15. Heroes and Villains of the Globalization Era: The Rise of al-Qaeda and International Terrorism

My Name is Gary Schroen: A CIA Officer's Hunt for Osama bin Laden

I was born on November 6, 1941, in East St. Louis, Illinois. My father was an electrician, and I grew up far removed from the secret operations that would eventually define my career. In 1969, I joined the Central Intelligence Agency, beginning more than three decades of intelligence work. I wasn't interested in being a Hollywood spy. Real intelligence work involved patience, observation, relationships, and understanding people who might know something your government needed to know. I would eventually serve across the Middle East and South Asia, often in places where American interests faced serious challenges.

Learning the Intelligence Business

During the 1970s and 1980s, I served in countries including Iran, Pakistan, and the United Arab Emirates. My assignments involved recruiting intelligence sources, evaluating information, and understanding political developments that could threaten American security. When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in December 1979, the region became a major battleground of the Cold War. The CIA supported Afghan resistance forces fighting Soviet occupation, and I became deeply familiar with Afghanistan's complicated tribal relationships, rival commanders, and dangerous mountain terrain. I learned something important: intelligence depends on trust, and trust cannot be manufactured overnight.

The Rise of a New Enemy

When Soviet forces withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989, many Americans believed the struggle there was finished. I knew the situation was more complicated. Afghanistan descended into civil war, and a new movement called the Taliban eventually seized much of the country. Meanwhile, Osama bin Laden, a wealthy Saudi extremist who had supported foreign fighters during the Soviet-Afghan War, was building an international terrorist organization called al-Qaeda. During the 1990s, this network increasingly threatened American interests. Its members were not simply fighting over territory. They were organizing attacks across international borders, using Afghanistan as a sanctuary.

My Mission in Pakistan

From 1996 to 1999, I served as the CIA's station chief in Islamabad, Pakistan. Afghanistan was next door, and bin Laden had returned there under Taliban protection. My job included rebuilding intelligence relationships with Afghan resistance leaders, particularly Ahmad Shah Massoud, whose forces opposed the Taliban. We needed information about terrorist training camps, al-Qaeda leadership, and possible operations against Americans. The embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania in August 1998 demonstrated how dangerous bin Laden's organization had become. We worked to locate him and develop opportunities to capture him, but intelligence was often incomplete, access was difficult, and political decisions complicated our operations.

September 11 Changes Everything

By September 2001, I was preparing to retire from the CIA. After 32 years, I thought my operational career was finished. Then terrorists hijacked four passenger airplanes on September 11, striking New York City and the Pentagon while a fourth aircraft crashed in Pennsylvania. Nearly 3,000 people were killed. The attacks were carried out by al-Qaeda. Within days, Cofer Black, the CIA's counterterrorism chief, asked me to lead a team into Afghanistan. I knew the country, understood its people, and had established relationships with the Northern Alliance. Retirement would have to wait. We had a mission to accomplish.

Operation Jawbreaker: First Into Afghanistan

On September 26, 2001, I led a small CIA team into Afghanistan aboard a Russian-built Mi-17 helicopter. Our mission, code-named Jawbreaker, was to coordinate with the Northern Alliance, gather intelligence, and prepare the ground for American military operations against al-Qaeda and the Taliban. We carried communications equipment, weapons, and millions of dollars to support Afghan allies. Ahmad Shah Massoud had been assassinated just two days before September 11, but his resistance organization continued fighting. For several weeks, our team operated before American Special Forces joined us. We were working in hostile territory, but we understood the assignment: establish partnerships, identify enemy positions, and help bring down the Taliban government.

From the Soviet-Afghan War to the Birth of al-Qaeda - Told by Gary Schroen

By 1988, Afghanistan had endured nearly nine years of brutal warfare against the Soviet Union. As a CIA officer who worked extensively in the region, I understood how this conflict had transformed the country. When Soviet troops invaded in December 1979, Afghan resistance fighters, known as the mujahideen, fought back with weapons, determination, and assistance from foreign governments. The United States provided weapons and funding through Pakistan's intelligence services, hoping to weaken Soviet influence. But something else was happening behind the battle lines. Thousands of foreign Muslim volunteers had traveled to the region, convinced that fighting the Soviets was a religious obligation. Among them was a wealthy Saudi Arabian named Osama bin Laden. Few Americans understood how important his growing network would eventually become.

Osama bin Laden and the Foreign Fighters

Bin Laden came from a wealthy Saudi construction family and used his money and connections to support foreign volunteers traveling to Afghanistan. Working with a Palestinian religious scholar named Abdullah Azzam, he helped establish Maktab al-Khidamat, or the Services Bureau, which recruited volunteers and arranged funding, transportation, and accommodations. These foreign fighters were often called Afghan Arabs, although many came from countries far beyond the Arabian Peninsula. Most Afghan resistance fighters were defending their own homeland, while bin Laden increasingly imagined an international movement. One important distinction must be understood: although America supported Afghan resistance organizations, there is no reliable evidence that the CIA directly financed or trained bin Laden's emerging organization. His network developed largely through its own donors and connections.

1988 — The Secret Birth of al-Qaeda

In April 1988, Soviet leaders announced plans to withdraw their forces from Afghanistan. For bin Laden, this presented an opportunity rather than an ending. He and his associates believed the networks developed during the war could be used for future conflicts. By August 1988, bin Laden was leading a new organization called al-Qaeda, an Arabic name meaning "the base" or "the foundation." Unlike a conventional army, al-Qaeda was designed to maintain connections across national boundaries. It developed committees responsible for military affairs, finances, intelligence, and propaganda, with a leadership council directing its activities. What began as a relatively small organization would eventually become a dangerous international terrorist network. At the time, however, its future reach was far from obvious.

1989 — Soviet Withdrawal and a Struggle for Leadership

On February 15, 1989, the last Soviet combat troops left Afghanistan. For Afghan resistance fighters, it was a historic achievement, although the Soviet-backed government remained in power. For bin Laden, the experience reinforced his belief that determined militants could defeat a superpower. Yet disagreements were growing among the movement's leaders. Abdullah Azzam favored concentrating on Afghanistan and other particular struggles, while bin Laden wanted a broader organization capable of fighting internationally. On November 24, 1989, Azzam and two of his sons were killed by a car bomb in Pakistan. The murder remains unresolved, and accusations about responsibility have never been conclusively established. With Azzam gone, bin Laden's control over his network grew stronger.

1990–1991 — From Regional Conflict to International Extremism

By 1990, bin Laden had returned to Saudi Arabia, but the organization he helped establish remained connected to militants across several countries. Veterans of the Afghan conflict carried military experience, personal relationships, and extremist ideas into other regional struggles. Some became involved in conflicts in Kashmir, the Philippines, and Central Asia. Meanwhile, figures associated with Egyptian extremist organizations, including Ayman al-Zawahiri, contributed to the ideological environment surrounding bin Laden. Their radical interpretations of Islam increasingly portrayed political opponents and foreign governments as enemies. These ideas were rejected by the overwhelming majority of Muslims, but within al-Qaeda's emerging leadership, they helped justify violence beyond conventional battlefields.

The Warning Signs of a New Kind of Terrorism

Looking back as an intelligence officer, I see an important lesson in those early years. The Soviet-Afghan War had brought together people who would otherwise never have met. Some returned home peacefully, but others maintained relationships that could support violent extremist movements. By 1991, al-Qaeda was still developing, and attacking the American homeland was not yet its defining mission. Nevertheless, bin Laden had established something dangerous: an organization that could move money, recruit followers, and coordinate activities across borders. The Cold War was ending, and Americans were celebrating the apparent triumph of democracy over communism. Yet in the mountains of Afghanistan and the cities of Pakistan, the foundations of another international threat had already been laid. The next great security challenge would not necessarily come from a rival superpower, but from a network operating across the world without one.

American Military Presence in Saudi Arabia and Bin Laden - Told by Gary Schroen

On August 2, 1990, Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein made a decision that would transform the Middle East. His military invaded neighboring Kuwait, overwhelming its defenses and threatening the security of the entire Persian Gulf. As a CIA officer familiar with the region, I understood the danger. Iraq possessed one of the largest armies in the Middle East, and its forces were now positioned dangerously close to Saudi Arabia. Saudi leaders feared that Saddam might continue southward, threatening their cities, oil fields, and national independence. The United States also had serious concerns about Iraq dominating the region. What followed was an extraordinary military partnership that would help liberate Kuwait but also provide Osama bin Laden with a grievance he would exploit for years.

Saudi Arabia Asks America for Military Protection

One fact must be understood clearly: the United States did not invade Saudi Arabia or force its military presence upon the kingdom. Saudi Arabia's own government requested and authorized American military assistance against the Iraqi threat. After discussions with American defense officials, King Fahd approved the deployment on August 6, 1990. President George H. W. Bush responded by sending American troops, aircraft, and defensive equipment to protect the kingdom. The mission, called Operation Desert Shield, began bringing American forces into Saudi Arabia on August 8. Saudi Arabia was a sovereign nation making its own security decisions, and its leaders chose American protection because they feared Saddam Hussein's aggression. The operation ultimately brought hundreds of thousands of American personnel into the region alongside forces from other nations.

Bin Laden Offers His Own Army Instead

Osama bin Laden saw the crisis differently. Having gained recognition for supporting Muslim volunteers during the war against Soviet forces in Afghanistan, he believed his network of experienced fighters could defend Saudi Arabia. He offered to mobilize mujahideen to confront Iraqi forces, but Saudi leaders rejected his proposal. Saddam possessed tanks, aircraft, artillery, and a modern military establishment. Bin Laden's irregular fighters were no substitute for the conventional military capabilities of the American-led coalition. King Fahd chose professional military assistance rather than placing his country's security in the hands of an extremist organizer. Bin Laden considered the rejection humiliating, and his resentment toward the Saudi monarchy intensified.

Operation Desert Storm and the Liberation of Kuwait

On January 17, 1991, the American-led coalition launched Operation Desert Storm after Iraq refused international demands to withdraw from Kuwait. American aircraft and those of coalition partners attacked Iraqi military positions, supply routes, and command facilities. A massive ground offensive began on February 24, and within approximately 100 hours, coalition forces had decisively defeated Iraqi troops occupying Kuwait. By February 28, Kuwait had been liberated. Saudi Arabia had successfully defended its territory with the assistance it had requested. Yet bin Laden did not celebrate the victory as Saudi officials had hoped. Instead, he increasingly condemned the presence of American troops in the kingdom, even though those forces had entered with the Saudi government's permission to protect the country.

Turning a Military Alliance Into a Religious Grievance

Saudi Arabia held special religious importance because it contained Mecca and Medina, Islam's two holiest cities. Bin Laden used this fact to argue that non-Muslim American forces should never have been stationed in the kingdom. He portrayed their presence as a foreign occupation, despite the invitation from Saudi Arabia's recognized government. His argument deliberately ignored the distinction between an invading army and military forces operating with a host nation's consent. He also condemned the continued American military presence after the Gulf War, which was connected to regional security arrangements and concerns about Iraq. His extremist religious interpretations did not represent the views of Muslims generally, and many Saudi religious authorities supported the government's decision to seek assistance. Nevertheless, bin Laden used this issue to recruit followers and build opposition to both the United States and the Saudi monarchy.

1991–1992 — A Dangerous New Direction

By 1991, bin Laden's criticism of the Saudi government had made him increasingly troublesome to the monarchy. Saudi authorities restricted his activities and confiscated his passport, but he managed to leave the kingdom in April 1991. He subsequently relocated to Sudan, where Hassan al-Turabi's Islamist political movement offered opportunities for business activities and the expansion of his militant network. By 1992, bin Laden was establishing commercial enterprises, cultivating international relationships, and strengthening al-Qaeda's organizational capabilities. His anger toward the United States was becoming part of a broader extremist ideology that would eventually justify attacks against American military personnel and civilians. The transformation was gradual, but its consequences would be enormous.

Sudan: Building an International Terrorist Network - Told by Gary Schroen

In 1991, Osama bin Laden arrived in Sudan, a country in northeastern Africa that was becoming a gathering place for radical Islamist movements. As a CIA officer familiar with the Middle East and South Asia, I understood that bin Laden's relocation was more than a change of address. Sudan's government, led by President Omar al-Bashir and influenced by Islamist leader Hassan al-Turabi, offered him an opportunity to expand his organization. Bin Laden had left Saudi Arabia after increasingly criticizing the monarchy and its decision to invite American forces to defend the kingdom during the Gulf War. In Sudan, he found something valuable: political connections, opportunities to establish businesses, and a relatively permissive environment for organizing extremist activities. What had begun as a network supporting foreign fighters in Afghanistan was becoming something far more dangerous.

Building Businesses with a Hidden Purpose

Bin Laden presented himself as a businessman and investor eager to help develop Sudan's economy. He established agricultural enterprises, construction companies, and commercial operations. One of his companies helped construct a highway connecting Khartoum with Port Sudan on the Red Sea. These projects created employment and strengthened his relationships with influential Sudanese officials. But beneath these legitimate commercial activities, al-Qaeda operatives used business positions to arrange international travel, purchase equipment, and support militant operations. Contrary to early assumptions that bin Laden possessed an enormous personal fortune, investigators later determined that al-Qaeda depended heavily on outside donations and financial facilitators. His businesses provided connections and logistical support, but many were not particularly profitable. Sudan was becoming an important headquarters for an organization that operated far beyond its borders.

Training Camps and an International Network

Throughout the early 1990s, bin Laden's organization expanded its relationships with extremist groups from Egypt, Yemen, North Africa, and other regions. Al-Qaeda established training facilities and supply networks in Sudan while maintaining connections with militants in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Recruits learned military skills, while trusted operatives helped arrange transportation, communications, and funding. Bin Laden also worked to build alliances among organizations that did not always share the same political goals or religious interpretations. Hassan al-Turabi encouraged cooperation among radical movements, and Sudan hosted conferences attended by representatives of organizations from several countries. Not every participant became an al-Qaeda ally, but the meetings demonstrated how extremist networks could cross national boundaries. From an intelligence perspective, this was troubling. An organization no longer needed to control a country to threaten people thousands of miles away.

1992–1993 — Terrorism Spreads Beyond Afghanistan

The growing danger became apparent in December 1992, when bombs exploded at two hotels in Aden, Yemen, that had been used by American military personnel traveling toward Somalia. Two people were killed, although no Americans died. Investigators later connected the perpetrators to militants associated with bin Laden's network. During 1993, al-Qaeda also provided assistance and training to Somali militants fighting international forces, although the precise effect of that assistance on particular battles remains uncertain. Meanwhile, American intelligence agencies were beginning to recognize that bin Laden was more than a wealthy supporter of extremism. His organization was helping other violent groups obtain resources, establish connections, and prepare attacks. In August 1993, the United States officially designated Sudan a state sponsor of terrorism, reflecting growing concerns about the country's support for international terrorist organizations.

1994–1995 — Bin Laden Becomes an International Outcast

By 1994, bin Laden's activities had seriously damaged his relationship with Saudi Arabia. The Saudi government revoked his citizenship and froze his assets, leaving him increasingly dependent on his organization and international supporters. Meanwhile, pressure against Sudan was growing. Egypt accused extremists sheltered in Sudan of threatening its government, while the United States and other nations demanded action against terrorist organizations operating there. In June 1995, militants attempted to assassinate Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak during a visit to Ethiopia. The failed assassination became a turning point because individuals involved had received assistance or sanctuary connected to Sudan. International pressure intensified, and Sudanese leaders began reconsidering whether protecting bin Laden was worth the diplomatic and economic consequences.

1996 — Forced Out of Sudan

By early 1996, Sudan faced increasing international isolation. Its government began exploring ways to improve relations with foreign powers, including discussions about removing bin Laden. Sudanese officials approached Saudi Arabia about accepting him, but the kingdom refused to take back the man whose citizenship it had revoked. The situation created a difficult problem for international authorities: forcing a terrorist leader out of one country did not necessarily eliminate his organization. On May 19, 1996, bin Laden departed Sudan aboard an aircraft bound for Jalalabad, Afghanistan. He left behind businesses and property, much of which the Sudanese government took over, but he retained experienced associates, extremist connections, and ambitions for international violence. He was financially weakened, yet his organization survived.

My Name is Ahmad Shah Massoud: The Lion of Panjshir

I was born on September 2, 1953, in Bazarak, in Afghanistan's Panjshir Valley. My father was an officer in the Afghan army, and I grew up learning the importance of discipline, honor, and service to my country. As a young man, I studied engineering at Kabul Polytechnic Institute, but Afghanistan was changing. Political movements competed for power, and I became convinced that my country was heading toward a dangerous future. I did not dream of becoming a famous commander. I wanted Afghanistan to be strong, independent, and governed by its own people.

My First Fight Against Oppression

During the 1970s, Afghanistan experienced political unrest as competing factions struggled for control. I joined an Islamist opposition movement against President Mohammed Daoud Khan's government and participated in an unsuccessful uprising in Panjshir in 1975. After a communist coup in 1978, Afghanistan entered a period of brutal repression and rebellion. Then, in December 1979, the Soviet Union invaded. I watched foreign soldiers enter my homeland to preserve a government many Afghans opposed. I gathered men who knew the valleys, mountains, and mountain passes. We were poorly equipped compared with the Soviet army, but we knew our land, and we were determined to defend it.

Becoming the Lion of Panjshir

The Soviets attacked my valley repeatedly throughout the 1980s. They brought helicopters, tanks, aircraft, and thousands of soldiers. We could not defeat such an army in open battle, so I relied on mobility, intelligence, carefully planned ambushes, and support from local communities. My fighters struck supply routes and withdrew into the mountains before Soviet forces could surround them. I also understood that fighting alone was not enough. We needed schools, medical care, food, and local administration. My enemies called me a dangerous guerrilla commander. My supporters gave me another name: the Lion of Panjshir. When Soviet forces finally withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989, I believed our nation had earned the opportunity for peace.

Victory Without Peace

The Soviet withdrawal did not end Afghanistan's suffering. The communist government remained in power until 1992, when resistance forces entered Kabul. I became defense minister in the new government, but rival Afghan factions soon fought one another for control of the capital. Kabul was devastated, and civilians suffered terribly. Forces aligned with my government, as well as rival factions, were implicated in serious abuses during the civil war. I had spent years fighting foreign occupation, only to witness Afghans destroying their own cities. The victory we had hoped would bring freedom instead led to another struggle for power.

The Taliban and a New Enemy

In 1994, a movement calling itself the Taliban began conquering Afghanistan. Its leaders promised order but imposed harsh restrictions, especially upon women and girls. By 1996, the Taliban controlled Kabul, and I withdrew my forces to northern Afghanistan. I helped lead the United Front, known internationally as the Northern Alliance, to resist their rule. Even more troubling was the arrival of Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda organization. These foreign militants used Afghanistan as a sanctuary to train fighters and organize terrorist attacks. I believed Afghanistan should never become a launching ground for violence against the world.

My Warning to the World

By 2001, my resistance controlled only a small portion of Afghanistan, yet we continued fighting. In April, I traveled to Europe and addressed members of the European Parliament, seeking humanitarian assistance and international support against the Taliban. I warned that al-Qaeda's activities threatened not only Afghanistan but other nations as well. I wanted the world to understand that our struggle was about more than territory. Afghanistan needed a government where different ethnic communities could participate and where children, including girls, could receive an education. I feared that ignoring the danger growing within Afghanistan would bring terrible consequences.

Afghanistan's Civil War and the Rise of the Taliban - Told by Ahmad Shah Massoud

In April 1992, Afghanistan stood at a historic crossroads. After years of fighting Soviet occupation and the communist government it supported, the resistance forces known as the mujahideen finally saw the government of President Mohammad Najibullah collapse. I had spent much of my life fighting for Afghanistan's independence, and I hoped our people could finally rebuild their country. Instead, the victory exposed bitter divisions among the resistance commanders. Different factions competed for power, each claiming to represent Afghanistan's future. Burhanuddin Rabbani became president, and I served as defense minister, but our government struggled to establish authority. Former allies became enemies, and the capital city of Kabul was soon transformed into a battlefield. We had defeated a foreign superpower, yet we were unable to agree on how to govern ourselves.

1992–1994 — Kabul Becomes a Battlefield

The fighting that followed was devastating. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, a powerful Islamist commander who had received substantial assistance through Pakistan during the Soviet war, refused to accept the new political arrangements. His forces bombarded Kabul with rockets, while rival militias fought over neighborhoods and government buildings. Other commanders, including Abdul Rashid Dostum and Abdul Ali Mazari, controlled powerful armed factions. Thousands of civilians died, homes were destroyed, and families fled the city. My forces fought to defend the government, but the war also brought grave abuses by forces associated with our side, including attacks against civilians in western Kabul. I had once believed our greatest challenge was defeating the Soviet army. Now I confronted something equally dangerous: a country divided by ambition, mistrust, ethnic tensions, and competing visions of Islamic government.

The Growing Rejection of Western Influence

Religion played an important role in Afghanistan's political struggles. Many Islamist movements believed that Western societies promoted behaviors they considered immoral, including sexual permissiveness, immodest clothing, alcohol consumption, and cultural freedoms that conflicted with their interpretations of Islamic teachings. Some also rejected Western-style secular government and the expanding public roles of women. These beliefs were not shared equally by all Afghans or all Islamist organizations. Many of us believed Islam could guide our nation while still allowing education, political participation, and necessary reforms. Nevertheless, more extreme religious leaders claimed Afghanistan's suffering resulted from abandoning traditional values and accepting foreign cultural influences. Their message appealed to communities already exhausted by corruption, lawlessness, and war. Yet Western culture was not the principal cause of Afghanistan's civil war. Our immediate crisis came from armed factions struggling for power after the collapse of the communist government.

1994 — The Taliban Promise to Restore Morality and Order

In 1994, a new movement emerged around Kandahar in southern Afghanistan. Its members called themselves the Taliban, meaning students, because many had studied in Islamic religious schools in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Their leader, Mullah Mohammed Omar, presented his movement as a force against corruption, robbery, sexual violence, and the abuses committed by local warlords. The Taliban promised to disarm rival commanders, restore security, and establish a government based on their strict interpretation of Islamic law. They condemned Western cultural influences, including certain forms of entertainment, dress, and social behavior, as threats to religious morality. For Afghans who had suffered years of violence, the promise of safety was powerful. With significant assistance from Pakistan and growing military strength, the Taliban captured Kandahar in November 1994 and began advancing across the country.

1995–1996 — Religious Rule Becomes Increasingly Harsh

As the Taliban conquered additional territory, their promises of justice were accompanied by increasingly severe restrictions. They banned many forms of music and entertainment, imposed strict dress requirements, and used religious enforcement patrols to punish behavior they considered sinful. Women faced restrictions on employment and movement, while girls were prevented from attending schools in areas under Taliban control. Taliban leaders argued that these measures protected Islamic morality and prevented Western-style freedoms from corrupting Afghan society. However, many Afghan Muslims disagreed with their interpretation of religious law. I believed Afghanistan's traditions and Islamic faith deserved respect, but I also understood that a country could not prosper by denying its people education and opportunity. The Taliban's vision was not simply a rejection of Western influence; it was an effort to impose one rigid interpretation of religion upon a diverse nation.

September 1996 — The Fall of Kabul

By September 1996, Taliban forces were approaching Kabul. I understood that attempting to hold the capital against their advancing army could bring another devastating battle into a city already ruined by years of fighting. My forces withdrew northward, and on September 27, the Taliban entered Kabul. They quickly captured former President Najibullah, who had been sheltering in a United Nations compound, and killed him. His body was publicly displayed as a warning to their enemies. The Taliban announced the establishment of their Islamic Emirate, replacing Afghanistan's struggling government with a new authoritarian regime. Their victory did not end the war. Instead, it marked the beginning of another struggle over Afghanistan's future.

Bin Laden Returns to Afghanistan and Declares War on the U.S. - Told by Massoud

In May 1996, a man named Osama bin Laden returned to Afghanistan after spending nearly five years in Sudan. I knew his reputation as a wealthy Saudi who had supported foreign Muslim fighters during our war against the Soviet Union. But the man returning to our country was no longer simply a supporter of the Afghan resistance. He had become the leader of al-Qaeda, an extremist organization developing connections across the Middle East, Africa, and Asia. Sudan had pressured him to leave, and Saudi Arabia had already revoked his citizenship. Afghanistan, divided by civil war and weakened by years of destruction, offered him another opportunity. I feared that foreign extremists would exploit our country's suffering to pursue ambitions that had little to do with the freedom of the Afghan people.

Finding Sanctuary in a Divided Nation

Bin Laden arrived in Jalalabad, where he initially received protection from Yunus Khalis, an influential former mujahideen commander. At that moment, the Taliban controlled much of southern Afghanistan but had not yet conquered Kabul. Our government continued resisting their advance, while rival factions competed for territory. Bin Laden maintained relationships with several Afghan commanders, calculating which alliances would best protect his organization. Afghanistan's rugged mountains, remote valleys, and poorly controlled borders made it difficult for any government to monitor his activities. Years of warfare had also left behind weapons, experienced fighters, and abandoned military facilities. These conditions created opportunities for extremists to establish camps and reorganize their networks beyond the effective reach of international authorities.

August 1996 — Bin Laden Declares War on America

In August 1996, bin Laden issued a declaration calling for war against American military forces stationed in Saudi Arabia. He condemned the Saudi monarchy for permitting American troops to operate within the kingdom and portrayed their presence as an occupation of sacred Islamic lands. Yet Saudi Arabia's own government had invited American forces to help defend the country against Saddam Hussein's Iraq during the Gulf War. Bin Laden rejected that distinction. He also accused the United States of supporting governments and policies he believed threatened Islam. His declaration presented violence as a religious obligation, transforming political grievances into an extremist call to arms. This was not a declaration from Afghanistan's government, nor did it represent the beliefs of all Muslims. It was the message of a militant leader attempting to rally followers for an international confrontation.

Religion, Western Culture, and the Battle Over Morality

Bin Laden's hostility extended beyond American military policy. Like other radical Islamist leaders, he condemned aspects of Western culture that he considered immoral, including sexual permissiveness, secular government, and social freedoms he believed contradicted Islamic teachings. The Taliban expressed similar objections, arguing that strict religious controls were necessary to protect Afghan society from corruption and foreign influence. These ideas appealed to some people who feared losing their cultural and religious traditions. I was a Muslim myself, and I understood the importance of faith in Afghan life. But I did not believe that protecting our religion required supporting international terrorism or denying our people opportunities for education and political participation. Bin Laden's ideology increasingly turned disagreements about morality, religion, and foreign policy into justifications for violence. His approach threatened to draw Afghanistan into conflicts far beyond our borders.

September 1996 — The Taliban Conquer Kabul

While bin Laden was making threats against the United States, the Taliban were advancing toward Afghanistan's capital. In September 1996, they captured Jalalabad and continued their offensive toward Kabul. I commanded government forces defending the capital, but I recognized that attempting to hold the city against overwhelming pressure could bring another devastating battle upon its exhausted population. On September 26, I ordered our forces to withdraw northward. The following day, Taliban fighters entered Kabul and established their rule. With their victory, bin Laden's position in Afghanistan became increasingly secure. His relationship with the Taliban leadership strengthened, although disagreements remained over how freely he should operate. The Taliban wanted to consolidate control over Afghanistan; bin Laden wanted a sanctuary from which to pursue international objectives. Those ambitions would gradually bring the two movements closer together.

An Alliance That Threatened Afghanistan and the World

The relationship between al-Qaeda and the Taliban was dangerous because each organization possessed something the other needed. The Taliban controlled territory and could provide protection, while bin Laden brought money, experienced militants, and international connections. Their partnership was not yet the fully developed military alliance it would later become, but the foundations were being established. I understood that Afghanistan's independence was threatened not only by foreign armies but also by foreign organizations seeking to use our homeland for their own wars. As my forces reorganized in northern Afghanistan, I prepared to continue resisting Taliban rule. Meanwhile, bin Laden's followers were developing a network whose ambitions extended far beyond our mountains.

My Name is Samuel “Sandy” Berger: White House During the Rise of Terrorism

Though most people called me Sandy. I was born on October 28, 1945, in Millerton, New York. Growing up, I developed an interest in politics, international affairs, and how governments make decisions that affect millions of people. I studied government at Cornell University before attending Harvard Law School. In 1972, I worked on Senator George McGovern's presidential campaign, where I met a young politician named Bill Clinton. Neither of us knew that our friendship would eventually lead me into the White House, where I would help make some of America's most difficult national security decisions.

Learning How Washington Works

My career took me through law, politics, and international diplomacy. During President Jimmy Carter's administration, I served in the State Department's policy planning office, helping examine America's relationships with other nations. I learned that foreign policy rarely presents simple choices. Every decision carries consequences, and sometimes the available options are all imperfect. During the 1980s, I practiced international trade law while remaining involved in Democratic politics. When Bill Clinton ran for president in 1992, I became one of his principal foreign policy advisers. After his election, he appointed me deputy national security adviser, placing me at the center of American foreign policy.

Becoming America's National Security Adviser

In March 1997, I became President Clinton's national security adviser. My responsibility was to coordinate information from the CIA, Pentagon, State Department, and other agencies so the president could make informed decisions. The Cold War had ended, but the world was far from peaceful. We confronted conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo, nuclear tensions involving India and Pakistan, threats from Iraq, and the expanding danger of international terrorism. My job was not to command armies or conduct intelligence operations personally. It was to ensure that the president understood the risks, heard competing advice, and could act in America's national interest.

Osama bin Laden and the Growing Terrorist Threat

One of the most troubling challenges we faced was Osama bin Laden and his organization, al-Qaeda. Bin Laden had established a terrorist network that recruited extremists, operated training camps, and planned attacks against Americans. By 1996, he had returned to Afghanistan, where the Taliban increasingly provided him protection. Our intelligence agencies worked to understand his organization and identify opportunities to capture him. I participated in discussions involving intelligence operations, cooperation with foreign governments, and the dangers of using military force. We knew bin Laden was dangerous. What remained uncertain was when, where, and how his organization would strike next.

The Embassy Bombings and America's Response

On August 7, 1998, coordinated terrorist bombings devastated the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, killing 224 people and injuring thousands more. The attacks demonstrated that al-Qaeda could organize deadly operations across continents. President Clinton demanded options for responding, and I helped coordinate the national security discussions. On August 20, American cruise missiles struck suspected terrorist facilities in Afghanistan and the Al-Shifa pharmaceutical factory in Sudan, which our administration believed was connected to chemical weapons production. The Sudan strike became deeply controversial as the intelligence supporting that conclusion was challenged. Bin Laden survived, and the threat continued.

The Final Warnings of the Clinton Presidency

During 1999 and 2000, we intensified efforts to disrupt al-Qaeda. American authorities stopped Ahmed Ressam, who was planning to bomb Los Angeles International Airport around the millennium celebrations. Then, on October 12, 2000, terrorists attacked the USS Cole in Yemen, killing 17 American sailors. Investigators increasingly connected the operation to al-Qaeda. We discussed further military and intelligence responses, but identifying reliable targets remained difficult. When our administration ended in January 2001, the danger had not disappeared. I understood that counterterrorism would remain one of the most urgent responsibilities facing America's next president.

Controversy After Leaving the White House

After the September 11, 2001, attacks, investigators examined how both the Clinton and Bush administrations had handled warnings about al-Qaeda. In 2003, while reviewing classified terrorism records at the National Archives, I improperly removed five copies of classified documents and later destroyed three. In 2005, I pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor involving the unauthorized removal and retention of classified material. I received probation, a fine, and community service, and surrendered my security clearance. It was a serious violation of the responsibilities I had once been entrusted to uphold. I continued working in international consulting and foreign policy, including alongside my former colleague Madeleine Albright.

American Intelligence Discovers the Growing al-Qaeda - Told by Sandy Berger

In 1996, American intelligence officials were beginning to recognize a dangerous transformation in international terrorism. As deputy national security adviser to President Bill Clinton, I helped coordinate information concerning threats to the United States. For decades, our intelligence agencies had focused heavily on the Soviet Union, hostile governments, and conventional military threats. Now we faced something different. Osama bin Laden, a wealthy Saudi extremist who had supported fighters during the Soviet-Afghan War, was building an organization capable of operating across international borders. His network, known as al-Qaeda, maintained relationships with militants in several countries. We understood that bin Laden was financing extremist activities, but intelligence officers were discovering that his organization was far more than a source of money. It was becoming an international terrorist network with its own leadership, military planners, and ambitions to attack American interests.

1996 — The CIA Establishes a Special Bin Laden Unit

Early in 1996, the CIA created a specialized intelligence unit dedicated to investigating Osama bin Laden and his associates. Informally known as Alec Station, it operated from CIA headquarters in Virginia rather than from a traditional overseas station. Its officers gathered intelligence from foreign governments, informants, intercepted communications, and existing terrorism investigations. Their mission was to understand bin Laden's organization, identify its financial supporters, and develop opportunities to disrupt its operations. This represented an important change in American intelligence priorities. Rather than investigating terrorist incidents individually, the CIA was beginning to examine the organization connecting them. The challenge was enormous. Al-Qaeda operated across national boundaries, used trusted personal relationships, and relied on supporters who could travel internationally without immediately attracting attention.

A Former Terrorist Reveals al-Qaeda's Secrets

One of the most important intelligence breakthroughs occurred later in 1996, when Jamal Ahmed al-Fadl, a former associate of bin Laden, provided information to American authorities. Al-Fadl had worked within al-Qaeda and possessed firsthand knowledge of its structure and activities. He described the organization's leadership, financial arrangements, training programs, and international connections. His information helped investigators understand that bin Laden was directing an organized terrorist movement rather than merely donating money to unrelated extremist groups. Additional intelligence sources supported important portions of his account. Officers began connecting individuals and operations that previously appeared separate. For intelligence professionals, this was a remarkable development. The scattered pieces of a much larger picture were finally coming together.

Discovering Connections to Earlier Attacks

As investigators examined the new information, they discovered connections between bin Laden's network and earlier violence against Americans. Intelligence indicated al-Qaeda involvement in a December 1992 bombing attempt against American military personnel in Yemen. Investigators also uncovered evidence that al-Qaeda operatives had provided assistance and training to militants in Somalia during the period surrounding the deadly October 1993 fighting in Mogadishu, although the organization's precise role remained disputed. Other leads pointed toward extremist networks involved in terrorist plotting in Southeast Asia. These discoveries suggested that al-Qaeda's international reach was greater than previously recognized. The organization had been developing relationships, supporting violent groups, and pursuing attacks while much of the world remained focused on the political changes following the Cold War.

1997 — From Intelligence Reports to Presidential Decisions

In March 1997, I became President Clinton's national security adviser, placing me at the center of discussions involving intelligence, diplomacy, and military planning. George Tenet, who became director of the CIA that July, and other intelligence officials faced the difficult task of transforming information about bin Laden into practical counterterrorism operations. We could identify the growing danger, but finding bin Laden's precise location and developing reliable means of apprehending him were much more difficult. Afghanistan's ongoing civil war complicated intelligence gathering, while the Taliban's expanding control created additional obstacles. American officials also considered ways to disrupt terrorist financing and strengthen cooperation with foreign governments. Every option required careful judgment. Intelligence might tell us who posed a threat, but stopping that person demanded trustworthy sources, international cooperation, and a realistic plan.

The Challenge of Fighting an Invisible Network

By the end of 1997, CIA officers understood that al-Qaeda possessed an organized military structure and was planning operations against American interests internationally. Yet the American government's broader assessment of the terrorist threat had not fully caught up with these discoveries. Some official reports continued describing bin Laden primarily as a financier rather than the operational leader of a dangerous organization. Our intelligence agencies also faced competing priorities, limited resources, and difficulties sharing information. Unlike a conventional enemy, al-Qaeda had no easily identifiable capital city, national army, or fixed front line. Its members could move between countries, conceal their activities among ordinary commercial operations, and exploit unstable regions where governments exercised little authority. This required a different approach to national security, one that combined intelligence, law enforcement, diplomacy, and carefully considered military options.

My Name is Madeleine Albright: America's First Female Secretary of State

I was born on May 15, 1937, in Prague, Czechoslovakia. My father was a diplomat, and my childhood taught me something that would shape my entire life: freedom is precious, and it can disappear with frightening speed. When Nazi Germany occupied my homeland, my family fled to Britain. After World War II, we returned to Czechoslovakia, only to see communists seize power in 1948. We escaped again, this time immigrating to the United States. I grew up knowing that dictatorships were not simply subjects in history books. They were forces that could destroy families, silence communities, and drive people from their homes.

Finding My Voice in America

My family settled in Denver, Colorado, where I embraced my new country and the opportunities it offered. I attended Wellesley College, graduating in 1959, and later earned a doctorate from Columbia University. I married Joseph Albright, raised three daughters, and gradually built a career in politics and international affairs. During President Jimmy Carter's administration, I worked on the National Security Council under Zbigniew Brzezinski. I later taught international relations at Georgetown University. I believed America possessed extraordinary power, but power alone was not enough. It needed purpose, judgment, and the willingness to defend democratic principles when they were threatened.

Representing America at the United Nations

In 1993, President Bill Clinton appointed me United States ambassador to the United Nations. The Cold War had ended, yet the world remained deeply troubled. Civil wars, ethnic violence, humanitarian disasters, and dictatorships demanded international attention. I confronted difficult questions involving Bosnia, Rwanda, Haiti, and Iraq. Diplomacy required more than polite conversation. It meant negotiating with allies, challenging hostile governments, and sometimes confronting the failure of the international community to prevent terrible suffering. I became known for speaking directly and refusing to retreat from difficult arguments. I believed American leadership was necessary, especially when innocent people were threatened.

Breaking a Barrier as Secretary of State

On January 23, 1997, I became the first woman in American history to serve as secretary of state. It was an extraordinary honor, but I had little time to celebrate. My responsibilities involved overseeing American diplomacy, meeting foreign leaders, and helping President Clinton address crises throughout the world. We worked to strengthen NATO, pursue peace in the Middle East, and confront threats from hostile governments. I believed that diplomacy and military strength should reinforce one another. Negotiations were essential, but agreements meant little if governments refused to honor them. America's greatest strength came from combining determination with international cooperation.

The Rise of Osama bin Laden and International Terrorism

During my years as secretary of state, a new danger was emerging. Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda organization were building a network of extremists dedicated to attacking Americans and spreading violence internationally. Afghanistan, under Taliban control, provided sanctuary for terrorist training camps and leadership. I understood that terrorism could not be defeated by one country acting alone. We needed cooperation from foreign governments, intelligence agencies, law enforcement, and international organizations. We worked to restrict terrorist financing, increase security, and pressure governments that sheltered extremists. Terrorism was becoming a global threat, and diplomacy had become an essential part of fighting it.

The Embassy Bombings and America's Response

On August 7, 1998, terrorists bombed the American embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, killing 224 people and injuring thousands. Most of those killed were Africans, including people who had simply been working or passing nearby. I was outraged. These were attacks not only against American diplomatic missions but against innocent human beings. President Clinton ordered cruise missile strikes against suspected terrorist facilities in Afghanistan and Sudan. I publicly defended America's right to respond in self-defense. Yet the attacks raised difficult questions about intelligence, military effectiveness, and how to confront terrorist organizations operating across national borders.

Diplomacy Against a Growing Threat

By 1999, we were increasing international pressure on the Taliban to surrender bin Laden. Through the United Nations, we supported sanctions intended to isolate the Taliban leadership and disrupt terrorist operations. I also worked to strengthen international agreements, improve embassy security, and encourage governments to cooperate against terrorism. In October 2000, terrorists attacked the USS Cole in Yemen, killing 17 American sailors. The danger was undeniable. When I left office in January 2001, al-Qaeda remained a serious threat. I believed America needed sustained international cooperation because terrorism was not a problem that could be solved with a single military operation.

A Lifetime of Diplomacy and Leadership

After leaving government, I continued teaching, writing, speaking, and advising leaders about international affairs. I wrote several books, including Madam Secretary and Fascism: A Warning, because I wanted future generations to understand the dangers of authoritarianism and the importance of democratic institutions. In 2012, President Barack Obama awarded me the Presidential Medal of Freedom. I remained convinced that America could lead most effectively when it combined strength with alliances and respected the responsibilities that came with its influence. I died on March 23, 2022, at the age of 84, after a lifetime devoted to public service.

Al-Qaeda's Declaration of Global Terrorism - Told by Madeleine Albright

On February 23, 1998, a declaration appeared in the Arabic-language newspaper Al-Quds al-Arabi, published in London. As President Bill Clinton's secretary of state, I understood that words issued by extremist leaders could have consequences far beyond the countries where they were written. The declaration came from Osama bin Laden and several militant allies operating under the name World Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders. It called for the killing of American civilians and military personnel wherever possible. This was no ordinary political statement. It was an attempt to transform regional grievances into a worldwide campaign of terrorism. From their sanctuary in Afghanistan, bin Laden and his associates were openly encouraging violence against Americans across the globe.

The Men Behind the Declaration

The declaration carried five signatures, including those of Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, an Egyptian physician who led Egyptian Islamic Jihad. Al-Zawahiri had spent years opposing Egypt's government and advocating violent revolution. Other signatories represented militant movements associated with Egypt, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. These men differed in background and political experience, but they shared a belief that violence could achieve their religious and political objectives. Their statement represented an effort to unite extremist organizations around a common enemy: the United States and its allies. Bin Laden was attempting something particularly dangerous. Instead of concentrating on overthrowing individual Middle Eastern governments, he wanted militants from different countries to cooperate in attacking American interests internationally.

Why Bin Laden Declared America His Enemy

Bin Laden presented several grievances to justify his declaration. He condemned the continued presence of American military forces in Saudi Arabia, home to Islam's holiest cities, Mecca and Medina. Yet he deliberately portrayed this presence as an occupation, overlooking that Saudi Arabia's government had invited American forces to help defend the kingdom against Iraq during the Gulf War. He also attacked American support for Israel and criticized sanctions imposed on Iraq following Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait. These were genuine subjects of political disagreement across the Middle East, but bin Laden took them in a radically different direction. He claimed they justified murdering Americans who had no responsibility for government decisions. From my perspective as a diplomat, disagreement between nations could never excuse deliberately attacking innocent civilians.

Religion, Western Freedoms, and the Extremist View of Morality

Bin Laden and his allies also believed Western influence threatened the religious and moral foundations of Muslim societies. They condemned secular government, sexual permissiveness, alcohol consumption, and social freedoms they regarded as violations of Islamic teachings. They portrayed American cultural and political influence as a force encouraging Muslim communities to abandon traditional values. Some extremist leaders particularly opposed Western ideas concerning women's independence, religious pluralism, and the separation of religion from government. Their ambition was not simply to remove foreign troops; it was to replace existing political systems with governments enforcing their strict interpretations of Islamic law. However, these views did not represent Islam as a whole. Millions of Muslims practiced their faith while rejecting terrorism, and many Muslim scholars disputed the religious arguments extremists employed to justify violence.

Turning Religious Language Into a Call for Murder

The February declaration claimed religious authority by presenting itself as a fatwa, a term ordinarily associated with a legal opinion issued by a qualified Islamic scholar. Bin Laden and his fellow signatories, however, did not possess the widely recognized scholarly authority necessary to speak for the world's Muslims. Their statement went beyond calling for resistance against military forces. It encouraged attacks against Americans without distinguishing between soldiers and civilians. This was the central danger. Al-Qaeda was attempting to erase the moral and legal distinction between combatants and innocent people. By portraying civilians as legitimate targets, its leaders sought to make terrorism appear acceptable to their followers. International humanitarian principles reject the deliberate targeting of civilians, regardless of the political or religious arguments used to defend such attacks.

A New Challenge for American Diplomacy

As secretary of state, I believed international terrorism required more than military strength. We needed cooperation among governments, stronger intelligence-sharing, financial restrictions, and diplomatic pressure against states sheltering terrorist organizations. Afghanistan had become especially troubling because the Taliban controlled much of the country and allowed bin Laden to remain there. Meanwhile, intelligence agencies were investigating his expanding network of operatives and supporters. Al-Qaeda did not operate like a traditional enemy government with an identifiable army and capital. Its members could organize across borders, exploit weak governments, and strike targets far from their training camps. The February declaration made the organization's ambitions unmistakable, even though American officials still faced enormous difficulties determining precisely when and where attacks might occur.

The Warning Before the Storm

Looking back, February 1998 represented a major turning point in the history of international terrorism. Bin Laden had already expressed hostility toward the United States, but this declaration publicly broadened his message into a call for violence against Americans around the world. The danger was not that millions of Muslims suddenly accepted his ideology; the overwhelming majority did not. The danger was that a relatively small organization of committed extremists possessed the connections, resources, and determination to translate those words into deadly action. As a diplomat who had witnessed the consequences of war, dictatorship, and political violence, I understood the importance of recognizing threats before they became catastrophes. Only months after the declaration appeared, devastating attacks against American embassies in East Africa would demonstrate that al-Qaeda's threats were far more than rhetoric.

American Embassy Bombings in Kenya and Tanzania - Told by Madeleine Albright

On the morning of August 7, 1998, two devastating explosions shattered the peace in East Africa. As President Bill Clinton's secretary of state, I was traveling in Rome when news reached me that American embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, had been attacked. At approximately 10:30 a.m. local time, a truck bomb exploded outside our embassy in Nairobi, devastating the building and surrounding streets. Minutes later, another explosion struck our embassy in Tanzania. Thousands of miles separated these diplomatic missions from Washington, yet the attacks had clearly been coordinated. American diplomats and African employees had arrived at work expecting an ordinary Friday. Instead, they found themselves confronting one of the deadliest terrorist attacks against American interests in history.

Nairobi: A City Devastated

The destruction in Nairobi was horrifying. The explosion severely damaged the American embassy and devastated nearby buildings, including a neighboring office building that collapsed. Streets filled with shattered glass, twisted metal, and people searching desperately for loved ones. Rescue workers, police officers, medical personnel, and ordinary Kenyan citizens rushed into the wreckage to save survivors. In Nairobi alone, 213 people were killed, including 12 Americans, and approximately 4,000 were injured. The overwhelming majority of victims were Kenyans, many of whom had no connection to the United States government. They were office workers, pedestrians, business owners, and people simply passing through the city. Terrorism had transformed an ordinary working morning into a national tragedy.

Dar es Salaam: A Second Coordinated Attack

Almost simultaneously, another truck bomb exploded near the American embassy in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. Eleven people were killed, and dozens more were injured. Although the destruction was less extensive than in Nairobi, the attack demonstrated the attackers' ability to coordinate violence across national borders. Both bombings targeted symbols of American diplomatic presence, but their victims were overwhelmingly African. Our embassies existed to maintain peaceful relationships, assist citizens, support economic cooperation, and encourage international understanding. The terrorists had attacked places dedicated to diplomacy rather than warfare. As secretary of state, I understood that this violence was intended to frighten American representatives and pressure our government into retreating from international responsibilities.

The Investigation Points Toward Osama bin Laden

Within hours, American and African investigators began examining evidence from the devastated embassy sites. The FBI dispatched personnel to assist Kenyan and Tanzanian authorities, while American intelligence agencies investigated possible connections to international extremist organizations. Suspicion increasingly centered on Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda. Only months earlier, bin Laden and his associates had publicly called for attacks against Americans around the world. Investigators eventually established that al-Qaeda operatives had organized the embassy bombings as part of their campaign against the United States. The attacks demonstrated that bin Laden's organization possessed experienced personnel, international connections, and the determination to murder large numbers of civilians. This was no longer simply an extremist movement issuing threats from Afghanistan. It was a terrorist network capable of carrying out coordinated mass-casualty attacks.

My Visit to the Devastated Embassies

On August 18, I traveled to Kenya and Tanzania to meet survivors, grieving families, diplomatic personnel, and government officials. Nothing could fully prepare me for the destruction. In Nairobi, I saw the devastating consequences of a bomb intended to destroy human lives and spread fear. I met people whose colleagues had been killed and whose families had been permanently changed. In Tanzania, I thanked American and Tanzanian embassy employees for their courage during the emergency. I promised that the United States would help rebuild diplomatic operations, provide emergency assistance, and support those who had suffered. Their bravery reminded me why diplomacy matters. The terrorists wanted to drive nations apart, but the courage and compassion displayed by ordinary people demonstrated the strength of international friendship.

America Prepares to Respond

President Clinton faced an urgent decision. Intelligence officials had gathered evidence connecting al-Qaeda to the attacks, and American leaders feared that additional terrorist operations might follow. The administration considered military action, law enforcement measures, diplomatic pressure, and increased security at American facilities worldwide. On August 20, nearly two weeks after the bombings, President Clinton ordered cruise missile strikes against suspected terrorist facilities in Afghanistan and a factory in Sudan that American intelligence believed was connected to chemical weapons production. The Sudanese target later became highly controversial because the evidence supporting that assessment was disputed. Bin Laden survived the strikes, and al-Qaeda remained operational. The bombings had demonstrated that conventional military retaliation alone could not easily defeat an international terrorist network.

U.S. Response: Operation Infinite Reach and Sanctions - Told by Sandy Berger

On August 7, 1998, terrorists linked to Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda organization bombed the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, killing 224 people and injuring thousands more. As President Bill Clinton's national security adviser, I understood that America could not ignore such an attack. Our intelligence agencies quickly worked to identify those responsible, while the president demanded options for preventing further violence. The evidence pointed toward al-Qaeda, whose leaders had openly encouraged attacks against Americans earlier that year. We faced a difficult question: how could the United States strike a terrorist organization operating from remote locations in Afghanistan without launching a much larger war? Every military option carried risks, but allowing bin Laden to continue organizing attacks without consequences was dangerous.

August 20, 1998 — Operation Infinite Reach Begins

Thirteen days after the embassy bombings, President Clinton authorized a military operation known as Operation Infinite Reach. On August 20, American warships in the Arabian Sea launched Tomahawk cruise missiles against suspected al-Qaeda training facilities near Khost, Afghanistan, and the Al-Shifa pharmaceutical factory in Khartoum, Sudan. Intelligence suggested that bin Laden's operatives used the Afghan camps for military training and terrorist planning. We hoped to disrupt the organization and potentially kill senior terrorist leaders, including bin Laden himself. The missiles struck their designated targets, but bin Laden survived. Intelligence assessments suggested that he might have departed the targeted area only hours before the attack. We had demonstrated America's ability to strike distant terrorist facilities, but we had not eliminated the organization's leadership.

The Controversy Over Sudan's Pharmaceutical Factory

The decision to strike the Al-Shifa factory became one of the most controversial actions of our administration. American intelligence officials believed the facility was associated with chemical weapons production and possibly connected to bin Laden's network. Their assessment relied partly on a soil sample reportedly containing a chemical associated with the production of VX nerve gas. Sudan's government insisted that the factory manufactured pharmaceuticals and had no connection to chemical weapons. Critics argued that the evidence was insufficient to justify destroying the facility. Although I defended our decision, independent evidence confirming the suspected chemical weapons activity never emerged. The controversy demonstrated a difficult reality of national security: governments sometimes must act on incomplete intelligence, but a mistaken assessment can carry serious consequences for innocent people.

1998–1999 — Hunting Bin Laden Through Intelligence

Following the missile strikes, President Clinton and I made bin Laden a continuing national security priority. Intelligence officials supplied frequent reports about his suspected movements, associates, and activities. The CIA worked with Afghan contacts, including individuals associated with Ahmad Shah Massoud's resistance forces, to explore opportunities for capturing him. Yet these operations presented enormous difficulties. Bin Laden traveled through mountainous territory, relied on loyal supporters, and benefited from protection within Taliban-controlled Afghanistan. Military commanders needed reliable information before recommending additional strikes, particularly when civilians might be nearby. Meanwhile, American officials sought cooperation from foreign governments to disrupt al-Qaeda's finances and international operations. We were fighting an organization that did not possess a conventional army, fixed borders, or a government headquarters that could simply be conquered.

July 1999 — America Imposes Sanctions Against the Taliban

By 1999, our administration had concluded that Taliban protection was essential to al-Qaeda's survival in Afghanistan. We repeatedly demanded that Taliban leaders surrender bin Laden to face justice, but they refused. On July 6, President Clinton signed Executive Order 13129, imposing financial and commercial sanctions against the Taliban. These measures were intended to restrict its economic relationships with the United States and increase pressure on its leadership. We carefully distinguished the Taliban government from ordinary Afghan citizens, exempting humanitarian assistance, food, and medical supplies from the restrictions. Our goal was not to punish Afghanistan's suffering population. It was to demonstrate that protecting internationally wanted terrorists carried diplomatic and economic consequences.

October–November 1999 — The United Nations Takes Action

American diplomacy eventually helped persuade the United Nations Security Council to take stronger action. On October 15, 1999, the council unanimously adopted Resolution 1267, demanding that the Taliban surrender Osama bin Laden to authorities capable of bringing him to justice. When the Taliban refused to comply, international sanctions took effect on November 14. The restrictions included freezing designated Taliban financial assets and limiting international flights operated by or on behalf of the Taliban, with exceptions for humanitarian needs. This was an important diplomatic achievement because the United States was no longer acting alone. Governments around the world were being asked to deny support to a regime providing sanctuary for international terrorism. Nevertheless, the Taliban continued protecting bin Laden, and al-Qaeda's operations remained largely intact.

The Millennium Terror Plots and the Bombing of the USS Cole - Told by Samuel “Sandy” Berger, Madeleine Albright, and Gary Schroen

Samuel “Sandy” Berger: As 1999 approached its final months, Americans were preparing for an extraordinary celebration. The world was about to enter the year 2000, and people were planning fireworks, concerts, and gatherings to welcome the new millennium. But inside the White House, we were confronting a very different reality. Intelligence reports suggested that Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda organization was preparing additional attacks against American interests. As President Clinton's national security adviser, I coordinated discussions involving the CIA, FBI, Pentagon, and State Department. We knew al-Qaeda had murdered hundreds of people in the 1998 embassy bombings. Now we feared its operatives intended to exploit the millennium celebrations to strike again. Our challenge was identifying which threats were credible before innocent people paid the price.

December 1999 — Terrorist Plots Uncovered in Jordan

Madeleine Albright: Sandy, those threats demanded international cooperation, and Jordan demonstrated why diplomacy was essential. In December 1999, Jordanian security officials disrupted a terrorist conspiracy involving planned attacks against hotels and tourist destinations associated with Americans and other Western visitors. Authorities arrested numerous suspects connected to an extremist network linked to al-Qaeda. Some intended targets were locations visited by Christian pilgrims during the millennium celebrations. Jordan's intelligence work helped prevent what might have become a devastating tragedy. As secretary of state, I understood that terrorism could not be defeated by American action alone. Foreign governments possessed knowledge, relationships, and intelligence capabilities that were indispensable. The arrests in Jordan showed that cooperation could save lives before a terrorist operation ever reached its intended target.

December 14, 1999 — A Suspicious Traveler at the Canadian Border

Gary Schroen: While Jordanian authorities were making arrests, another dangerous plot was unfolding much closer to American soil. On December 14, an Algerian extremist named Ahmed Ressam arrived by ferry from Canada at Port Angeles, Washington. An alert American customs inspector became suspicious of his behavior and ordered further examination of his vehicle. Inside the car, officers discovered explosive materials and components used in bomb-making. Ressam attempted to flee but was quickly captured. Investigators eventually established that he intended to bomb Los Angeles International Airport during the millennium period. He had received terrorist training in Afghanistan and maintained connections with extremist networks associated with al-Qaeda. That arrest illustrated something every intelligence officer understood: sometimes a catastrophe is prevented not by a massive military operation, but by one observant officer asking the right questions.

The Millennium Passes, but the Danger Remains

Samuel “Sandy” Berger: The approaching New Year's holiday became one of the most intense counterterrorism periods of our administration. President Clinton directed national security agencies to maintain heightened vigilance, and officials worked to investigate possible threats against airports, public celebrations, and American interests overseas. As midnight approached on December 31, 1999, security personnel remained alert while millions celebrated. Fortunately, the feared terrorist attacks did not occur. The conspiracies disrupted in Jordan and at the Canadian border demonstrated that intelligence and law enforcement cooperation could work. Yet we had little reason to celebrate a permanent victory. Al-Qaeda remained operational, bin Laden was still protected in Afghanistan, and the investigations suggested that extremist networks were continuing to develop new plans.

January 2000 — A Failed Attack in Yemen

Gary Schroen: Only three days into the new year, al-Qaeda operatives attempted another attack, although American authorities would learn its significance later. On January 3, terrorists in Aden, Yemen, prepared to attack the American destroyer USS The Sullivans using a small boat carrying explosives. Their plan failed when the overloaded boat sank before reaching its target. The attackers recovered their equipment and continued preparing for another opportunity. At the time, American intelligence did not know the full details of this unsuccessful operation. Looking back, it demonstrated al-Qaeda's persistence. Its leaders were not simply issuing threats against American military forces; they were developing operations intended to kill American service members. A failed attack could become a rehearsal for a successful one.

October 12, 2000 — The USS Cole Is Attacked

Madeleine Albright: On October 12, 2000, tragedy struck in the harbor of Aden, Yemen. The American guided-missile destroyer USS Cole had stopped to refuel during its journey toward the Persian Gulf. Two terrorists approached the warship in a small boat loaded with explosives. At approximately 11:18 a.m., they detonated their cargo alongside the destroyer, tearing an enormous hole in its hull. Seventeen American sailors were killed, and nearly 40 others were injured. Sailors rushed to save their wounded shipmates and prevent their damaged vessel from sinking. The courage displayed aboard that ship was extraordinary. For the families of the dead, however, there could be no consolation in knowing their loved ones had served honorably. Once again, violent extremists had attacked Americans far from home.

Investigating the Bombing and Searching for Answers

Gary Schroen: Following the attack, the FBI sent more than 100 agents and specialists to Yemen to investigate. They worked with Yemeni authorities, examined evidence, interviewed witnesses, and attempted to identify the people responsible. Intelligence officers explored connections between the bombing and al-Qaeda's operations in Afghanistan and the Arabian Peninsula. Eventually, investigators established that al-Qaeda had organized the attack, but during the final months of 2000, the full evidence was still being assembled. For those of us who had spent years studying bin Laden, the pattern was disturbing. Al-Qaeda had developed the ability to attack embassies, threaten airports, and strike American warships. Its operations crossed national boundaries, and its leadership remained difficult to reach inside Afghanistan.

The Clinton Administration's Final National Security Challenge

Samuel “Sandy” Berger: The bombing of the USS Cole left President Clinton's administration confronting difficult decisions during its final months. We examined possible responses, including military strikes, but intelligence officials could not provide the certainty we needed about suitable targets and responsibility for the attack. We continued pressing the Taliban to surrender bin Laden and supported stronger international sanctions against his organization. On December 19, 2000, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1333, expanding sanctions against the Taliban and demanding that it end its support for terrorism. Nevertheless, bin Laden remained beyond our reach. When President Clinton left office on January 20, 2001, we transferred responsibility for confronting al-Qaeda to the incoming administration. We had disrupted plots, pursued terrorists, and built international cooperation, but the central threat remained unresolved.

The Warning History Would Remember

Madeleine Albright: Looking back, the events of 1999 and 2000 demonstrated both the possibilities and limitations of international counterterrorism. Jordanian intelligence officers, American customs inspectors, diplomats, investigators, and military personnel had all contributed to protecting innocent lives. Yet the murder of 17 sailors aboard the USS Cole reminded us that preventing one attack did not guarantee another would not follow. Al-Qaeda's leaders exploited political grievances, extremist religious interpretations, and hostility toward American influence to justify murdering people. Their methods violated the very principles of human dignity that governments should protect. As we entered the twenty-first century, the United States faced an enemy that did not need a conventional army to cause enormous destruction. We had received warnings, witnessed attacks, and recognized the danger. What we did not yet know was how terribly that danger would reveal itself on September 11, 2001.