly communist exploitation. I returned determined to build a modern, powerful country capable of resisting Moscow and commanding respect throughout the Middle East. But the events of 1953 followed me for the rest of my reign. Many Iranians came to believe that my throne survived because Washington and London had helped restore my authority. I did not appreciate deeply enough how damaging that perception would become. Twenty-six years later, when revolution swept away my monarchy, protesters were still speaking about Mosaddegh, foreign interference, and 1953. We believed we had ended a crisis. In truth, we had also planted grievances that would outlive nearly everyone who created them.

My Name is Gamal Abdel Nasser: Egypt, Arab Nationalism, and the Cold War

I was born in Alexandria, Egypt, in 1918, when Britain still exercised enormous influence over my country. As a young man, I watched Egyptians speak of independence while foreign soldiers remained on Egyptian soil and foreign interests influenced our government. I entered the military because I believed Egypt could never become truly independent until Egyptians themselves controlled their nation's future.

The War That Changed Me

In 1948, I fought in the first Arab-Israeli War. Our defeat humiliated Egypt and much of the Arab world. I saw poor leadership, weak organization, and political corruption. I became convinced that Egypt's problems could not be solved simply by replacing ministers. The entire political system had to change. Along with other officers, I helped organize the Free Officers Movement. We believed Egypt needed independence, social reform, military strength, and leadership free from foreign control.

The Egyptian Revolution

In July 1952, the Free Officers overthrew King Farouk. Egypt's monarchy was finished. General Muhammad Naguib initially became the public face of the revolution, but disagreements developed over who would control Egypt's future. By 1954, I had emerged as the country's dominant leader, and in 1956 I became president. I wanted to redistribute land, expand education, industrialize Egypt, strengthen the army, and restore dignity to ordinary Egyptians. My revolution would not merely change the government; I intended it to transform Egyptian society.

I Would Not Choose Washington or Moscow

The Cold War divided much of the world between the United States and Soviet Union, but I rejected the idea that Egypt had to become the servant of either. I wanted weapons and development assistance, but I wanted Egypt to make its own decisions. When Western governments refused to provide the military support I sought, Egypt obtained weapons through Czechoslovakia and the Soviet bloc. When the United States and Britain withdrew support for the Aswan High Dam, I answered in a way the world could not ignore.

The Suez Canal Belongs to Egypt

On July 26, 1956, I announced the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company. The canal ran through Egyptian territory, and its revenues could help finance the Aswan Dam. Britain and France were furious. Together with Israel, they launched a military attack against Egypt. Their forces were powerful, but politically they failed. Pressure from both the United States and Soviet Union helped force their withdrawal. Egypt had survived, and throughout much of the Arab world, I became a symbol of resistance to European imperialism.

The Dream of Arab Unity

I believed Egyptians were part of a larger Arab nation connected by language, history, and shared struggles. My speeches traveled across borders by radio, inspiring supporters from North Africa to Iraq. In 1958, Egypt and Syria formed the United Arab Republic. I hoped it would become the beginning of greater Arab unity. Instead, political disagreements and Egyptian domination created resentment, and Syria withdrew in 1961. The dream survived, but unity proved much harder to achieve than revolutionary speeches suggested.

The Disaster of 1967

My greatest humiliation came in June 1967. Tensions with Israel escalated rapidly, and Israel launched a devastating attack against Egypt and neighboring Arab states. In only six days, Egypt lost the Sinai Peninsula, while Israel captured additional territories from Jordan and Syria. I announced my resignation, but enormous demonstrations demanded that I remain. I stayed. Egypt rebuilt its armed forces, and fighting continued along the Suez Canal in what became known as the War of Attrition.

What I Left Behind

I died suddenly in Cairo in September 1970, only fifty-two years old. I left behind an Egypt more independent of the old European powers, with expanded education, industry, land reform, and a powerful sense of Arab nationalism. I also left behind an authoritarian political system, imprisoned opponents, failed experiments in Arab unity, and the painful consequences of military defeat. I believed deeply that Egypt deserved dignity and independence, and I do not apologize for demanding them. But power can convince a leader that national purpose and his own judgment have become the same thing. Looking back, I would admit that Egypt needed not only independence from foreign powers, but stronger institutions capable of questioning its own leaders. That is a lesson victory did not teach me. Defeat did.

Arab Nationalism, and Non-Aligned Middle East - Told by Gamal Abdel Nasser

When my fellow officers and I moved against King Farouk in July 1952, we were not thinking merely about replacing one ruler with another. Egypt was formally independent, yet British troops remained along the Suez Canal, foreign interests held enormous economic influence, and our defeat in the 1948 Arab-Israeli War had exposed the weakness of the old political order. I believed Egypt needed something greater than a change of government. We needed dignity, independence, and the power to decide our own future.

The Free Officers Take Egypt

Our Free Officers Movement overthrew the monarchy with remarkably little bloodshed. General Muhammad Naguib initially became the public leader of the revolution, while I worked behind the scenes through the Revolutionary Command Council. Soon disagreements emerged over Egypt's direction and how quickly civilian political rule should return. By 1954, I had become the dominant figure in the government. We abolished the monarchy, pursued land reform, weakened the old aristocracy, and began building a state that I believed could transform Egypt economically and socially.

The Arab World Must Stand for Itself

My ambitions did not stop at Egypt's borders. Arabs lived under different governments, but we shared language, history, cultural connections, and memories of European imperialism. Britain and France still exercised influence across much of the region. I argued that Arab nations should cooperate rather than remain weak and divided. This became known as Arab nationalism, and eventually Pan-Arabism. Radio broadcasts carried my speeches across the Middle East, and millions heard a message that was simple and powerful: Arabs did not have to accept permanent domination by foreign powers.

Washington Wants an Alliance

The Americans viewed the Middle East through the Cold War. Washington wanted governments that would help contain the Soviet Union and supported the creation of the Baghdad Pact in 1955, linking Britain, Iraq, Turkey, Pakistan, and Iran. I saw the matter differently. Why should Egypt exchange British domination for dependence upon another great-power alliance? The Soviet Union was not my master, but neither would the United States be. Egypt refused to join the Baghdad Pact. I intended to deal with both blocs while belonging completely to neither.

A Third Path Through the Cold War

In 1955, I traveled to Bandung, Indonesia, where leaders from Asian and African countries gathered to discuss cooperation outside the traditional European-dominated international system. There I stood among figures such as India's Jawaharlal Nehru, Indonesia's Sukarno, and China's Zhou Enlai. The conference helped strengthen the ideas that would develop into the Non-Aligned Movement. Non-alignment did not mean ignoring the Cold War. It meant refusing to surrender our foreign policy automatically to Washington or Moscow.

Weapons From the Communist Bloc

There was, however, a hard reality behind speeches about independence: Egypt needed weapons. Israel had demonstrated its military strength, and I believed Egypt's armed forces required modernization. Western governments were reluctant to supply the weapons I wanted without political conditions. In 1955, Egypt announced an arms agreement with Czechoslovakia, acting with Soviet approval. Tanks, aircraft, artillery, and other weapons would flow to Egypt from the communist bloc. Washington was alarmed. From my perspective, I had demonstrated exactly what non-alignment meant: if one side refused to deal with Egypt on acceptable terms, I would negotiate with the other.

The Aswan Dam Becomes a Cold War Weapon

I also dreamed of constructing the Aswan High Dam across the Nile. It promised hydroelectric power, improved irrigation, and greater control over flooding—an enormous symbol of Egyptian modernization. The United States and Britain initially considered helping finance it but withdrew their offer in July 1956 amid worsening relations. They expected pressure to change my policies. Instead, their decision presented me with a challenge. If the West would not help finance Egypt's future, Egypt would find another way.

Egypt Would Not Be a Pawn

Between 1952 and 1956, Egypt had moved from monarchy to republic and from British-dominated politics toward a much more independent foreign policy. I dealt with the Americans, purchased weapons from the Soviet bloc, cooperated with emerging nations of Asia and Africa, and called upon Arabs to control their own destiny. This was dangerous diplomacy because both superpowers wanted influence in the Middle East. But I believed the greatest danger was allowing Egypt to become someone else's piece on the Cold War chessboard. Then, in July 1956, I made the decision that would turn this struggle into an international crisis: if foreign governments would not finance the Aswan Dam, Egypt would take control of the Suez Canal and use its revenues ourselves.

Suez Crisis: Britain and France Lose Their Grip - Told by Gamal Abdel Nasser

On July 26, 1956, I stood before an enormous crowd in Alexandria and announced a decision that stunned the world: Egypt was nationalizing the Suez Canal Company. The canal crossed Egyptian soil and connected the Mediterranean with the Red Sea, yet the company operating it was dominated by British and French interests. After the United States and Britain withdrew financial support for our Aswan High Dam project, I decided Egypt would take control of the canal and use its revenues to help build the dam ourselves. To Egyptians, this was sovereignty. To Britain and France, it was a direct challenge.

A Canal at the Center of the World

The Suez Canal was much more than a waterway. Ships carrying oil and international commerce passed through it, making the canal one of the world's most strategically important routes. Britain had treated control of Suez as essential to its global position for generations. France had another reason to oppose me: my government supported Algerian nationalists fighting French colonial rule. British Prime Minister Anthony Eden and French leaders increasingly saw me as a dangerous revolutionary who might encourage resistance against European influence throughout the Arab world.

A Secret Plan

Britain and France began planning military action, but they were not alone. Israel had its own conflicts with Egypt, including border violence, Egyptian-supported fedayeen raids, and Egypt's blockade of Israeli shipping through the Straits of Tiran. In October, representatives of Britain, France, and Israel secretly met at Sèvres outside Paris. Their plan was extraordinary. Israel would invade Egypt's Sinai Peninsula. Britain and France would then demand that both sides withdraw from the canal. When Egypt predictably refused, British and French forces would intervene, supposedly to separate the combatants and protect the canal.

Israel Strikes

On October 29, Israeli forces attacked across the Sinai. Their soldiers advanced rapidly toward the canal. Britain and France issued their ultimatum and then began bombing Egyptian targets when I refused their demands. Their aircraft struck our airfields, and Anglo-French forces eventually landed near Port Said. Militarily, Egypt faced opponents far stronger than we were. I ordered Egyptian forces in the Sinai to withdraw rather than allow much of our army to be trapped and destroyed.

I Sank Ships in My Own Canal

If the invaders wanted the canal, I would make certain they could not easily use it. Egypt blocked the waterway by sinking ships and other vessels inside it. Fighting erupted around Port Said, where Egyptian soldiers and civilians resisted the invasion. Britain, France, and Israel possessed overwhelming military advantages, but something had changed since the days when European empires could invade a Middle Eastern country and expect the rest of the world simply to accept it.

Washington and Moscow Say No

The strangest part of the crisis was that the United States and Soviet Union opposed the invasion. Soviet leaders threatened the attackers and strongly supported Egypt diplomatically. But Britain's most damaging opposition came from its own American ally. President Dwight Eisenhower had not approved the secret attack and feared it would strengthen Soviet influence throughout the Arab world. The United States applied intense diplomatic and financial pressure on Britain. Facing international condemnation and severe economic pressure, Britain and France accepted a ceasefire.

The Old Empires Retreat

British and French forces withdrew from Egypt, followed later by Israeli forces from Sinai and Gaza under international pressure and arrangements involving a United Nations emergency force. The canal remained under Egyptian control. Britain and France had demonstrated that they could still deploy armies, aircraft, and warships—but they had also demonstrated something more important: they could no longer act as independent imperial powers without considering Washington, Moscow, and international opinion. Suez became a symbol of the decline of Britain's and France's old Middle Eastern empires.

Egypt Loses Battles but Wins the Crisis

No honest soldier could call our battlefield performance a military victory. Israeli forces defeated Egyptian positions across much of Sinai, and British and French forces successfully landed at Port Said. Yet wars are political as well as military. I remained in power, Egypt kept the canal, and the invading forces eventually departed. Across much of the Arab world, people celebrated what they saw as an Egyptian stand against imperialism. My influence reached heights I had never known before.

The Middle East Had Changed

The Suez Crisis revealed a new Middle East and a new world. Britain and France were fading as dominant regional powers. The United States and Soviet Union were becoming increasingly important. Arab nationalism had gained an extraordinary symbol of resistance, and Egypt had shown that a former colonial power could be challenged. But victory also carried danger. My prestige after Suez encouraged me to believe that political determination could overcome almost any obstacle. History would eventually remind me that surviving a crisis and mastering the forces unleashed by it were two very different things.

Israel, the Arab States, and the Superpower Arms Race - Told by David Ben-Gurion

When Israeli forces withdrew from the Sinai after the Suez Crisis of 1956, I understood that the next struggle would not begin only on our borders. It would begin in the factories, arsenals, diplomatic offices, and intelligence services of nations thousands of miles away. Egypt and other Arab states were acquiring Soviet-bloc weapons. Israel needed aircraft, tanks, intelligence, and dependable international partners. The Middle East was becoming connected to the Cold War arms race, and a regional conflict was increasingly supplied by the world's great powers.

Soviet Weapons Change the Balance

The transformation had begun before Suez. In 1955, Egypt announced a major arms agreement with Czechoslovakia, backed by the Soviet Union. Egypt received Soviet-designed MiG fighter aircraft, tanks, artillery, and other equipment. Moscow increasingly supplied weapons to Arab governments, particularly Egypt and Syria, while presenting itself as a supporter of anti-colonial movements. To Israel, these shipments were not abstract Cold War diplomacy. They were weapons being delivered to governments that openly opposed our state.

France Becomes Israel's Essential Partner

During much of the 1950s, our most important military relationship was not with the United States but with France. Paris opposed Nasser partly because Egypt supported Algerian rebels fighting French rule. France supplied Israel with advanced military equipment, including Dassault fighter aircraft. French cooperation also became crucial to Israel's nuclear program at Dimona in the Negev. I believed Israel needed a powerful deterrent against enemies with much larger populations and territories. Israel maintained deliberate ambiguity about nuclear weapons, but developing advanced strategic capabilities became an important part of our security thinking.

Washington Moves Cautiously

Many people today assume that Israel and the United States were always close military allies. The reality was more complicated. Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy were concerned about Israel's security, but Washington also wanted good relations with Arab governments and feared an uncontrolled regional arms race. The United States initially resisted becoming Israel's principal weapons supplier. That began to change when President John F. Kennedy agreed to sell Israel Hawk surface-to-air missiles in 1962, one of the first major American weapons systems provided directly to Israel.

The Arab World Was Not One Army

It was tempting to speak of "the Arabs" as though Israel faced a single unified enemy, but reality was more complicated. Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Iraq, and other Arab governments had different interests and rivalries. Nasser promoted Pan-Arab unity, yet the United Arab Republic between Egypt and Syria collapsed in 1961. Arab leaders competed with one another even while condemning Israel. This division sometimes benefited us, but it was dangerous to assume those rivalries would prevent them from cooperating against Israel.

Syria and the Battle Over Water

During the early 1960s, tensions increasingly centered on Israel's northern frontier. Israel developed its National Water Carrier to move water from the Sea of Galilee toward other parts of the country. Arab governments responded with plans to divert tributaries of the Jordan River. Israel regarded those projects as threats to a vital national resource, and military exchanges followed. Israeli and Syrian forces traded artillery fire, and Israeli aircraft struck equipment associated with the diversion effort. Water, territory, and national survival were becoming intertwined.

The Palestinians Reenter the Struggle

Another important change came from the Palestinians themselves. In 1964, the Palestine Liberation Organization was established with Arab League support. Fatah, led by Yasser Arafat and others, increasingly pursued its own armed campaign against Israel. Palestinian guerrilla raids and Israeli retaliatory operations added another layer to the conflict. The struggle could no longer be understood solely as Israel against neighboring Arab governments. Palestinian nationalism was becoming an independent political and military force.

The Arms Race Accelerates

By the middle of the 1960s, the military balance was changing rapidly. Egypt and Syria possessed growing quantities of Soviet equipment. Jordan received significant Western support. Israel continued acquiring French aircraft and increasingly developed military ties with the United States. Tanks became faster, aircraft more advanced, and armies larger. Each side argued that it needed more weapons because the other side was becoming stronger. This is the terrible logic of an arms race: preparation intended to prevent war can convince everyone that war is approaching.

A Region Moving Toward Another War

I left the office of prime minister in 1963, but I watched the danger continue to grow. Border clashes, Palestinian raids, Israeli reprisals, competing Arab governments, disputed water resources, and enormous shipments of foreign weapons created an increasingly unstable region. Washington and Moscow did not invent the Arab-Israeli conflict, but their weapons and alliances gave local governments greater power to fight it. By 1966, the Middle East contained many of the ingredients necessary for another major war. All that remained was the crisis that would bring them together—and in 1967, that crisis came with astonishing speed.

Six-Day War and a Middle East Transformed (1967) - Told by Gamal Abdel Nasser

By the spring of 1967, the Middle East was dangerously tense. Israel and Syria had exchanged fire along their border, Palestinian guerrillas were carrying out attacks, and Israeli forces had conducted major reprisals. Egypt was bound to Syria by a defense agreement. Then the Soviet Union warned my government that Israel was concentrating troops near Syria. The report proved inaccurate, but at the time we treated it seriously. I moved Egyptian troops into the Sinai Peninsula. Within weeks, decisions made in Cairo, Jerusalem, Damascus, Amman, Moscow, and Washington would help produce one of the fastest and most consequential wars in modern history.

The Sinai Fills With Soldiers

On May 16, I demanded the withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force that had been stationed along parts of the Egyptian-Israeli frontier since the Suez Crisis. UN Secretary-General U Thant complied with Egypt's demand to remove the force from Egyptian territory. Egyptian troops moved forward. Then, on May 22, I announced that the Straits of Tiran would be closed to Israeli shipping and strategic cargo bound for Israel. Israel had previously declared interference with its access through the straits a potential cause for war. The crisis was no longer merely about Syria. Egypt and Israel were approaching direct confrontation.

Arab Armies Prepare

Across the Arab world, expectations soared. Egypt had the largest Arab army, Syria was already Israel's bitter enemy, and Jordan's King Hussein entered a defense agreement with Egypt on May 30. Iraqi forces were also sent toward Jordan. My speeches projected confidence because I believed Egypt could not retreat repeatedly in the face of Israeli threats. Yet confidence was not the same as readiness. Our military was burdened by weaknesses in command, and tens of thousands of Egyptian soldiers were still committed to the costly war in Yemen.

Israel Strikes First

On the morning of June 5, Israel attacked. Its aircraft flew toward Egyptian airfields at low altitude in Operation Focus. Much of the Egyptian Air Force was destroyed on the ground within hours. Israel then struck the air forces of Syria and Jordan. Without effective air cover, Egyptian forces in Sinai became terribly vulnerable. Orders and counterorders created confusion, and our withdrawal toward the Suez Canal became chaotic. A war that many expected to last weeks or months was being decided with breathtaking speed.

Six Days Change the Map

Israel did not fight Egypt alone. Jordan entered the war, and Israeli forces captured East Jerusalem and the West Bank. Israeli troops drove Egyptian forces from the Sinai Peninsula and occupied the Gaza Strip. In the final phase of the fighting, Israel captured the Golan Heights from Syria. When the war ended on June 10, Israel controlled territory several times larger than the state it had possessed six days earlier. Egypt had lost Sinai and Gaza; Jordan had lost the West Bank and East Jerusalem; Syria had lost the Golan Heights.

Jerusalem and the Palestinian Question

The consequences went far beyond military maps. Israel now controlled East Jerusalem, including the Old City and sites sacred to Jews, Muslims, and Christians. Hundreds of thousands of Palestinians came under Israeli military occupation in the West Bank and Gaza, while hundreds of thousands were displaced during and after the fighting, including many who became refugees for the first time and some who had already been displaced in 1948. The Palestinian question, already central to the region, entered an entirely new phase.

I Announced My Resignation

On June 9, while the war was still ending, I addressed Egypt and accepted responsibility for what I called the setback. I announced that I would resign as president. Enormous crowds took to the streets demanding that I remain. I withdrew my resignation and stayed in office, but the Nasser who emerged from 1967 could not claim the same triumph that had followed Suez. Egypt began rebuilding its armed forces with extensive Soviet assistance, preparing for what became the War of Attrition along the Suez Canal.

The Cold War Deepens

The defeat also strengthened the Cold War's grip on the region. The Soviet Union replaced enormous quantities of Egyptian and Syrian equipment and increased its military involvement. The United States moved toward a much closer strategic relationship with Israel, particularly in the years that followed. Regional enemies were now tied more firmly to competing superpower networks. Every future Arab-Israeli confrontation carried the danger that Washington and Moscow might be drawn into the crisis.

Six Days, Decades of Consequences

The war lasted only six days, but its consequences have lasted for generations. Israel emerged militarily dominant and in possession of territories that became central to future negotiations and conflicts. Arab nationalism suffered a devastating psychological defeat. Palestinian organizations increasingly concluded that they could not depend entirely upon Arab armies to recover their homeland. I had believed that determination, unity, and military pressure could force a change in the regional balance. Instead, my decisions contributed to a confrontation for which Egypt was not adequately prepared. The lesson was severe: leaders may control their speeches and orders, but once a crisis begins accelerating toward war, they may discover that they no longer control where it ends.

Black September, Palestinian Nationalism, and the PLO - Told by Ben-Gurion

By the 1960s, the conflict surrounding Israel was changing. For years, we had thought primarily in terms of armies: Egypt to the south, Syria to the northeast, and Jordan to the east. But another force was becoming increasingly important. Palestinians who had fled or been displaced during the war of 1948 had built communities across Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Gaza, and elsewhere. A younger generation increasingly argued that Palestinians could not wait for Arab governments to recover their homeland. They would organize themselves.

The Birth of the PLO

In 1964, with support from the Arab League, the Palestine Liberation Organization was established. Its stated goal was Palestinian liberation, and its early charter rejected Israel's legitimacy. At first, the PLO remained strongly influenced by Arab governments. But another organization, Fatah, founded by Palestinian activists including Yasser Arafat, pursued a more independent course. Fatah argued that Palestinians themselves must lead their struggle. In January 1965, it announced the beginning of armed operations against Israel.

The Six-Day War Changes Everything

The Arab defeat of 1967 transformed Palestinian politics. Israel captured the West Bank and East Jerusalem from Jordan and the Gaza Strip from Egypt, placing large Palestinian populations under Israeli military occupation. Many Palestinians concluded that relying upon Arab armies had failed. Guerrilla organizations gained prestige, and after the 1968 Battle of Karameh in Jordan, Fatah's reputation grew dramatically despite heavy losses. In 1969, Arafat became chairman of the PLO.

A State Within Jordan

Jordan presented a particularly dangerous situation. A large portion of its population was Palestinian, and Palestinian guerrilla organizations established armed bases there. Fighters known as fedayeen conducted operations against Israel, which responded with military raids. Some Palestinian groups established checkpoints, carried weapons openly, and increasingly challenged the authority of King Hussein's government. Jordan was supposed to be a sovereign kingdom, but parts of the country were beginning to resemble an independent revolutionary base.

Airliners in the Desert

The confrontation exploded in September 1970. Members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine hijacked several international airliners. Three aircraft were eventually taken to Dawson's Field in Jordan. After the hostages were removed, the hijackers dramatically destroyed the empty aircraft before international cameras. King Hussein concluded that his government's authority could no longer tolerate the armed Palestinian organizations operating almost independently inside Jordan.

Black September

The Jordanian army moved against Palestinian forces. Fierce fighting erupted in Amman and elsewhere. Syria sent armored forces into northern Jordan in support of the Palestinians, creating the possibility that a civil war could become a regional conflict. The United States supported Hussein diplomatically and placed forces on alert, while Israel prepared for possible intervention if Syria threatened the Jordanian monarchy. Syrian forces eventually withdrew, and Jordan's army gained the upper hand. Fighting continued into 1971, when the PLO was finally driven from Jordan.

The PLO Moves to Lebanon

After losing its bases in Jordan, the PLO shifted much of its armed presence to Lebanon. There, Palestinian organizations again developed military and political power while conducting attacks against Israel. Israel responded with raids and strikes of its own. Lebanon's already fragile political system became increasingly strained. A conflict that had once centered heavily on conventional Arab armies was now spreading through guerrilla warfare, terrorism, retaliation, and cross-border operations.

Munich Shocks the World

In 1972, an organization calling itself Black September took eleven members of the Israeli Olympic team hostage during the Munich Games in West Germany. The crisis ended with all eleven Israeli hostages dead, along with a West German police officer and five of the attackers. Israel subsequently launched operations against individuals it believed were connected to Palestinian militant organizations. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict had moved beyond the Middle East and onto the international stage.

A Conflict No Army Could Simply Defeat

I watched many of these developments after leaving the prime minister's office, and by the time of my death in 1973, one fact had become unavoidable. Palestinian nationalism could not simply be treated as an extension of Egypt, Jordan, or Syria. Palestinians had developed their own organizations, leaders, political goals, and armed movements. Israel had legitimate reason to defend its citizens against attacks and terrorism, but military strength alone could not make Palestinian national identity disappear. That was the deeper transformation of these years: the conflict was no longer simply Israel against the Arab states. Israelis and Palestinians were increasingly confronting one another directly, and neither people was going away.

My Name is Anwar Sadat: War, Peace, and a Changing Middle East

I was born in 1918 in the village of Mit Abu al-Kum in Egypt's Nile Delta. I grew up while Britain still exercised enormous influence over my country, and I came to believe that Egypt could never possess true dignity while foreign powers determined its future. I entered the Egyptian Military Academy and became an army officer, but my ambitions extended beyond military service. I wanted Egypt to stand independently among the nations of the world.

The Free Officers

Gamal Abdel Nasser and I became members of the Free Officers Movement, a group of military men determined to remove King Farouk and end the corruption and foreign influence surrounding the monarchy. In July 1952, we carried out our revolution. The monarchy fell, and Egypt became a republic. Nasser eventually became the dominant leader of our movement. I served him in several positions and became vice president. For many years I stood beside a man whose voice seemed to speak for the entire Arab world.

I Inherit Nasser's Egypt

When Nasser died suddenly in September 1970, I became president. Some believed I would merely preserve his system until stronger men pushed me aside. They misunderstood me. Egypt was exhausted economically and still carried the humiliation of losing the Sinai Peninsula to Israel in the Six-Day War of 1967. Soviet advisers and weapons had become deeply embedded within our military establishment. I intended to restore Egyptian confidence and recover our territory, but I would choose Egypt's course for myself.

Breaking Away from Moscow

The Soviet Union was our principal supplier of weapons, but I increasingly questioned whether Moscow's interests were the same as Egypt's. In 1972, I ordered thousands of Soviet military advisers to leave Egypt. I was not abandoning every relationship with the Soviets, but I wanted the world to understand that Egypt was not a Soviet possession. Neither Moscow nor Washington would be permitted to decide indefinitely whether Egypt remained at war or peace.

The October War

On October 6, 1973, Egyptian forces crossed the Suez Canal and attacked Israeli positions in the Sinai while Syria attacked in the north. Egyptian soldiers broke through the Bar-Lev Line and achieved successes that restored confidence after the disaster of 1967. Israel counterattacked, and the war became dangerous enough to draw intense American and Soviet involvement. I understood that Egypt could not destroy Israel militarily. My purpose was to break the political deadlock and demonstrate that occupied Egyptian territory could not simply be forgotten.

Oil Changes the World

The war shook nations far beyond the battlefield. Arab oil-producing countries imposed an embargo against countries supporting Israel, helping produce an international energy crisis. Suddenly, Americans and Europeans who had regarded the Arab-Israeli conflict as distant discovered that events in the Middle East could affect their gasoline stations, industries, and economies. The war also opened the door to American diplomacy. I began moving Egypt away from dependence on Moscow and toward a new relationship with Washington.

I Went to Jerusalem

In 1977, I made a decision many believed impossible: I traveled to Jerusalem and addressed Israel's parliament, the Knesset. I had commanded Egypt during war against Israel only four years earlier, yet I now told Israelis that I was prepared to seek peace. I did not go because Egypt had forgotten its soldiers or surrendered its claims. I went because courage is required not only to begin a war, but also to end one.

Camp David and Peace

In 1978, President Jimmy Carter brought Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin and me to Camp David in the United States. After difficult negotiations, we reached the Camp David Accords. In 1979, Egypt and Israel signed a peace treaty. Israel agreed to withdraw from the Sinai, and Egypt became the first Arab nation formally to recognize Israel. Begin and I received the Nobel Peace Prize. Many Egyptians welcomed the return of the Sinai, but much of the Arab world condemned my decision, and Egypt was temporarily isolated from its Arab neighbors.

The Price of My Decisions

On October 6, 1981, while attending a military parade commemorating the 1973 war, I was assassinated by Islamist extremists within the Egyptian military. I had spent my presidency making decisions that angered communists, Arab nationalists, Islamists, and even former allies. I remained convinced that recovering Egyptian land and ending the cycle of war with Israel were necessary achievements. Yet I must also acknowledge that my government restricted political opposition and imprisoned many critics, especially during the final months of my life. I sought peace between nations while sometimes allowing too little political freedom within my own. History may debate my methods, but the lesson I would leave is simple: there comes a moment when a leader must decide whether yesterday's enemy must remain tomorrow's enemy. I chose to believe that he did not.

Sadat Takes Egypt in a New Direction (1970–1973) - Told by Anwar Sadat

When Gamal Abdel Nasser died suddenly on September 28, 1970, Egypt lost the man who had dominated our political life for nearly two decades. I became president, but many powerful men around me believed I would be temporary—a quiet successor they could control. They were mistaken. I inherited an Egypt exhausted by war, burdened economically, dependent upon Soviet weapons, and still living with the humiliation of the Six-Day War. Israel occupied the Sinai Peninsula all the way to the eastern bank of the Suez Canal. My first great task was clear: Egypt had to recover its confidence and its land.

Living With the Defeat of 1967

The defeat of 1967 was everywhere around us. Israeli forces stood across the Suez Canal, and the Sinai remained beyond Egyptian control. Nasser had rebuilt our military with Soviet assistance and fought the War of Attrition from 1969 to 1970, but the occupation remained. I could not accept a permanent situation in which Egyptian territory remained under Israeli control. At the same time, I understood that simply ordering another massive attack without preparation could bring another disaster.

They Thought They Could Control Me

Inside Egypt, powerful officials associated with Nasser's government attempted to limit my authority. In May 1971, I moved against several of them in what I called the Corrective Revolution. Senior political figures were removed or arrested, and I consolidated control over the government. I respected Nasser and had stood beside him since the Free Officers Revolution, but I would not govern as his shadow. Egypt needed a different strategy, both at home and abroad.

Moscow Was an Ally, Not My Master

The Soviet Union had supplied Egypt with aircraft, missiles, tanks, advisers, and other military assistance after 1967. I needed Soviet weapons, but I grew frustrated with Moscow's caution and its reluctance to provide some of the advanced equipment I wanted. The Soviets feared that another Arab-Israeli war could draw them into confrontation with the United States. I understood their concerns, but Egypt could not leave its territory occupied indefinitely because Moscow preferred stability.

I Sent the Soviet Advisers Home

In July 1972, I ordered thousands of Soviet military personnel and advisers to leave Egypt. I did not break relations with Moscow, and Soviet weapons continued to reach us. My purpose was larger. I wanted the Soviets, Americans, Israelis, and Egyptians themselves to understand that Egypt would determine its own policy. Washington had become Israel's most important great-power supporter. I calculated that if diplomacy remained frozen, I would have to create a crisis powerful enough to force the United States to become more deeply involved in seeking a settlement.

Preparing for a War We Could Actually Fight

I did not ask my generals to destroy Israel. That was not a realistic objective. Instead, we developed a limited strategy. Egyptian forces would cross the Suez Canal, break through Israel's Bar-Lev Line, and establish positions inside Sinai while remaining under the protection of our Soviet-supplied surface-to-air missile defenses. Even a limited military success could shatter the belief that Israel's occupation was permanent and restore Egyptian confidence after 1967.

Syria Joins the Plan

Syria had also lost territory in 1967—the Golan Heights—and President Hafez al-Assad wanted it returned. Egypt and Syria therefore prepared a coordinated attack. Secrecy became essential. Military exercises and troop movements were designed to make Israeli intelligence uncertain about our intentions. Egypt had mobilized before without going to war, and I wanted our preparations to appear routine until the final moment.

The Americans Would Have to Pay Attention

My strategy was military, but my objective was ultimately political. The Middle East had become trapped. Israel believed its military superiority gave it little reason to withdraw from occupied territory without secure peace arrangements. The United States believed the situation could be managed. The Soviet Union wanted to avoid a dangerous confrontation. I intended to break that stalemate. Sometimes diplomacy begins at a conference table. Sometimes the table does not appear until someone changes the balance on the battlefield.

October 6 Approaches

By the autumn of 1973, our preparations were nearly complete. We chose October 6, the Jewish holy day of Yom Kippur, which also fell during the Muslim month of Ramadan. Egyptian soldiers waited along the western bank of the Suez Canal while Syrian forces prepared opposite the Golan Heights. I knew the gamble was enormous. Failure might destroy my presidency and inflict another catastrophe upon Egypt. Success might restore our honor and force the world to reconsider the occupation of Sinai. At approximately two o'clock in the afternoon on October 6, Egyptian aircraft crossed the canal. Thousands of our soldiers followed. The direction of Egypt—and of the entire Middle East—was about to change.

The Yom Kippur War and the Oil Crisis (1973–1974) - Told by Anwar Sadat

At two o'clock in the afternoon on October 6, 1973, Egyptian aircraft roared across the Suez Canal. Thousands of our soldiers followed. At the same time, Syrian forces attacked Israeli positions on the Golan Heights. It was Yom Kippur, the holiest day of the Jewish calendar, and the Muslim month of Ramadan. Six years earlier, Israel had defeated Egypt, Syria, and Jordan with astonishing speed. Now I intended to prove that the military situation created in 1967 could not continue forever.

Across the Suez Canal

Our opening attack succeeded beyond what many expected. Egyptian engineers used powerful water cannons to cut passages through the enormous sand barriers protecting Israeli positions along the Bar-Lev Line. Bridges went across the canal, soldiers crossed in boats, and Egyptian forces established bridgeheads in the Sinai. Portable anti-tank weapons and Soviet-supplied surface-to-air missiles helped protect our troops against Israel's armor and aircraft. For Egyptians who had lived beneath the humiliation of 1967, watching our flag raised on the eastern side of the canal was electrifying.

Israel Recovers

But Israel did not collapse. After the initial shock, Israeli reserves mobilized rapidly. In the north, Israeli forces stopped the Syrian advance and counterattacked toward Damascus. In Sinai, the situation also changed. When Egyptian forces advanced farther beyond the protection of our air-defense umbrella, they suffered serious losses. Israeli forces under commanders including Ariel Sharon found a gap between Egyptian armies, crossed the Suez Canal to its western side, and threatened to surround Egypt's Third Army. The battlefield had become dangerously unpredictable.

Washington and Moscow Enter the Crisis

Behind us stood the two Cold War superpowers. The Soviet Union supplied Egypt and Syria with weapons and equipment. The United States launched a major airlift to resupply Israel. American and Soviet aircraft carried enormous quantities of military matériel into the region while their allies continued fighting. When the conflict threatened to escalate further, Washington and Moscow pushed for a ceasefire through the United Nations. During the crisis, both superpowers took military precautions, demonstrating how an Arab-Israeli war could potentially become something far more dangerous.

Oil Becomes a Weapon

Then the war reached people who had never been near the Middle East. Arab oil-producing countries used petroleum as political leverage. Members of the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries reduced production, and several imposed an embargo against the United States and other governments seen as supporting Israel. The embargo was not my military operation, but the war helped trigger it. Oil prices rose dramatically. Long gasoline lines appeared in the United States, and energy costs struck economies across the industrialized world.

The World Discovers the Power of Middle Eastern Oil

For decades, Western governments had understood that Middle Eastern petroleum was important. In 1973, ordinary citizens discovered just how important. Factories, transportation systems, heating, electricity generation, and modern militaries depended heavily on energy. The crisis contributed to inflation and economic disruption and encouraged governments to reconsider energy policy. Arab states had demonstrated that influence in the modern world could come not only from armies but from control over strategic resources.

The War Ends, but the Strategy Continues

The fighting formally gave way to ceasefire arrangements, but neither side could claim a simple victory. Israel had recovered from the initial attack and ended the war with forces west of the Suez Canal, while Egypt's Third Army was in a precarious position. Yet Egypt had crossed the canal, broken the Bar-Lev Line, and shattered the belief that the military situation established in 1967 could continue without challenge. For me, that mattered enormously. The battlefield had reopened the diplomatic door.

From Henry Kissinger to Disengagement

American Secretary of State Henry Kissinger began intense shuttle diplomacy between Israel, Egypt, and other regional governments. In January 1974, Egypt and Israel signed their first disengagement agreement, separating their forces around the Suez Canal. A second agreement followed in 1975. Egypt was gradually moving away from dependence upon the Soviet Union, while the United States was becoming increasingly important to Egyptian diplomacy. War had changed the political equation.

I Did Not Begin the War Simply to Continue It

The October War cost thousands of Egyptian, Israeli, and Syrian lives. I knew when I ordered our forces across the canal that the price could be terrible. My purpose was not the destruction of Israel; it was to break the paralysis created by 1967 and recover Egyptian territory. Yet leaders must acknowledge that even carefully limited wars can escape their calculations. Oil shocks spread around the world, superpowers approached dangerous confrontation, and families on every side buried their dead. The war restored Egyptian confidence and created an opening for diplomacy. My next challenge was more difficult still: to determine whether the enemy we had fought could become the nation with which we negotiated peace.

Revolution in Iran and Egypt Makes Peace with Israel (1978–1979) - Told by Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and Anwar Sadat

Mohammad Reza Pahlavi: Imagine the Middle East at the beginning of 1978. My Iran was one of America's strongest allies in the region, armed with advanced American weapons and enriched by oil. Sadat's Egypt was moving closer to Washington after years of Soviet influence. To an American strategist, perhaps the region appeared to be moving securely toward the West. Yet within two years I would lose my throne, while Sadat would sign a peace treaty with Israel. The political map of the Middle East was about to be rewritten.

Two Nations Moving in Different Directions

Anwar Sadat: I had already made my great gamble. In November 1977, I traveled to Jerusalem and spoke before Israel's Knesset. Egypt had fought Israel repeatedly, including under my command in 1973, but I concluded that another generation of warfare would not recover everything we wanted. Israel's Prime Minister Menachem Begin and I disagreed profoundly, especially over territory and the Palestinian question, but we had begun speaking directly. That alone was revolutionary.

Mohammad Reza Pahlavi: While Egypt moved toward negotiation, my Iran moved toward upheaval. Demonstrations against my government intensified during 1978. Religious opponents rallied around Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who had lived in exile since the 1960s. But the opposition was much broader than his followers alone. Liberals demanded political freedoms, leftists opposed my alliance with the United States, merchants and clerics objected to aspects of modernization, and many ordinary Iranians were angered by inequality, corruption, political repression, and the power of SAVAK.

Camp David

Anwar Sadat: In September 1978, President Jimmy Carter invited Begin and me to Camp David in Maryland. For thirteen days we negotiated, argued, threatened to leave, and returned to the discussions. The central question for Egypt was Sinai, the territory Israel had occupied since 1967. We ultimately produced the Camp David Accords. One framework addressed peace between Egypt and Israel; another proposed a process concerning the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza. The Palestinian portion never produced the comprehensive settlement Carter hoped for, but the Egyptian-Israeli negotiations continued.

Mohammad Reza Pahlavi: As Sadat negotiated peace, Iran's streets were filling with protesters. One of the darkest moments came on September 8, 1978—Black Friday—when security forces fired upon demonstrators in Tehran. The death toll remains disputed, but the killings intensified opposition to my government. Strikes spread, including through the vital oil industry. My government alternated between concessions and repression, satisfying neither those demanding reform nor those demanding stronger control.

The Shah Leaves Iran

Mohammad Reza Pahlavi: On January 16, 1979, I left Iran. Officially, I was taking a vacation. In reality, I knew my monarchy might not survive. Crowds celebrated my departure. On February 1, Khomeini returned from exile to an extraordinary public reception. Within days, the government of Prime Minister Shapour Bakhtiar collapsed, military resistance to the revolution disintegrated, and the monarchy my father had founded was finished. Iran would soon become an Islamic Republic.

Anwar Sadat: I watched the fall of the Shah carefully. He had been an important American ally, and his collapse demonstrated something every ruler should understand: weapons, oil revenues, and powerful foreign friendships cannot guarantee political survival. Egypt had its own opposition, but my attention remained fixed on completing the negotiations with Israel. I wanted the Sinai returned to Egyptian sovereignty, and I believed a treaty offered a path that continued war could not.

Egypt Makes Peace With Israel

Anwar Sadat: On March 26, 1979, Begin and I met at the White House with President Carter and signed the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty. Egypt became the first Arab country formally to recognize Israel. Israel agreed to withdraw from the Sinai Peninsula in stages, a process completed in 1982, while Egypt agreed to normal diplomatic relations and security arrangements. For the first time since Israel's creation, the most populous Arab nation and Israel were formally at peace.

Mohammad Reza Pahlavi: But the reaction throughout the Arab world was severe. Many governments accused Sadat of abandoning the Palestinian cause and breaking Arab unity. Egypt was suspended from the Arab League, and its headquarters moved away from Cairo for a time. Yet Sadat had recovered Egyptian territory through negotiation. His decision showed that Arab governments did not have to remain permanently united in confrontation with Israel.

Iran Turns Against America

Mohammad Reza Pahlavi: Iran traveled in almost the opposite direction. The Islamic Republic rejected the close relationship with Washington that I had built. In November 1979, after the United States admitted me for medical treatment, Iranian militants seized the American embassy in Tehran and took American hostages. The hostage crisis lasted 444 days and shattered what remained of the old U.S.-Iranian relationship. One of Washington's strongest Middle Eastern allies had become a revolutionary opponent.

Two Revolutions in Middle Eastern Politics

Anwar Sadat: In less than two years, the strategic assumptions of the region had been overturned. Egypt, once the Soviet Union's most important Arab partner, had moved toward the United States and peace with Israel. Iran, once one of America's strongest regional allies, had experienced an Islamic revolution and turned sharply against Washington. The Cold War mattered, but these events demonstrated that Middle Eastern nations were not simply pieces controlled by Washington and Moscow.

Mohammad Reza Pahlavi: That may be the most important lesson of 1978 and 1979. Great powers believed alliances could create stability, while rulers sometimes believed armies and economic development could guarantee their authority. I learned otherwise. Sadat risked his standing in the Arab world to make peace; I lost a throne while trying to preserve the state I had built. Neither story ended without suffering or controversy. But together they reveal something fundamental: sometimes the greatest changes in the Cold War did not begin in Washington or Moscow. They began when people in Cairo, Jerusalem, and Tehran decided that the old order could no longer continue.